MONDAY CO-SIGNING DEADLINE.
To Whom It May Concern:
First, I apologize for intruding into your Easter Weekend Activities, but the BELOW Petition For Rule Making is going out early next week, and we need co-signers. There will never be a more opportune time for a unified coalition than this, so please read this petition carefully. I've pasted the text unformatted below for ease of reading, so that you can make your decision more easily.
If you want to be listed as a co-signer, simply email your name and contact information to my email by Monday at
roycepenstinger@aol.com and your name will be added as a party to this petition for rule making. We need as many co-signers as we can get, and this petition addresses every reactor in America, so please forward it on to your friends, neighbors and fellow activists.
PETITION
Secretary
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC, 20555-0001
Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff
E-mail:
secy@nrc.govFax: 301-415-1101
Before the
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20555
2.802 Petition for rulemaking
10 CFR 2.206, 2.802 and 2.202 REQUEST FOR Rule Making/Change To Hold The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), FEMA, DOE, DHS and Reactor Licensees Financially Responsible For Citizen Financial Costs Incurred In Building, Stocking, and Maintaining A Personal Space/Shelter For The NRC, FEMA, DOE and DHS's Preferred Emergency Goals of Sheltering Citizens In Place at Their Property of Residence, and For Such Other Regulatory Relief As Is Spelled Out Herein
1. Request For Action
Sherwood Martinelli, stakeholder/petitioner living within three miles of the aging, brittling and fatally flawed reactors known as Indian Point Reactors 1, 2 and 3 and the individual and organizational petitioners identified on the attached page (collectively, Petitioners) hereby respectfully request, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 and 2.202 and 2.802, that the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission take the following immediate actions:
A) In the past few years, specifically since 9/11, DOE, NRC, FEMA, AND DHS have embraced as a primary strategy for protection of the general public, the concepts and principles of sheltering in place should there be a terrorist attack and/or incident that resulted in the release of nuclear material, particulates, plumes or matter into the general public beyond the defined property lines of licensed nuclear facilities.
B) The constitution of the United States, as well as codified rules and regulations of the NRC, DOE, FEMA, and DHS charge the Federal Government and it's multitude of organizations, departments, agencies and commissions with protecting human health and the environment. In carrying out this charge, the NRC's rules, regulations and policies have created a situation where protection of human heath and safety has taken a back seat to the task of protecting and maintaining the nation's nuclear energy supply as risk assessment has taken a wrongful front seat ahead of efforts that properly prepare communities for consequences. Far too much emphasis has been placed on risk assessment, rather than adequate attention to CONSEQUENCES AND MITIGATION OF SAME SHOULD THERE BE AN INCIDENT OR TERRORIST ATTACK AT A NUCLEAR FACILITY. (EMPHASIS ADDED) In short, the NRC and other departments, agencies, organizations and commissions have embraced a risk assessment mitigation method (Sheltering In Place) without any financial mechanisms put in place for the citizens to have the proper tools and shelters to actually take protective actions in the case of a significant event. This amounts to a cold, calculated, negligent and egregious case of Economic Racism, even class based genocide...it is pointed out here for the record, that Vice President Dick Cheney, at tax payers expense, has been afforded the ability and space in which to shelter in place.
C) A cursory review of the check lists found on NRC, FEMA, DHS and other Preparedness web sites hosted by and funded by the government of the United States, coupled with pricing studies conducted by the petitioner(s) make it abundantly clear that the average citizen would need to spend (on average) $50,000 dollars (not counting any legal and/or licensing fees for local zoning board approvals) to build and adequately supply a personal shelter should "sheltering in place" become necessary. To be properly prepared, this is a front load expenditure that most host communities cannot afford. Further, maintenance and management of this home shelter, as well as potential increased property taxes could add a yearly up keep charge to the scenario of $2,500. Building these shelters, being prepared for a consequence are steps that need taken before one of these unlikely events occur, not afterward when it is too late to mitigate the harm to human health and safety. NRC's steadfast refusal to mandate that their licensees afford citizens of communities being forced to accept license renewals the necessary funding needed to prepare for sheltering in place 1) abridges and negates our basic constitutional rights to protection of our health and safety, 2) denies those unable to afford the costs of the basic tools needed to protect home and family the right to the peace of mind that comes with having a workable plan in place that has a high ratio of success in the case of a major nuclear incident and/or terries attack of a nuclear facility, and 3) makes one's chance of survival greatly dependant on their ability to buy the best protection money can by. Surely, if a shelter is good enough for Dick Cheney, it is good enough for ALL AMERICANS?
For the reasons above, and because citizens are being ordered to play host to unsafe, brittling, and environmentally damaging nuclear reactors (through a license renewal process which is rigged, and stacked in favor of GUARANTEED LICENSE RENEWAL FOR THE LICENSEE), and because our Federal Government (DOE, NERAC, GNEP, NRC, DHS, FEMA, George Bush and Dick Cheney, as well as various members of the House and Senate) have, it is believed, colluded with lobbyists, the NEI, and the Nuclear Industry to create and bring about a Nuclear Renaissance through the use of deceit, trickery, lies and public propaganda campaigns, using all forms of press and media so that a whole new generation of reactors can be built, placing an ever growing portion of the American public at risk should a Nuclear Incident Occur the petitioner(s) herein petition the NRC for the following changes in the 10 CFR Rules and Regulations which govern all facilities involved directly and/or indirectly in the nuclear fuel/energy cycle process, including, but not limited to all currently operating reactors licensed by the NRC, all fuel processing facilities, including those operated by USEC, all facilities accepting waste of any kind (low or high level) from the nuclear fuel/energy process, as well any and all facilities envisioned for and/or built and/or licensed in the future.
1. Any NRC licensee and its host community which has an emergency plan in place that includes as a part of said plan criteria for, or steps for citizens to Shelter in Place will be entitled to an Independent Safety Assessment on a bi-yearly basis at the request of any stakeholder living within 10 miles of said NRC licensed facility. In the event no stakeholder requests said bi-yearly Independent Safety Assessment, which will include as a part thereof a full PUBLIC REVIEW AND TEST OF BOTH ONSITE SECURITY, AND OFF SITE EVACUATION PLANS, the 10 CFR Rules and Regulations shall make an Independent Safety Assessment mandatory every five years during the time period a license remains in effect.
2. To make human health and safety the TOP PRIORITY that it must be, 10 CFR Rules and Regulations are to be amended in such a fashion that the Licensee and/or the federal government provide all adequate funding necessary for every family living within a ten mile radius of a nuclear facility to build, stock and maintain a personal family shelter. In the case of those living in multiple dwellings (such as apartments, townhouses or condo) the building owner will be awarded any and all funds necessary to build, stock, manage and maintain a shelter of adequate size to protect all residents and/or staff of the building that might/would need sheltering in the case of a nuclear incident and/or attack.
3. To protect human health and the environment, it is imperative that host communities for nuclear facilities have state of the art communications systems for citizens, and the first responders we are counting on should a nuclear incident and/or terrorist event take place. For this to occur, we satellite communications systems for EVERY NUCLEAR REACTOR COMMUNITY, with the costs of same born by, and paid for by the nuclear industry, and their licensees. This assures host communities of proper communications access, even if terrestrial infrastructure is damaged, destroyed, or over loaded.
2. Further Request For Action:
Sherwood Martinelli, stakeholder/petitioner living within three miles of the aging, brittling and fatally flawed reactors known as Indian Point Reactors 1, 2 and 3 and the individual and organizational petitioners identified on the attached page (collectively, Petitioners) hereby respectfully request, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 and 2.202 and 2.802, that the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission take the following immediate actions:
1. Renewal of the Price Anderson Act has unfairly released all current and future NRC licensees from their financial obligations in the event of a significant event or terrorist at a nuclear facility involved in the nuclear fuel/energy cycle here in American, as the financial set asides on the part of licensees is woefully inadequate to cover the estimated damages and financial losses should a major nuclear incident occur. In fact, NRC's own studies indicate damages and financial loses as a result of a significant incident at Entergy's brittling, aging reactors known as Indian Point, which are already suffering from cracks in the reactor domes, failing welds and a dismal over all safety record while also leaking strontium 90 and tritium into the Hudson River could run as high as $750 BILLION DOLLARS. A part of protecting members of the general public, especially in communities FORCED TO PLAY HOST (which is every community where and NRC Licensee is being given a RUBBERSTAMPED license renewal of at least 20 years) is protecting our financial holdings, such as our homes. Further, the NRC and other governmental agencies own studies admit that the average home owner would only get back pennies on the dollar if a major nuclear incident or attack were to occur, and this tragic rape of Americans citizens must be corrected before any further movement on GNEP, or the Nuclear 2010 agendas are allowed to move forward in ant fashion.
2. Consolidation of America's reactor ownership, coupled with the wrongful use of LLC's by nuclear licensees to protect and hide their assets has placed stake holders in host communities in an even greater peril, as these LLC's greatly eliminate corporate financial responsibility, and allow parent companies to escape ALL RISKS by simply placing the holding company for a reactor license into a Chapter Eleven Bankruptcy proceeding. Companies such as Entergy, in this petitioner’s opinion, have set up a PONZI SCHEME wherein they are assured of always winning, while host communities are left in the Enron like position of losing everything, including in some cases our lives. Companies like Entergy have even stooped to stealing money paid into decommissioning funds by we the rate payers, and that should not be allowed, as those earmarked funds should rightfully belong to the communities that paid them, rather than being changed over into wind fall profits with the stroke of a pen.
3. Subpart E--Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences (140.81-140.85 inclusively) have been written in such a fashion that they provide no assurances and/or protections for host communities should a major nuclear incident occur.
4. It is impossible for any American to purchase insurance to cover their losses from a nuclear incident and/or attack.
For the reasons above, and because citizens are being ordered to play host to unsafe, brittling, and environmentally damaging nuclear reactors (through a license renewal process which is rigged, and stacked in favor of GUARANTEED LICENSE RENEWAL FOR THE LICENSEE), and because it is believed that our Federal Government (DOE, NERAC, GNEP, NRC, DHS, FEMA, George Bush and Dick Cheney, as well as various members of the House and Senate) have colluded with lobbyists, the NEI, and the Nuclear Industry to create and bring about a Nuclear Renaissance through the use of deceit, trickery, lies and public propaganda campaigns, using all forms of press and media so that a whole new generation of reactors can be built, thus placing an ever growing portion of the American public at risk should a Nuclear Incident Occur the petitioner(s) herein petition the NRC for the following changes in the 10 CFR Rules and Regulations (specifically 140.81-140.85) which govern all facilities involved directly and or in directly in the nuclear fuel/energy cycle process, including, but not limited to all currently operating reactors licensed by the NRC, all fuel processing facilities, including those operated by USEC, all facilities accepting waste of any kind (low or high level) from the nuclear fuel/energy process, as well any and all facilities envisioned for and/or built and/or licensed in the future to read as follows:
Subpart E--Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences
§ 140.81 Scope and purpose.
(a) Scope. This subpart applies to applicants for and holders of licenses authorizing operation of production facilities and utilization facilities, and to other persons indemnified or not with respect to such facilities, including all stakeholders both individually and collectively.
(b) Purpose. One purpose of this subpart is to set forth the criteria which the Commission proposes to follow in order to determine whether there has been an “nuclear occurrence." The other purpose is to establish the conditions of the waivers of defenses proposed for incorporation in indemnity agreements and insurance policies or contracts furnished as proof of financial protection, and to assure that all citizens and stakeholders are made whole should a nuclear occurrence transpire.
(1) The system is to come into effect where the discharge or dispersal constitutes an off site migration of source, special nuclear or byproduct material, or has caused elevated radiation levels offsite. The various limits in present NRC regulations are not appropriate for direct application in the determination of a "nuclear occurrence," for they were arrived at with other purposes in mind, and those limits have been set at a level which is liberally arrived at by incorporating an ever decreasing and insignificant safety factor. Thus, a discharge or dispersal which exceeds the limits in NRC regulations, or in license conditions, is a cause for serious concern, it is one which could potentially be expected to cause substantial injury or damage. Accordingly, in arriving at the values in the criteria to be deemed "elevated" it is not appropriate to adopt values separate from NRC health and safety regulations. An elevated discharge, for purposes of the criteria, represents a perturbation of the environment which is clearly above that which could be anticipated from the conduct of allowable licensee activities. The criteria are intended for the purposes of administration of the Commission's statutory responsibilities under Pub. L. 89-645, and also intended to indicate a level of discharge or dispersal at which damage to persons or property necessarily could occur, or a level at which damage is likely to occur, or even a level at which some type of protective action is indicated. It should be clearly understood that the criteria establish or indicate that there is a specific threshold of exposure at which biological damage from radiation will take place. It cannot be emphasized too frequently that the levels set to be used as criteria for the first part of the determination, that is, the criteria for amounts offsite or radiation levels offsite which are elevated, are meant to indicate that, because such amounts or levels are determined to be substantial for purposes of administration, they are also "substantial" in terms of their propensity for causing injury or damage. (emphasis added)
(2) It is the purpose of the second part of the determination that the Commission decide whether there have in fact been or will probably be catastrophic damages to persons offsite or property offsite. The criteria for catastrophic damages will be formulated, and the numerical values selected, on a wholly identical basis from that on which the criteria used for the first part of the determination with respect to elevated discharge were derived.
(3) The first part of the test is designed so that the Commission can assure itself that something has occurred; that something untoward and unexpected has in fact taken place and that this event is of sufficient significance to raise the possibility that some damage to persons or property offsite has resulted or may result. If there appears to be negligence on the part of the licensee, the waivers will not apply because the Commission will be unable, under the second part of the test, to make a determination that "substantial damages” can be made whole. If damages have resulted or will probably result, they could vary from de minimis to serious, and the waivers will not apply until the damages, both actual and probable, are determined within the second part of the test.
(4) The presence or absence of an off site nuclear occurrence determination does not concomitantly determine whether or not a particular claimant will recover on his claim. In effect, it is intended to remove potential obstacles to recovery from the route the claimant would ordinarily follow to seek compensation for his injury or damage. If there has been an offsite nuclear occurrence determination, the claimant must proceed (in the absence of settlement) with a tort action subject to whatever issues must be met, and whatever defenses are available to the defendant, under the law applicable in the relevant jurisdiction. If there has been an offsite nuclear occurrence determination, the claimant must still proceed (in the absence of settlement) with a tort action, but the claimant's burden is substantially eased by the elimination of certain issues which may be involved and certain defenses which may be available to the defendant. In either case the defendant may defend with respect to such of the following matters as are in issue in any given claim: The nature of the claimant's alleged damages, the causal relationship between the event and the alleged damages, and the amount of the alleged damages.
(5) In case of negligence on the part of the NRC and/or their licensee(s), all damages in a successful tort action shall be quadrupled so as to be punitive in nature and scope.
§ 140.82 Procedures.
(a) The Commission must initiate, on its own motion, the making of a determination that there has been an off site nuclear occurrence. In the event the Commission does not so initiate the making of a determination, any affected person, stakeholder, or any licensee or person with whom an indemnity agreement is or is not executed or a person providing financial protection will petition the Commission for a determination that there has been an off site nuclear occurrence. If the Commission does not have, or does not expect to have, within 3 days after it has received notification of an alleged event, enough information available to make a determination that there has been an off site nuclear occurrence, the Commission must publish a notice in the Federal Register setting forth the date and place of the known and/or alleged event requiring any persons having knowledge thereof to submit their information to the Commission.
(b) When a procedure is initiated under paragraph (a) of this section, the Commission will designate members of the principal staff to begin immediately to assemble the relevant information and prepare a report on which the Commission must make its determination.
§ 140.83 Determination of extraordinary nuclear occurrence.
When the Commission determines that one or both of the criteria set forth in §§ 140.84 and 140.85 have been met, it will make the determination that there has been an off site nuclear occurrence. When the Commission publishes a notice in the Federal Register in accordance with § 140.82(a) and does not make a determination within 90 days thereafter that there has been an off site nuclear occurrence, the alleged event will be deemed to be an off site nuclear occurrence. The time for the making of a determination may be extended by the Commission by notice published in the Federal Register, not to exceed 30 days
§ 140.84 Criterion I--Off Site discharge of radioactive material or measurable radiation levels offsite.
The Commission will determine that there has been a off site discharge or dispersal of radioactive material offsite, or that there have been levels of radiation offsite, when, as a result of an event comprised of one or more related happenings, radioactive material is released from its intended place of confinement or radiation levels occur offsite or if either of the following findings are also made:
(a) The Commission finds that one or more persons offsite were, could have been, or might be exposed to radiation or to radioactive material associated with any actions (or failures of same) by a licensee.
Exposures from the following types of sources of radiation shall be included:
(1) Radiation from sources external to the body;
(2) Radioactive material that may be taken into the body from its occurrence in air or water; and
(3) Radioactive material that may be taken into or touch the body the body from its occurrence in food or on terrestrial surfaces.
(b) The Commission finds that:
(1) Surface contamination of at least a total of any 10 square feet of offsite property has occurred as the result of a release of radioactive material from a production or utilization facility, or
(2) Surface contamination of any offsite property has occurred as the result of a release of radioactive material in the course of transportation.
§ 140.85 Criterion II--Substantial damages to person’s offsite or property offsite.
(a) After the Commission has determined that an event has satisfied Criterion I, the Commission must determine that the event has resulted or will probably result in damages to person’s offsite or property offsite if any of the following findings are made:
(1) The Commission finds that such event has resulted in the death or hospitalization, within 40 years of the event, of one or more people located offsite showing objective clinical evidence of physical injury from exposure to the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material; or
(2) The Commission finds that $2,500 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by any one person, or $50,000 or more of such damage in the aggregate has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such event; or
(3) The Commission finds that $50 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by each of 50 or more persons, provided that $50,000 or more of such damage in the aggregate has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such event.
(b) As used in paragraphs (a) (2) and (3) of this section, "damage" shall be that arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material, and any actions/damages responding to and/or remediating same, and shall be based upon estimates of one or more of the following:
(1) Total cost necessary to put affected property back into use, if possible, regardless of cost and/or inconvenience
(2) Loss of use of affected property, including temporary housing costs, and mortgage payments during the time property is being remediated, and fit to live in.
(3) Pre-incident value of affected property where not practical to restore to use, plus the value of home contents at full replacement value, and a relocation allowance not to exceed $100,000.00
(4) Financial loss resulting from protective actions appropriate to reduce or avoid exposure to radiation or to radioactive materials, including pre incident costs for the construction, stocking and maintenance of a suitable underground shelter for all citizens living within a ten mile radius of any licensee facility associated with the nuclear fuel/energy cycle, not to exceed $50,000 per verified house hold.
The Interests of Petitioners
Petitioner(s) Sherwood Martinelli is a stakeholder being negatively impacted whose mission is to protect the environmental, recreational and commercial integrity of the Hudson River, and to safeguard New York City's and Westchester County’s drinking water supply specifically, and generally to protect the environmental, recreational and commercial integrity of all NRC licensee host communities here in America, or if applicable around the world. Petitioners together and independently state that they are personally affected and aggrieved by the continued operation of nuclear fuel/energy cycle licensees without the specific financial, safety and security measures identified in this request.
Section 2.206(a) and 2.802 of Title 10, CFR, states that [a]any person may file a request to institute a proceeding pursuant to 2.202 to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or for any other action as may be proper. Sherwood Martinelli and all other petioners hereby submit this petition identifying the very real potential threat of a terrorist attack, or a nuclear incident on/at nuclear fuel/energy cycle licensed facilities including Entergy's Indian Point facility as a new hazardous condition that is larger and more dangerous than previously considered in the licensing and the design basis threat, that must be remedied in a fashion that eliminates economic racism visited upon host communities, and rewrites the regulations in a way that do not endorse societal genocide based on financial class status should and event or attack occur.
Critical New Information Constituting the Basis for This Request
A. Nuclear fuel/energy cycle licensees are a Plausible Target of Future Terrorist Actions.
The United States is currently facing a heightened state of security related to the terrorist attacks against infrastructure targets in New York City and Washington D.C. As political, judicial, and military operations against suspected terrorist organizations continue and George Bush continues to make matters in Iraq worse, civilian and military establishments within the United States remain probable targets of future terrorist attack. New York City and other nuclear facility host communities remains a primary terrorist target. As nuclear facility host communities are a terrorist target, so too are nearby industrial facilities that, if compromised, could cause devastation to the populace, environment, and economy. No other facilities in the country, let alone in New York, poses as great a risk to as great a number of people as the Indian Point nuclear power plant, but all communities being forced through a rigged relicensing process to play host to aging, brittling, unsafe reactors are at great risk. Expecting these communities to risk everything including their lives and homes in the name of NUCLEAR INDUSTRY PROFITS is morally repugnant to any God believing person.
B. Actual Threats Against Nuclear Power Plants Have Been Documented.
The imminent threat of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant is evidenced in news and in government statements. On November 3, 2001, Daniel Rubin reported in his article, Nuclear Terrorism Threat Growing: [t]he vulnerability of power plants moved to center stage after last Sunday, when Canadian authorities monitored a phone call from an alleged al-Qaida member to Afghanistan. Two targets, he said, would be attacked this week down south, including an unnamed nuclear facility.
Shortly following the attacks on September 11, 2001 the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant received a credible threat on October 17, prompting officials to shut down two nearby airports and dispatch military aircraft to protect the facility.
On November 1, 2001, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned that there is "the potential of terrorists targeting nuclear facilities. Mr. ElBaradei also stated that the "safety and security of nuclear material is a legitimate concern of all States" and that "[t]he willingness of terrorists to commit suicide to achieve their evil makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more likely than it was before September 11.
On November 1, 2001, the Washington Post reported: "Nancy Savage, an FBI agent in Eugene, Ore., who is president of the FBI Agents Association, said the biggest concerns for investigators include airports, power plants and other key infrastructure points."
On July 4, 2001, the New York Times reported that an Algerian man, Ahmed Ressam, convicted of attempting to carry out a terrorist attack in Los Angeles, testified that he was trained in an Afghanistan camp run by Osama bin Laden and received training in how to blow up "the infrastructure of a country." Ressam described how he was among 50 to 100 men at the camp who were being trained in "urban warfare." Ressam stated that power plants were targets as they were labeled "enemies installations."
On October 21, 2001, the Sunday London Times reported that the FBI is studying a report that the four terrorists who seized Flight 93, which crashed near Pittsburgh, may have been targeting a nuclear power plant. The Federal Aviation Administration established a no-fly zone around nuclear power plants. On October 30, 2001, the Washington Post reported on an interview with a jailed disciple of Osama bin Laden who said there are more important places, like atomic plants and reactors that may have been more appropriate targets than the World Trade Center.
The NRC admits the threat against nuclear power plants, as evidenced by the agency’s move to shut down its website within weeks after the September 11 attacks. NRCs website is back up but with limited access to sensitive information, raising the question of whether terrorists already have downloaded and made use of information that has since been removed from the website. The United States remains on high alert in anticipation of additional terrorist attacks.
C. Nuclear Facilities Are Currently Vulnerable to Catastrophic Terrorist Attack.
1. While Operational, Nuclear Facilities Unnecessarily Vulnerable.
a. Risks from Takeover of or Damage to Control Rooms, Or a Terrorist using Shoulder Mounted Rockets From Across a River Or Lake to Blow up And Clog Water Intakes.
As long as these facilities remain operational, the control rooms are a likely and vulnerable target for terrorist attack. Seizure or disability of the control rooms would dramatically increase the potential for the intentional or accidental destruction of the reactor core. A terrorist attack on the control rooms of a facility would cause a loss of control of Reactor Units. Disruption of the off-site power supplied to Indian Point or an on-site cutoff of power directly to the control room could render the control room inoperable. Back-up diesel generators are also vulnerable and sometimes unreliable. An on-site fire affecting the control room could render the control inoperable or ineffective, as technicians would be forced to leave or die. A properly functioning control room and control staff is necessary to ensure safe operation of an active reactor core. Absent proper control of plant operations, the risk of a reactor core melt-down or spent fuel storage incident rises precipitously. Evacuation in a FAST MOVING EVENT will not work, leaving sheltering as a community's only hope, yet where is the NRC's guidelines to fund family shelters.
b. Breach of Operating Reactors Creates Greater Danger of Catastrophic Contamination.
Reactor containment walls were not designed to withstand the accidental or intentional crash of fuel Laden jetliners. The incidents of September 11, 2001, have introduced the likelihood that such an aircraft may be used against high-risk infrastructure facilities. The dangers posed by a breach of the containment domes of any reactor would be reduced by a cold shut down of these reactors. In particular, de-powering the reactors would reduce a potential release of high-risk radio-nucleides, thereby lowering long-term impacts such as childhood thyroid cancers of the type encountered in the wake of the Chernobyl accident. If the NRC is going to use a corrupted relicensing process to allow dangerous reactors built with antiquated technology to continue operation for 20 more years, then it is imperative that host communities be afforded more before hand protections in the way of shelters, and be granted FULL ASSURANCES by our government and the NRC that we will be made fully and completely whole should such and incident occur.
c. Operational Facility Creates Multiple Vulnerable Points in Plant Security.
Because reactors are operational, the licensees must extend full security measures to ensure protection of the control rooms and to guard against strikes that threaten the structural stability of the containment domes. While shutting down the reactors will not remove the need for such security, the reduction in threat would allow the licensees to focus their protective efforts on the more critical areas of the facility, especially the spent fuel storage areas. The licensee would be able to shift some security personnel away from low risk areas, concentrating resources where they are most valuable and most likely to protect effectively against the deadliest attack.
D. Vulnerability of the Spent Fuel Storage Facility
Terrorist action against spent fuel storage facilities could result in a catastrophic failure of the containment system. NRC has never established that spent fuel storage facilities are secure against foreseeable attacks. Likewise, the Commission cannot be certain that the structure of the storage facilities are sufficiently sound to preclude the possibility of a spent fuel fire in the event of an airborne, land, or water based assault.
NRC has not properly evaluated the consequences of terrorist attack on the spent fuel storage areas of nuclear plants. In a study conducted by the NRC in October 2000, it stated that:
The risk analysis in this study did not evaluate the potential consequences of a sabotage event that could directly cause off-site fission product dispersion, for example, a vehicle bomb driven into or otherwise significantly damaging the SFP [Spent Fuel Pool], even after a zirconium fire was no longer possible."
A likely result of an aircraft crashing into a spent fuel storage facility, or of a truck bomb explosion similar to that which destroyed the Alfred E. Murrow Federal Building, would be a precipitous loss of cooling water in the spent fuel pools. During the course of normal operation, the presence of cooling water reduces heat produced by the decaying fuel rods and minimizes the potential for fire in the fuel cladding. In the absence of cooling water, adequate air circulation through the spent fuel storage racks is necessary to prevent such a fire. Partial dewatering of the storage pools will block this air flow, especially if the racks are damaged or obstructed by falling debris or the force of an explosion or as is the case with most spent pools, they have been re-racked into a over crowded configuration.
A reduction of cooling water in the spent fuel pools could lead to a catastrophic release of radiation. As the water in the fuel pool is reduced the remaining water will heat up and evaporate. This could expose the zirconium cladding which surrounds the spent fuel rods to oxygen and steam, resulting in an exothermic reaction that will lead to a spent fuel rod assembly fire. This event would release deadly amounts of radiological material and toxic fumes. The NRC October 2000 report stated:
This reaction of zirconium and air, or zirconium and steam is exothermic (i.e., produces heat). The energy released from the reaction, combined with the fuels decay energy, can cause the reaction to become self-sustaining and ignite the zirconium. The increase in heat from the oxidation reaction can also raise the temperature in adjacent fuel assemblies and propagate the oxidation reaction. The zirconium fire would result in a significant release of the spent fuel fission products which would be dispersed from the reactor site in the thermal plume from the zirconium fire. Consequence assessments have shown that a zirconium fire could have significant latent health effects and resulted (sic) in number of early fatalities.
A Department of Energy report indicates that such a fire would release considerable amounts of cesium-137, an isotope that accounted for most of the offsite radiation exposure from the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Another report, authored by NRC, concludes that, in the event of a pool fire approximately 100 percent of the pools inventory of cesium would be released to the atmosphere.
The emission of radioactive particles from a spent fuel pool accident would lead to horrific consequences. The NRC study stated that human fatalities within the first year of such an event can be as large as for a severe reactor accident even if fuel has decayed several years. The radioactive fallout from this type of release could also make tens of thousands of acres of land uninhabitable. Which is why the NRC's callous disregard to the issue of financing FAMILY SHELTERS is so shocking.
An uncontrolled fuel rod fire in one pool could quickly cause fires in other pools where water loss is occurring at multiple reactor sites such as Entergy's trouble plagued Indian Point facility. In the October 2000 report, the NRC stated that if the fuel handler fails to respond to the alarm or is unsuccessful in extinguishing the fire within the first 20 minutes, the staff assumes that the SSP cooling system will be significantly damaged and cannot be repaired." In short, worse case scenario CHINA SYNDROME, and families without adequate in home shelters because of government lies, and corporate greed.
In addressing catastrophic events such as an earthquake, the report stated that the spent fuel pools "are also subject to unpredictable changes as a result of the severe seismic, cask drop and possibly other dynamic events, such as spent fuel rods breaking apart and crashing to the bottom of pools, which could rapidly drain the pool." A terrorist attack is one such dynamic event, but sadly with these leaking, aged buildings, not the only one.
The spent fuel storage buildings are not capable of withstanding a partially successful terrorist attack. The roofs on some are made partly out of pretty insubstantial metal, like sheet metal, according to the Nuclear Energy Institute (lobbying arm of nuclear industry given far too much sway with the NRC, and Congress). This type of inadequate construction, coupled with relatively thin walls, is insufficient to protect against large vehicles or medium sized aircraft. The storage facilities are highly vulnerable to a ground-based attack of only several individuals or to a car and/ or truck bomb. Compromise of the storage facility would pose an immediate health threat to workers and residents within close proximity (10 miles) of a nuclear facility since radiation levels in the spent fuel storage facility can be five times higher than radiation levels in the containment area.
The spent fuel storage areas are highly vulnerable to an air attack and mitigation and control of damage from such an attack is highly improbable. An NRC report stated that an aircraft crashing into the spent fuel storage area could seriously affect the structural integrity of the spent fuel pool or the availability of nearby support systems, such as power supplies, heat exchanges, or water makeup sources, and may also affect recovery actions. The NRC study goes on to estimate that 1 or 2 aircrafts are large enough to penetrate a five foot thick reinforced concrete wall. The conditional probability that a large aircraft crashing penetrate a 5-foot-thick reinforced concrete wall is taken as 0.45. Problem is, storage pool buildings do not have five foot thick walls...again, the NRC gives far to much weight to the risk assessment side of the equation, AND DONE TO THE COST OF CONSEQUENCES SIDE, and gleefully expects us to accept their accepted level of risk for our communities with no real off site protections, and no real plans to make us whole should a nuclear incident occur.
This probability is based on the occurrence of catastrophic damage to the spent fuel pool where "the pool is so damaged that it rapidly drains and cannot be refilled from either onsite or offsite resources." Such an impact could cause a catastrophic event. The report estimates that a worse case scenario radiation release from a spent fuel rod fire will cause a 4.3 percent increase in early fatalities among those who are late to evacuate ... The individual risk of latent cancer fatalities from a worse case scenario release would be 8.42% higher.
E. Economic Loss Data...Based on Entergy's Failing and Antiquated Indian Point Reactors Should A Terrorist Attack, or Major Incident Occur.
A NRC study reveals that a terrorist attack on the Indian Point Unit Two or Three reactors that lead to a meltdown would cause $274 billion (1982 dollars) in property damage, and $314 billion (1982 dollars) in property damage respectively. In terms of 2000 dollars, property damage from a Unit Two meltdown would be estimated conservatively at $500.5 billion, and property damage from a Unit Three meltdown would be estimated conservatively at $573.5 billion -- figures based solely on inflation without factoring the substantial rise in metropolitan area real estate values. Data from the New York State Office of Real Property Services show that property values in Westchester County and NY State in general, have increased four-fold since 1982. Compounding this economic disaster would be the tremendous loss of both personal and corporate equity, and the loss resulting from uninsured and unrecoverable defaults on mortgage loans resulting from property loss. In short, a major incident at Indian Point would result in damages running into TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS.
An economic loss of this magnitude for the City of New York would have devastating consequences on our nation’s entire economy. IT WOULD NOT BE OVERLY PESSIMISTIC TO SAY, THAT SUCH AND EVENT WOULD INSTANTLY THROW AMERICA INTO ANOTHER GREAT DEPRESSION.
The NRC Has Broad Discretionary Powers to Order and Implement Petitioners Requests. THOUGH SADLY, most times they choose not to use it, wanting instead to protect their licensees (and in some cases their own investments) at all costs, even if it means risking the heath, safety and financial well being of host communities.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(a) the Commission has authority to institute a proceeding to modify, suspend or revoke a license or to take such actions as may be proper. In upholding its duty to protect the public, environment, and property, the NRC has broad discretionary powers to grant Petitioners requests. Which is why included herein, as a part of the relief sought in this rule making petition, we additionally seek and order staying all relicensing proceedings during the pendency of this rule making petition, including but not limited to court appeals. We further request the NRC's office of inspector general to open up and investigation (with the GAO as lead agency) into a charge of possible collusion between various parties including but not limited to the NRC, DOE, NEI, CASEnergy, Entergy, Nuclear Entergy, Exelon and Nuclear Industry to rig the relicensing process against host communities, and to use whatever means necessary, including public propaganda campaigns to bring about George Bush's Nuclear 2010 plan and a global Nuclear Renaissance.
Section 161(b) of the Atomic Energy Act empowers the Commission to establish rule[s], regulation[s], or order[s] to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property. The NRC's authority to protect the public cannot be read simply to permit the Commission to provide adequate protection; another section of the Act requires the Commission to do that much. We therefore must view section 161 as a grant of authority to the Commission to provide a measure of safety above and beyond what is adequate. The exercise of this authority is entirely discretionary. If the Commission wishes to do so, it may order power plants already satisfying the standard of adequate protection to take additional safety precautions.
In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations, in Title 10, Sections 2.200, 2.204, 2.206, and 73.55, as well as other authority, authorizes the NRC to take the specific actions requested herein.
The Actions Requested Are Necessary and Appropriate to Protect the Safety of the Twenty Million People Living in the Vicinity of Indian Point, and the 50 percent of American Society living within 50 miles of the aging relics that are the nuclear industry's legacy to us.
Petitioners have properly set forth the facts that constitute the basis for [this] request pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, and have properly identified "the potentially hazardous conditions" as required by 10 CFR 2.202(a)(1), specifically the threat of a terrorist attack and/or nuclear incidents at aging antiquated nuclear facilities across America. The NRC should take immediate action in response to Petitioners request.
The threat of terrorism on a scale of the September 11th attacks, and including assaults from the air or water, has not been previously considered in the licensing and/or design basis threat of the reactor facilities that for the most part are almost 40 years old, therefore, this request is proper and demands NRCs immediate attention and action. The Atomic Energy Act commands the NRC to ensure that any use or production of nuclear materials provide[s] adequate protection to the health or safety of the public, and granting every single license renewal that comes across your desks, regardless of the real risks it poses to host communities and their environment shows you failing miserably at the task. As of September 11, 2001, this duty has taken on a new dimension: the protection of the public from threat of a major radiological release resulting from a terrorist attack. Given that NRCs paramount responsibility [is] protection of the public health and safety and the environment, the NRC should immediately order the actions requested herein and more fully articulated below.
A. The NRC Should Order An Immediate, Temporary Suspension of Operations at all nuclear reactors, and Conduct a Full Review of The Facilities Vulnerabilities, Security Measures and Evacuation Plans. No licensee should be allowed to begin further operations, until they had provided adequate funding for the relief sought in this petition.
Title 10, Section 2.202 of the Code of Federal Regulations authorizes the NRC to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or [take] any other action as may be proper. The NRC should immediately order all nuclear reactor licensees to suspend operations, revoke their operating license, or adopt other measures resulting in a temporary shutdown, as per 10 CFR 2.202, and to conduct a full review of these facility’s vulnerabilities, security measures and evacuation plans for the following reasons:
First, as explained above, as operating facilities, even new reactors are unnecessarily vulnerable to risks from takeover of or damage to control rooms. As long as the aging reactor facilities remain operational, the control rooms are a likely and vulnerable targets for terrorist attack. Seizure or disability of the control rooms would dramatically increase the potential for the intentional or accidental destruction of the reactor core. Because none of these facilities, nor the NRC have given adequate attention to consequences, nor provided adequate protection from said consequences, all nuclear facilities should be closed down until such time as adequate public protections, including family shelters are both implemented and deployed in all host communities.
Second, because the reactor containment walls were not designed to withstand the accidental or intentional crash of fuel laden jetliners, a breach of operating reactors creates a significantly greater danger of catastrophic contamination. The danger of a potential release of high-risk radio-nucleides would be reduced by a temporary de-powering and cold shut down of these reactors until such time as shelters to house 100 percent of host community citizens are in place, and the NRC and/or Congress have come up with a plan, and put it into operation which guarantees citizens of host communities will be made financially whole in the case of a nuclear incident and/or attack.
Third, operating facilities create multiple vulnerable points in plant security. While shutting down the reactors will not remove the need for security, the reduction in threat would allow the licensee to focus its protective efforts on the more critical areas of the facility, especially the spent fuel storage areas, thereby concentrating resources where they are most valuable and most likely to effectively protect against the deadliest attack while the NRC takes step to address their over sights in adequately addressing consequence mitigation efforts.
Nuclear facilities and NRC personnel and resources confront dual challenges when ensuring security at an operational facility. Currently, employees at these nuclear fuel/energy cycle facilities must ensure both the safe and stable generation of power and create a heightened security environment. Simultaneously, NRC personnel are tasked with overseeing the ordinary operations of the plants, while also ensuring protection against foreseeable threats. Resources of both the agency and the licensee are stretched thin by this double-tasking, and combined with egregious licensee actions like spending $1.5 Billion to buy back their own stock while failing to provide adequate host community protections should be criminal.
Finally, shutting down these reactors creates a far more secure environment though many risks remain as long as the NRC and DOE fail in their empty promise to deal with the lethal waste streams sitting in failing, leaking spent fuel pools across America. Spent fuel security has never been demonstrated at Indian Point or any other reactor site. A provisional shut down of these plants is needed to allow the licensee and the NRC to test critical security provisions for their facilities. "Business as usual" operation of nuclear power plants provides no incentive for the plant's owner and the NRC to remedy this long overlooked vulnerability. The time has come to put much needed efforts and money into the consequences of the nuclear equation.
For all of these reasons, an immediate, temporary shutdown of the operating reactors across America is necessary and prudent.
B. The NRC Should Require the Licensees to Provide Information Documenting That Existing Security and Financial Measures Are Sufficient Against Plausible Threats of Terrorist Attacks/Nuclear Incidents, and that Communities Can Be Made Whole Should Such Event(s) Occur.
Title 10, Section 2.204(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations authorizes the NRC to demand information from a licensee. The NRC should immediately demand that Entergy, Exelon and other reactor owners/licensees provide information documenting the existing and readily attainable security and financial measures which provide the facilities with protection against land, water, and airborne terrorist attacks are in place, and that they have workable plans including family shelters in place to adequately protect human health and safety, including a families financial well being, even if Price Anderson Act is outlawed to do it, and licensees are stripped of their ability to hide behind LLC's. Such information must provide, at a minimum, sufficient basis for the Commission to determine that physical barriers, intrusion alarms, and other measures are in place or may be easily constructed to meet plausible threats, funding has been set aside for construction, supplying and yearly maintenance of family shelters adequate to house all populations within ten miles of these facilities, including the homeless, and to show adequate funds to rebuild communities to being whole for the following reasons:
Actual threats against nuclear power plants have been documented and reactors like Entergy's Indian Point facility are a plausible target of future terrorist actions. However, as explained above, the design-basis threat for Indian Point and the other 102 reactors now operating in America did not consider the possibility of an intentional terrorist attack from the air or water, or a suicide attack from any front. Security forces at nuclear power plants have repeatedly failed to repel mock terrorist attackers. Moreover, most of these aging, brittled reactors with failing welds, and significant cracks have a long history of safety problems related to the inability to respond to emergency situations. Entergy as one example, has a demonstrably poor security record and it is clear from Entergy’s history of violations that its ability to protect its facilities against a terrorist attack is questionable at best. Further, aging issues coupled with a never ending stream of human errors make a significant event at a nuclear reactor a question of when, not if.
Because a terrorist attack was not considered in these plants design basis threat, because mock attacks at nuclear plants are rarely thwarted by security forces, and because these facility and their operators have notoriously poor security histories, the NRC should immediately demand all information necessary to determine whether any reactor in America is, or can be secured against a land-, air- or water-based terrorist attack.
Faced with these catastrophic threats, the NRC should, at a minimum, take action to obtain the following security and safety measures:
1. A permanent no-fly zone within 25 nautical miles of all nuclear facilities;
2. A defense and security system sufficient to protect and defend the no-fly zone; and
3. A defense and security system sufficient to protect the entire facility, including the containment and spent fuel storage buildings, control room and electricity equipment, from a land- or water-based terrorist attack.
4. Require licensees to provide adequate funding for the construction of, supply of, and maintenance of family shelters for all citizens living within ten miles of a nuclear fuel/energy cycle licensee.
These measures are necessary to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 regarding physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage, and to fulfill the governments moral and ethical obligations to protect human heath and safety from the consequences of a nuclear incident and/or attack. .
D. The NRC Should Order the Revision of all Nuclear Licensee Response Plans and Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Order to Account for Critical New Information and Prepare for Possible Terrorist Attacks, and To Require Adequate Funds To Cover All Citizen Costs in Preparing To Shelter In Place...to do otherwise is Economic Racism, Providing True Protection Of Human Health and Safety To Only Those Who Can Afford The Luxury.
CONCLUSION
The NRC is confronted with new challenges: how to protect the nations densely populated areas and the environment from the threat of terrorist attacks/nuclear incidents at aging, failing nuclear facilities such as Entergy's Vermont Yankee and Indian Point, and balancing corporate greed against human health and safety, with more emphasis in being prepared for consequences, rather than using skewed risk assessments as excuses for not having adequate protections in place...the Nuclear Renaissance cannot, and must not move forward until this disparity is righted. While this may be a challenging and daunting task, the NRC must react quickly and in a determined manner. The temporary shutdown of these facilities will significantly reduce the potential catastrophic consequences if any one of them experiences a terrorist attack or nuclear incident, and send a clear message to the NuStart's of the nuclear industry that the free ride at the tax payers and host community's expense is over. As the potential harm resulting from such attacks and incidents is reduced with facility closures, reactors become less of an attractive target to terrorists during the time of transition. Therefore, the temporary shutdowns and increased protections of these facilities until the protection called for in this petition for rule making are implemented, is the most logical action to be taken to protect public health and minimize danger to life and property.
The NRC should order their licensees and local municipalities to review and update their emergency response plans in consideration and response to both terrorist threat, or nuclear incident since: (1) the threat of a large, highly coordinated terrorist attack has not been previously considered in the licensing or the design basis threat of these facilities; (2) it also has not been considered in the development of emergency response plans; and (3) it has not been considered in the Radiological Emergency Response Plans developed by local municipalities, and 4. no plans adequately fund real time sheltering costs or provide adequate mechanisms for a community to rebuild, with no clearer example of this reality than the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. If Entergy, Exelon, other key nuclear industry players and/or any municipality determines that it is infeasible to develop a Emergency Response Plan or a Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan to meet this new threat of aging or a terrorist attack, is not willing to fund the necessary steps to fully protect the health and safety of citizens, then the NRC should order the shutdown of the facility, deny a license for a new facility until the site-specific, hazardous condition is abated in such a fashion that provides maximum protection for the citizens of a host facility.
Petitioner’s requests are for reasonable and achievable measures that should be supported and implemented by the NRC. This is the only way NRC may uphold its congressional mandate to protect the lives, the environment and the property of the people of the United States of America.
"Here in NYC, I want to fight for better energy efficiency and conservation, to reduce our demand on IP. And, realistically, a very, VERY small percentage of NYC's electricity comes from IP--by mandate a full 80% of the city's PEAK load (the hottest, more energy hungry summer days, that is) must be generated w/in the city. Most of our juice comes from all those natural gas plants scattered around our crusty waterfronts. So I hope that we can, as a city, reduce our demand on IP to a big 0. And I think that's quite possible."
