Friday, August 17, 2007

EPRI, DOE, NEI, NRC and The Defense and Commericial Nuclear Industry Keeping Public in Dark?

For those of us who find ourselves living within the shadow of death that is the 50 mile circle around an aging, decaying nuclear reactor here in America, we have sadly come to know what it is like to be kept in the dark. We are asked to accept the risks associated with the NRC rubber stamping of 20 year license renewals without being told just what the real risks are that we will be faced with. Accidents caused from FAC (Flow Accelerated Corrosion), stainless steel fatigue, concrete degradation and weld failures are all serious concerns, with the true risks hidden behind the closed doors of the EPRI documents room.

Security is another issue, with the DBT hidden from public view, and any attempts to get honest answers met with a STONE WALL as Sam Collins and other members of the NRC refuse to answer our questions put forth at public meetings. Why can't we know the truth, be told why it was that the NRC commissioners removed from the weapons lists mortars, shoulder launched grenades and rockets (RPG's), and armor piercing munitions? Is it true that NEI pressured the NRC to remove these weapons because they would render 85 percent of the industry's security infrastructure obsolete?

Now, lets look at public health and safety should a nuclear event or terrorist attack at say, "Indian Point". Obviously, one of the things citizens want to know, want to understand is plume modeling. When we try to discuss this with NRC officials (Richard Barkley) we get vague answers, and promises of more information later...that then never arrives. This area is one of great concern to myself, so I did some research this evening, and in a word we want access to NARAC! Why is this valuable software that would allow local communities and citizens to evaluate their risk being SECRETED AWAY behind the walls of Lawrence Livermore Laboritories by the DOE? Could it be, that the truth of Plumes in the event of a significant nuclear incident see citizens demanding the closure of all NUCLEAR REACTORS? Below is some very SOMBERING information on NURAC, and the DOE's involvement in safeguarding public safety. Get involved, demand that this valuable software tool be made available to citizens in Nuclear Reactor host communities...we have a right to know what risks we are facing.


The NARAC suite of software tools include simple stand-alone, local-scale plume modeling tools for end-user’s computers, and Web- and Internet-based software to access advanced modeling tools and expert analyses from the national center at LLNL. Initial automated, 3-D predictions of plume exposure limits and protective action guidelines for emergency responders and managers are available from the center in 5-10 minutes. These can be followed immediately by quality-assured, refined analyses by 24 x 7 on-duty or on-call NARAC staff. NARAC continues to refine calculations using updated on-scene information, including measurements, until all airborne releases have stopped and the hazardous threats are mapped and impacts assessed

1 Introduction
The dispersion of radiological material in the atmosphere poses potential risks to human health. Releases may occur from accidents involving nuclear power plants, nuclear material processing and transportation, or nuclear weapons. The post-coldwar proliferation of nuclear material has increased the potential for threats from radiological dispersal devices and nuclear weapons. In order to prepare for airborne releases and mitigate the resulting impacts, tools are needed that can accurately and quickly predict the environmental contamination and health effects.

Other Important Directives:

DOE/NRC's One Strike Approach


(1) Single Failure. Safety class SSCs shall be able to accommodate a single failure and still meet their intended safety function, as required, to ensure compliance with the facility acceptance criterion. A "single failure" means an occurrence which results in the loss of capability of the safety class structure, system or component to accomplish its required safety functions. Multiple failures resulting from a single occurrence are considered to be a single failure.
Some Important Manuals can be found here:

Do DOE Nuclear Reactor Sites afford American citizens a higher level of protection than those afforded communities forced to play host to commercial nuclear reactors such as Entergy's failing Indian Point reactors? Read DOE guidelines here:

Where are our protections from the NRC?

Below is and excerpt from DOE's Nuclear Energy Policy, which you can read at: http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/senord/35/n3591.html

Reading the excerpt, one has to wonder where our similar EQUAL RIGHTS are when looking at NRC's commercial licensees.

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY POLICY

It is the policy of the Department of Energy (DOE) that the general public be protected such that no individual bears significant additional risk to health and safety from the operation of a DOE nuclear facility above the risks to which members of the general population are normally exposed. The purpose of this document is to establish the basic nuclear safety policy from which specific safety rules, orders, standards, and other requirements shall follow.* DOE facilities will be designed, constructed, operated, and decommissioned to assure the protection of the public, workers, and the environment.

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