Exelon and Entergy Now Hiring...position...Sleeping Security Guard

Well, seems we have yet another example of SLEEPING GUARDS at the nations two largest nuclear giants, Entergy and Exelon. Not to worry though, the NRC swears we are safe from a terrorist attack, and even if there is one, these fine sleeping men are ready to DEFEND.

Sep 26, 2007 12:10 am US/Eastern

Nuclear Plant Guards Caught Sleeping On The Job

Walt Hunter
Reporting

(CBS 3) YORK COUNTY, Pa. Major security changes are underway at an area nuclear plant following the discovery of several guards sleeping on the job.

The guards were caught on tape sleeping on duty, secretly taped by a fellow officer.

The images are all the more disturbing because their job is protecting the Peach Bottom Nuclear Plant, which is one of America's largest.

"It's outrageous that they're not ready to go," Peter Stockton said.

Stockton is with a government watchdog group.

The area where the guards were taped sleeping on different shifts and days, is called "the ready room."

The sleeping guards are supposed to be poised to spring into action immediately if there is an emergency.

"Certainly every one of these officers should have been wide awake and ready to go," said a former Peach Bottom officer who asked not to be identified. "Some of these officers should have been patrolling the facility."

The owner of Peach Bottom, Exelon Nuclear, said the sleeping is in its words, "not acceptable" and they've now terminated their contract with Wackenhut Security to protect Peach Bottom.

Exelon does maintain that, because the sleeping guards are only part of a much wider security net, there was no risk to the public.

"The actions we have seen on the videotape and found in our internal inquiry did not directly impact the safety and security of the plant," a statement from Exelon read.

Wackenhut Security, the same company providing security at Peach Bottom, also protects three other Exelon facilities: Three Mile Island outside Harrisburg, the Limerick Nuclear Plant in Montgomery County, and Oyster Creek in New Jersey.

However, while Wackenhut is being removed from Peach Bottom, Exelon said the company will continue to protect the other three nuclear facilities, pending the outcome of a security review.

"You're only as strong as your weakest link, and you don't want your weakest link to be a security guard sleeping on the job," Eric Epstein of a nuclear watchdog group.

Epstein, chairman of a community nuclear watchdog group "Three Mile Island Alert" said the sleeping guards show nuclear plant owners should stop outsourcing security to private companies and instead rely on officers trained and managed by the Federal Government.

"Clearly we're concerned about what we saw," Nuclear Regulatory Commission Administrator Sam Collins said.

After viewing the tape, the NRC now has a special five member team conducting what it calls a "special security inspection" at Peach Bottom.

"What we saw is not aligned with our expectations or Exelon's expectations and we will pursue it on that basis," Collins said.

The NRC will issue a report 30 days after its inspection.

Meanwhile, Wackenhut calls it quote "an anomaly," and said "it was a small number of security personnel that were not performing as they should have."

EPRI, DOE, NEI, NRC and The Defense and Commericial Nuclear Industry Keeping Public in Dark?

For those of us who find ourselves living within the shadow of death that is the 50 mile circle around an aging, decaying nuclear reactor here in America, we have sadly come to know what it is like to be kept in the dark. We are asked to accept the risks associated with the NRC rubber stamping of 20 year license renewals without being told just what the real risks are that we will be faced with. Accidents caused from FAC (Flow Accelerated Corrosion), stainless steel fatigue, concrete degradation and weld failures are all serious concerns, with the true risks hidden behind the closed doors of the EPRI documents room.

Security is another issue, with the DBT hidden from public view, and any attempts to get honest answers met with a STONE WALL as Sam Collins and other members of the NRC refuse to answer our questions put forth at public meetings. Why can't we know the truth, be told why it was that the NRC commissioners removed from the weapons lists mortars, shoulder launched grenades and rockets (RPG's), and armor piercing munitions? Is it true that NEI pressured the NRC to remove these weapons because they would render 85 percent of the industry's security infrastructure obsolete?

Now, lets look at public health and safety should a nuclear event or terrorist attack at say, "Indian Point". Obviously, one of the things citizens want to know, want to understand is plume modeling. When we try to discuss this with NRC officials (Richard Barkley) we get vague answers, and promises of more information later...that then never arrives. This area is one of great concern to myself, so I did some research this evening, and in a word we want access to NARAC! Why is this valuable software that would allow local communities and citizens to evaluate their risk being SECRETED AWAY behind the walls of Lawrence Livermore Laboritories by the DOE? Could it be, that the truth of Plumes in the event of a significant nuclear incident see citizens demanding the closure of all NUCLEAR REACTORS? Below is some very SOMBERING information on NURAC, and the DOE's involvement in safeguarding public safety. Get involved, demand that this valuable software tool be made available to citizens in Nuclear Reactor host communities...we have a right to know what risks we are facing.

http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/318555.pdf

The NARAC suite of software tools include simple stand-alone, local-scale plume modeling tools for end-user’s computers, and Web- and Internet-based software to access advanced modeling tools and expert analyses from the national center at LLNL. Initial automated, 3-D predictions of plume exposure limits and protective action guidelines for emergency responders and managers are available from the center in 5-10 minutes. These can be followed immediately by quality-assured, refined analyses by 24 x 7 on-duty or on-call NARAC staff. NARAC continues to refine calculations using updated on-scene information, including measurements, until all airborne releases have stopped and the hazardous threats are mapped and impacts assessed

1 Introduction
The dispersion of radiological material in the atmosphere poses potential risks to human health. Releases may occur from accidents involving nuclear power plants, nuclear material processing and transportation, or nuclear weapons. The post-coldwar proliferation of nuclear material has increased the potential for threats from radiological dispersal devices and nuclear weapons. In order to prepare for airborne releases and mitigate the resulting impacts, tools are needed that can accurately and quickly predict the environmental contamination and health effects.

Read The DOE Directive:
http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/neword/153/o1531.pdf

Other Important Directives:

http://www.directives.doe.gov/cgi-bin/currentchecklist#ORDERS

DOE/NRC's One Strike Approach

http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/oldord/5480/o548030c1.html

(1) Single Failure. Safety class SSCs shall be able to accommodate a single failure and still meet their intended safety function, as required, to ensure compliance with the facility acceptance criterion. A "single failure" means an occurrence which results in the loss of capability of the safety class structure, system or component to accomplish its required safety functions. Multiple failures resulting from a single occurrence are considered to be a single failure.

Some Important Manuals can be found here:

http://www.directives.doe.gov/cgi-bin/currentchecklist#MANUALS

Do DOE Nuclear Reactor Sites afford American citizens a higher level of protection than those afforded communities forced to play host to commercial nuclear reactors such as Entergy's failing Indian Point reactors? Read DOE guidelines here:

http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/oldord/5400/o54005c2.html

Where are our protections from the NRC?

Below is and excerpt from DOE's Nuclear Energy Policy, which you can read at: http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/senord/35/n3591.html

Reading the excerpt, one has to wonder where our similar EQUAL RIGHTS are when looking at NRC's commercial licensees.

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY POLICY

It is the policy of the Department of Energy (DOE) that the general public be protected such that no individual bears significant additional risk to health and safety from the operation of a DOE nuclear facility above the risks to which members of the general population are normally exposed. The purpose of this document is to establish the basic nuclear safety policy from which specific safety rules, orders, standards, and other requirements shall follow.* DOE facilities will be designed, constructed, operated, and decommissioned to assure the protection of the public, workers, and the environment.

Inside Security Breach At Entergy, Or Pro Nuke Nut Job?

WE are sharing a comment sent in on our "What If" article from this weekend, but doing it in the form of an article so that we can address some of the points that it raises. Secondly, we are sharing it for another reason...if the writer of the comment is putting out this information, and (a big if) the details about Indian Point Security are for real, this comment amounts to a very serious Security Breach at the Indian Point Plant...one of their own, or at least someone with some very serious inside information is posting it onto the Green Nuclear Butterfly Blog to refute the points made in Royce Penstinger's historical fiction piece. For ease of reading, Green Nuclear Butterfly's responses have been bolded and GREENED.

Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "Indian Point...A Story of What If? Will You Survi...":

Hey man ! You've outdone yourself! Great fiction piece.

Thank You...I prefer to think of it as Historical Fiction. IF you follow many of the links embedded in the story, you'll see the events are not as far fetched as Indian Point and the NRC would like us to think they are.

I have some questions, though. Since it was blizzard conditions, how did the commando force get to the two jump-off spots? Didn't the coast guard cutter pick them up on radar, as they approached? Why didn't the Coast Guard's quadruple 50's Gatling guns hit them while on the rock face?

First, the work is fiction, but since we are on the subject, I could think of several ways. Further, not so sure that Coast Guard Cutter is docked in front of the plant 27/4 as your question infers. You, much like the NRC wants to give the licensee every assumed advantage that you can. IE, our troops, Indian Point's security staff would and could do everything right. Despite George Bush and the NRC sweeping the web clean, there is still plenty of anecdotal evidence to be found that would leave the average person shaking their head at the nuclear industry's ability to take care of a serious terrorist attack on the facilities. For instance, though they claim it is nothing, Entergy cannot even locate a simple leak in the spent fuel pool of Reactor 2...yet, you would have us believe their security staff would function perfectly. Perfectly like the control room personnel found sound asleep in one of the Entergy plants?

How did they go up the rock face in the snow? Did they use cross country skis? Didn't the cross country skis fuck them up at the jersey barriers?

Sure you would disagree, but this author believes a small force under cover of darkness could approach the facility unseen in kayaks from either direction on the Hudson...further, they could stage across the river to shorten distances. Again, you seem intent on convincing the public that Indian Point is not assailable. Until the NRC conducts a real force on force test at Nuclear Reactors based on some of the real life scenarios that could happen, their assertion that the sites are safe are nothing more than water cooler assurances.

Where did they practice?

Does it matter? Canada, Russia, Alaska to name just three locations that would provide adequate weather conditions for Arctic training, as well as areas of remoteness away from prying eyes. Again, does it matter where they trained? The hijackers that smashed planes into the World Trade Centers trained right here in the United States, right under the noses of those keeping and eye out for them. They did not target just one facility, they targets four planes, and four buildings....they succeeded in seven out of eight of their primary objectives.

If it was real blizzardy, kayaks would have obviously swamped. Power boats might have, too.

Nice try...I did not say it was BLIZZARDY! I stated the system had STALLED, that there was NOT ENOUGH WIND to blow the system north, or out to sea. Tipping motor boats? What, are you saying the NRC and Indian Point need to factor in a typhoon in helping them keep terrorists away from the nuclear reactors?

How come the dogs didn't start barking? Those fuckin dogs bark at turkeys, and deers, and even squirrels. Were they very small commandos, smaller than a turkey?

First, you would have us believe that carefully trained guard dogs are being left out on a bitterly cold winter night in the middle of a snow storm with eighteen inches of snow already on the ground? Do the ANIMAL RIGHTS GROUPS KNOW THIS? Secondly, dogs and other animals have a habit of HUNKERING down during a storm of this magnitude. Lastly, you discount the reality that dogs can be taken out with silent means of death.

How come the remote capacitive motion sensors on the hillside didn't pick them up? Deer set them off all the time.How did they get past the razor wire, without breaking the circuit? (I can understand video being whited out, but not the other systems).

There's a good one...remote capactitive motions sensors...even states the location of these things. Deers set them off all the time. Let me guess, in the middle of a snow storm like the one in the story, there is NO CHANCE that a brief trip of these censors wouldn't be discounted, written off as a deer? Though I do thank you for admitting one layer of Reactor Safety could be rendered ineffective with something as a snow storm.

How come the covert iron foxhole firing positions didn't set up a cross fire? How about the elevated firing towers? How did they get a vehicle past the 8 foot high 360 degree concrete wall? How come the resident national guard tanks didn't respond? How the fuck did they get into, and out of, all the confusing razor wire cul-de-sacs in the second fence line, or the third fence line, or the fourth?(they are ALL electrified).

I see, the FENCE at Indian Point is safe, secure and vital, but the fence at our Southern Border will not work? To use the adage oft quoted by the Pro-Illegal Alien factions, built a 25 foot fence, and someone will build a 26 foot tall ladder. Sure that these obstacles would not be enough to stop our own nation's special forces, but we are TOLD TO BELIEVE no other nation, or terrorist group has the ability to have similarly trained forces that they can insert into any given area in America?

Did the two nearby state trooper barracks fail to respond?

Here's a wake up call for you...in most snow storms, staff at Highway Patrol barracks are STRETCHED, most of the officers dealing with various accidents or motorist emergencies.

Did the Regular Army troops at camp smith get taken out beforehand? Their 12 tanks, and heavy weapons are only 6 minutes away, usually.

Like the way you snuck in that word USUALLY...nice try. Problem is, many of the reservists that do their time there go out to dinner and for a few drinks at various locations here in Peekskill. Those tanks might be six miles away, but they are not ready for RAPID DEPLOYMENT in the best weather, let alone a snow storm as described in the article.

And just how did these birds get a major meltdown to go out of the dome? didn't the dome hold it in, like at three mile island?

IAEA documents admit that they cannot come up with formula to completely discount either a hydrogen or steam explosion of a reactor core. Further, numerous documents are out there that admit the industry and NRC don't really understand brittling at a reactor, nor what the effects of this brittling would have in such a case as a hydrogen explosion inside the core. In fact, despite the NRC's wrongful generic re licensing hoodoo voodoo, one of the Commissioners at the NRC has admitted publicly that no two reactors are alike, each has their own unique set of risks.

Did they send another team to try to make a hole in the dome? How did they get near the dome, since the outside is totally inaccessible at the bottom, made so by the 345 KV high tension lines, the ones where the tree cutter got zapped 4 years ago.? If they went inside the dome to blow a hole in it, how did they find their way through the 5 successive airlocks into the radiation area? Who told them all the security codes? Did they blow the airlocks with C4? If they did , an automatic scram would have locked them in, AND shut the plant down.

I'm not the security expert, though you seem to desperately want our readers to believe you are. How many of us have watched controlled explosives take down buildings 50 times as large as the reactors at Indian Point in less than 30 seconds? Yet, you would have us believe that it's impossible for dedicated professions would not have the know how to overcome various obstacles in their desire to complete their mission. If terrorists have managed to get their hands on weapons to pierce the armor of tanks, surely they can find something that would open four or five doors? I'm sure they are not worried about making it all look pretty.

Didn't the isolation breakers at Buchanan switch yard operate to prevent the blackout spreading? Did your guys send a team over there first to lock those breakers shut?

Let's reverse this question...has the NRC factored this into their Force on Force exercises? In their mock attacks, have they sent a security detail over to guard these isolation breakers?

Were they old retired Con Ed guys, only Con Ed knows how to open or shut that stuff, or even where the controls are in the yard.

Oh, that's reassuring? Such important controls, and no one knows how to open or shut the stuff, or where it is located except old Con Ed guys?

Did they try to find the control room? Weren't they fooled by the ten dead end fake cul-de-sac mock control room passages, the ones nobody but the operators know about?

How reassuring...if no one but the operators know about these ten dead end fake cul-de-sac mock control room passages, HOW DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THEM?

Didn't the automatic bulletproof stainless steel shutters and isolation blast doors operate to isolate the control room? Did the control room go on its emergency air system? Didn't the second team evacuate like they're supposed to, into the alternate safe shutdown bunker, so that even if a nuke worker was a commando, the main control room would have lost the ability to melt the place down anyway?

For starters, if someone had actually gotten this far into Indian Point, there are all kinds of ways to create problems that could result in core meltdown. For instance, one would assume, that those bent on mischief in this case, destruction of the reactor's core could attack the reactor at it's weakest point...say for instance the flow through pipe that drives the steam turbines? Not sure here, but I would think someone shutting down the flow pipe that allows steam/pressure to leave the reactor would cause a serious issue of concern? Further, find it interesting here, that in your entire rebuttal of my piece of fiction you STEERED AWAY from discussing the very vulnerable spent fuel pools. What, afraid to admit that a few armor piercing rounds fired into the bottom of said pools would create serious havoc in and of itself?

Other than those few obvious mistakes, the rest makes quite a story. Hangin out with ME, might make a writer out of you yet, Sherm! Just be honest with me. You lit a spliff before writing it, right?

Be nice if ME identified him/herself for our readers, for the NRC, for the plant. If any of what "ME" shared is true, Indian Point has a VERY SERIOUS SECURITY BREACH, and it would seem one on the inside.

The Commenter's Full Original Text is below:

Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "Indian Point...A Story of What If? Will You Survi..."

Hey man ! You've outdone yourself! Great fiction piece. I have some questions, though. Since it was blizzard conditions, how did the commando force get to the two jump-off spots? Didn't the coast guard cutter pick them up on radar, as they approached? Why didn't the coast guard's quadruple 50's gatling guns hit them while on the rock face?how did they go up the rock face in the snow? Did they use cross country skis? Didnt the cross country skis fuck them up at the jersey barriers?Where did they practice? If it was real blizzardy, kayaks would have obviously swamped. Power boats might have, too. How come the dogs didn't start barking? Those fuckin dogs bark at turkeys, and deers, and even squirrels. Were they very small commandoes, smaller than a turkey? How come the remote capacitive motion sensors on the hillside didn't pick them up? Deer set them off all the time.How did they get past the razor wire, without breaking the circuit? (I can understand video being whited out, but not the other systems). Howcome the covert iron foxhole firing positions didn't set up a cross fire? How about the elevated firing towers? How did they get a vehicle past the 8 foot high 360 degree concrete wall? How come the resident national guard tanks didn't respond? How the fuck did they get into, and out of, all the confusing razor wire cul-de-sacs in the second fence line, or the third fence line, or the fourth?(they are ALL electrified). Did the two nearby state trooper barracks fail to respond? Did the Regular Army troops at camp smith get taken out beforehand? Their 12 tanks, and heavy weapons are only 6 minutes away, usually. And just how did these birds get a major meltdown to go out of the dome? didn't the dome hold it in, like at three mile island? Did they send another team to try to make a hole in the dome? How did they get near the dome, since the outside is totally inaccessible at the bottom, made so by the 345 KV high tension lines, the ones where the tree cutter got zapped 4 years ago.? If they went inside the dome to blow a hole in it, how did they find their way through the 5 successive airlocks into the radiation area? Who told them all the security codes? Did they blow the airlocks with C4? If they did , an automatic scram would have locked them in, AND shut the plant down. Didn't the isolation breakers at Buchanan switchyard operate to prevent the blackout spreading? Did your guys send a team over there first to lock those breakers shut? Were they old retired Con Ed guys, only Con Ed knows how to open or shut that stuff, or even where the controls are in the yard. Did they try to find the control room? Weren't they fooled by the ten dead end fake cul-de-sac mock control room passages, the ones nobody but the operators know about? Didn't the automatic bulletproof stainless steel shutters and isolation blast doors operate to isolate the control room? Did the control room go on its emergency air system? Didn't the second team evacuate like they're supposed to, into the alternate safe shudown bunker, so that even if a nuke worker was a commando, the main control room would have lost the ability to melt the place down anyway? Other than those few obvious mistakes, the rest makes quite a story. Hangin out with ME, might make a writer out of you yet, Sherm! Just be honest with me. You lit a spliff before writing it, right?