Nuclear Reactors and Airplane Attacks

Now, we are all aware that citizens are not allowed to have access to, or even discuss the DBT under the guise we could be tipping off terrorists by holding such discussions. Never mind a community being allowed to know the real risks associated with being forced to play host to a aging, fatigued, FAC plagued reactor such as Indian Point. Besides, the NRC and Entergy have told us that the chance of air planes crashing into Nuclear Reactors are so remote, that consideration of the risks associated with such a scenerio are not even worth considering.

OK, then maybe someone from the NRC (Sam Collins?) can explain to me why air planes flying into reactors, the danger of planes and immenent risks play such an important part of the NRC email (copied below)that discusses phone call protocols. Seems that the risks of planes being highjacked and flown into nuclear reactors is a far more real event than the NRC and Homeland Security want to let on. Said letter was found on the NRC Adams site doing a very simple search.

http://adamswebsearch.nrc.gov/scripts/rwisapi.dll/@pip1.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=IHUYSZYJNAWU&CQ_QUERY_HANDLE=124757&CQQNUM=3&CQ_DOCUMENT=YES&CQ_SAVE[ResultsReturnPage]=results_list.html&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=47

June 25, 2007

SECURITY ADVISORY FOR POWER REACTORS

SA-07-01 Rev. 1

SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY USE OF AUTHENTICATION CODES TO VALIDATE CALLER IDENTIFICATION DURING THREATS AND PHYSICAL ATTACKS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC [?] ) has identified the benefit of expediting the verification of caller identity in the case of a threat or attack to a nuclear power plant. This is especially important in the case of an airborne threat.

Background

Appendix G, “Reportable Safeguards Events,” to Title 10, Section 73.71, “Reporting of Safeguards Events,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 73.71) provides the current reporting requirements for security-related events. In addition, the Commission has previously advised licensees of the need to expedite their initial notifications to the NRC [?] in NRC [?] Bulletin 2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,” dated July 18, 2005. This Security Advisory (SA) provides guidance regarding a voluntary process intended to enhance the efficiency of initial notifications and reduce the resource impact of the existing caller identification protocol.

The current verification protocol involves several steps. First, the NRC [?] receives threat information from an external source (e.g., the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. Northern Command) and telephones the licensee main control room. To verify that the caller is actually the NRC [?] , the licensee has two options. While the licensee stays on the line, another member of the licensee’s staff can call the NRC [?] Operations Center to verify the authenticity of the call. Alternatively, the licensee can hang up the phone and call the NRC [?] Operations Center to perform the verification. NRC [?] staff would perform a similar process if the NRC [?] Operations Center receives a call from the licensee to notify the agency of a security threat or an actual attack.

The current verification protocol involves the use of resources that may be better suited to other tasks, such as licensee immediate actions for an imminent threat and notifying additional State and local first responders. Under the new protocol, the NRC [?] will exchange an authentication code with the licensee’s main control room to verify the caller’s identity whenever a caller makes a threat notification. The proper use of the code will provide a short, simple means of caller authentication that may eliminate the need to perform a callback, unless desired, and will still maintain reasonable assurance of the caller’s identity.

Due to feedback from industry representatives, the Agency is issuing this revision to remove the word “imminent” to avoid confusion with the use of the term with respect to aircraft threats. The revision also clarifies when use of the authentication code is appropriate. Specifically, the code is intended to be used as an operational aid by licensee main control room staff and NRC [?] Headquarters Operations Officers (HOOs) to facilitate rapid caller authentication during a threat or physical attack event.

Demand That Government Gives Us Truth on Human Health and Safety Risks Regarding Indian Point

Picture of DTRA Mobile Sheltering Device For Medical Staff...where is OURS?

The government has its own agenda where nuclear energy is concerned, and from what we can tell, they stand fully ready to DUPE the public in their quest for their own selfish goals...problem is,they are playing Russian Roulette with our safety. Below is a letter we have just sent out too various agencies of our Federal Government, and we recommend those concerned with Indian Points continued operation use it as a model to create inquiry letters of your own.

Dear Dr. James Tegnelia
Major General Ramdal R Castro
DTRA Office of Inspector General
FOIA Office for DTRA, NRC, DHS,FEMA
Chairman of NRC
Secretary-Department of Homeland Security (or lack thereof.)
FEMA
Secretary-Department of Energy
Hugo Teufel III


My name is Sherwood Martinelli, a citizen stakeholder living within three miles of a nuclear facility owned by the commercial enterprise Entergy, and commonly known as Indian Point. It is common knowledge in our area, that in the case of a nuclear incident and/or terrorist attack, that the NRC (as is outlined in various official documents including their fatally flawed DBT) have the following expectations, or lack thereof:

1. In the case of a fast moving event at the nuclear facility, NRC's Sam Collins has admitted that evacuation of citizens would not be workable/possible, and citizens would be sheltered in place. Further, the various governmental agencies charged with Emergency Response have admitted this as well in establishing a new wedge policy wherein only a 2.5 mile pie shaped wedge determined to be MOST AT RISK would be evacuated in a fast moving nuclear event with all others ordered sheltering in place.
2. NRC, and it's licensee would rely heavily on first responders, law enforcement and military aid in dealing with the situation. In the case of Indian Point, the inadequate military base just up route nine, and perhaps West Point would be called into action to provide aid, or in the case of a terrorist attack military support and fire power.

Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, NRC and various agencies at local, state and federal levels have attempted to fabricate a public belief that we are safe from the effects of a radioactive event being sheltered in place, and in fact and deed the NRC has used that very criteria to justify in part their decision not to include evacuation plans, and terrorist attacks on the facility in their decision making process during the license renewal application process for their licensees for the aforementioned Indian Point reactors. They have coupled this reasoning with flawed and biased modeling written by the nuclear licensees lobbyist (NEI)that shows the likelihood of an attack on a nuclear reactor is so small as to be almost mathematically impossible. Assorted information on other government sites categorically refute these false assumptions by the NRC and NEI.

Living in New York, having been down in New York (not at Ground Zero) on Sept 11, 2001 I was/am more than skeptical, and so have done my due diligence in conducting my own investigation/research into matters directly and/or indirectly associated with nuclear incidents, terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, and evacuation plans, specifically giving careful attention to the now preferred method of protecting human health and safety through sheltering in place during a catastrophic event. No more damning condemnation of the shortcomings of shielding in place could be found than the CDC report that discusses the level of protection for the average citizen who has been ordered to shelter in place. For a citizen sheltered in their stick frame and/or brick home in a concrete basement, the protection level is only 40 percent shielding from Radioactive fallout. For those living in residential structures with no basement, said level of protection drops to a devastatingly alarming ten percent.

Armed with this disturbing news, I began visiting a host of government sites, and found some more forthcoming than others. For instance, if you visit Condi Rice's Department of State site dealing with these issues, they state sheltering in place in the event of a Terrorist Dirty Bomb explosion and/or attack on a nuclear facility could, in a worst case scenario, last for a period of weeks, not days as is claimed and all but codified by the NRC.

Further, each for their own reasons, it became apparent in my research, that the DOD, DOE, NRC,NEI, the Nuclear Industry and various other corporate and governmental agencies under the guise of National Interest, and National Security have been intimately, if not incestuously involved in pushing/moving forward the agenda of a Nuclear Renaissance both here in America and abroad with GNEP being used as placebo to assure us as citizens that our Federal Government is finally coming up with a plan to deal with the waste streams from the nuclear industry (both military and civilian). It (GNEP) at best is good intentions gone astray, and at worse, a governmental boondoggle that leaves WMD's (leaking spent fuel pools, and aging failing reactors) inadequately guarded and protected in and around MAJOR (emphasis added) population centers, while the NRC, blindly ignoring basic truths continues the wrongful rubber stamping of reactor license renewal applications, while turning a blind eye to known public health and safety concerns. For instance, the population living within a 50 mile radius of Indian Point exceeds 21 million citizens, and in the case of a significantly nuclear event at Indian Point, some estimates say we could see a immediate death toll running into the tens of thousands...that risk in the name of a Nuclear Renaissance is unacceptable, as is the inadequate protections of shielding citizens in place.

It also became apparent as I looked into these related issues, that First Responders, including members of our military tagged to be a part of the response team dealing with a National Emergency such as a significant nuclear incident/accident (as almost happened when the truck carrying nuclear materials from Japan tipped over on I-95 in North Carolina-yes, the story got partially out before and exclusion zone was thrown up) and/or a terrorist attack at a nuclear facility are being told a different truth than members of the general public, being given a different set of instructions regarding what they need in the way of equipment to be adequately protected than what is being distributed out to members of the general public. The polar opposite realities are not both possible, one or the other is a lie.

Today I called up the DTRA after doing some extensive reading on their web site, and examining their various and assorted course offerings and asked your spokesperson, a reticent and stubborn Mr. Gaines a very straightforward question, which he (like all other agencies I have spoken to) stealthily avoided giving a direct answer to. If first responders need to wear super protective clothing , self containing breathing apparatus, and a dosimeter device in responding to a nuclear event, would civilians ordered to be sheltered in the affected area require that same level of equipment/protection to adequately protect their own health and safety? If medical staff and personal working in a nuclear fallout area need to be protected by being placed in one of the self contained sheltering vehicles such as the one pictured on your web site, wouldn't citizens in the exclusion zone need a similarly personal shelter to have adequate protection of their health and safety?

Mr. Gaines tried to avoid answering the question with a dodge when he stated, "Our agency is concerned with, charged with aiding members of the DOD in performing their task as relates to terrorist threat reduction, or aiding them (DOD) in responding to a nuclear event if our help is requested from the DHS, so I cannot speak to issues of civilian protection. Undeterred, I took a different tack by rephrasing the question. Would you send your agency's personnel into an nuclear incident area without the equipment mandated and/or recommended by your agency's guidelines, to which he replied, "We don't deploy personnel without adequate protective gear. (Iraq aside?) I pointed out, that was not the question asked, at which point he got belligerent, and said he was not willing, could not go there...as in truthfully and honestly answering an American citizen stakeholder's straight forward question?

As a result of this government run around, and deliberate avoidance in honestly answering a stakeholder citizen's questions, I am taking the step of formalizing my inquiries in this email. As citizen stakeholders living near a nuclear facility, we should know the full extent of the risks we are facing when government asks/demands that we play host to a nuclear facility. As allowed in the broadest interpretation of your agency's rules and regulations (individually and/or collectively) this letter is to be interpreted as A) inquiry, B) FOIA request, and C) and allegation. I would like the following questions asked, and as a part of the answer, please include any and all underlying lying documents used in formulating the answer/response, including citations of law, inter/intra office memos, emails, studies and or reports.

1. If first responders need to wear super protective clothing , self containing breathing apparatus, and a dosimeter device in responding to a nuclear event, would civilians ordered to be sheltered in the affected area require that same level of equipment/protection to adequately protect their own health and safety? If not, please explain with specifics why not, and why your agency finds these differing levels of personal protection acceptable.

2. If medical staff and personal working in a nuclear fallout area need to be protected by being placed in one of the self contained sheltering vehicles, such as the one pictured on DTRA web site, wouldn't citizens in the exclusion zone need a similar personal shelter to have adequate protection of their health and safety? If not, please explain with specifics why not, and why your agency finds these differing levels of personal protection acceptable.

3. Would you send your agency's personnel into a nuclear incident area without the equipment mandated and/or recommended by your agencies guidelines? If not, please in detail explain your decision, specifically identifying the risk that said personal would/could face in said potentially contaminated area if they did not have these adequate health and safety protections and equipment.

4. Please identify any and all known safety, security and structural concerns/problems you are aware of, and/or are researching/examining as relates to the continued safe operation and protection of America's nuclear facilities, including Commercial Nuclear Reactors and their leaking spent fuel pools. Please specifically identify known and/or suspected risks to public health and safety in the event of a nuclear accident and/or successful terrorist attack at a nuclear facility, with special attention given to the public risk regarding commercial nuclear reactors.

5. What inadequacies and/or potential problems is the government aware of as relates to A) community evacuation plans, and B) sheltering in place in the case of a nuclear incident and/or terrorist attack on a nuclear facility, and what levels of potential loss and/or harm have been identified (human life, long term health effects, infrastructure loss and/or contamination, financial losses, specifically as affects private citizens since the Price Anderson act leaves us with no form of protecting our assets in the case of a nuclear event and/or a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility.

As a citizen stakeholder living within 3 miles of a governmentally licensed and policed nuclear facility that has applied for a 20 year license renewal, and should be entitled by law to honest and forthright answers to these questions, so that I can fully and completely evaluate the true risk I and my community are being asked to take in continuing to play host to two aging, failing nuclear reactors that are already threatening human health and/or the environment as they leak strontium 90 and tritium into both the area ground water, and the Hudson river.

Respectfully Submitted

Sherwood Martinelli
351 Dyckman
Peekskill, New York 10566

For those activists receiving a copy of this letter...please feel free to forward this to your elected officials, and/or other activists involved in this issue.

This letter also being posted to the Green Nuclear Butterfly blog...please feel free to distribute it to your list serves.

Official Request for Fee Waivers:

For the following reasons, Sherwood Martinelli requests a full and complete waiver of any and all fees associated with the FOIA components of this document.

1. Purpose-To ascertain full risks I, as a stakeholder face in living near a nuclear facility, and distribute said information to the public so they as well can understand their risks as we face the potential re-licensing of the failing Indian Point Nuclear Reactors. Said distribution will occur has occurred through my NRC recognized advocacy group, GNB (Green Nuclear Butterfly) at public events, such as last month's NRC open house in our community where the NRC gave us a presentation table, as well as our blog.

2. The information and answer requested in this document will be used first to educate the public TRUTHFULLY about the risks associated with specifically, Indian Point, and additionally said information will be used as is practical in our plans to act as and intervener in Entergy's license renewal application process.

3. If the information gained reinforces our/my initial findings regarding public safety as relates to a fast nuclear event (terrorist attack of nuclear facility), there is a probabilistic chance that the members of the General Public in and around the host community of Indian Point will become far more active and plugged into the regulatory process, and in demanding the closure of said facility.

4. We currently interact with, communicate (through our blog, public outreach, and phone) daily with over 150 people...on average, 80 percent of these contacts are disseminating our material for the first time. As the license renewal process moves forward, we have the very real capability (thanks to the Internet) of having direct involvement with potentially millions of stakeholders within 50 miles of Indian Point who oppose its license renewal application.

5. As answered before, we distribute this information at public events, formal NRC events/meetings, and via the Internet, and do not charge a fee for our distributed information.

6. My private interests in this information are only as a stakeholder living within 3 miles of a nuclear event.

For these reasons, it is requested that any and all fees associated with the FOIA components of this document be waved in their entirety.

Sherwood Martinelli

A New Idea To Consider As I Head Out To Get My Cast Off

Was sitting here having my second cup of coffee, watching the pre-Kentucky Derby hysteria on the news when it came to me...lets put Entergy and the NRC's faith in plant security to the test with a winner take all Independent Force on Force test, with the site only knowing the day of the test. We, the host team get to design the event, and put together our own independently chosen attack force. Since we are not allowed to see security related items, we'll design our team, choose their weapons and attack points with only what we ourselves can find out on our own via the Internet. I'm thinking we should use a team of 18 members (we have precedent in 9/11 of that sized terrorist group working together inside America's borders) that we divide into say three strike force teams.

The NRC will provide us with nothing more than the objectives list. Entergy can prepare its site and security staff anyway it wants, but must have for the exercise it's normal security deployment numbers...no beefing up plant security for the test.

If our community based and designed Force on Force attack team beats Indian Point's Security team, we win...I'd suggest my Uncle who did several tours over in Nam as a Green Beret, or someone like him act as planner of our attack design for this exercise. Entergy wins, the plant stays open, we win the plant closes. One last note...we will not be held to the worthless standards in the NRC's DBT in planning our portion of the exercise.

As the old saying goes, let the NRC and Entergy put their money where their mouth is, and prove to us how good their security team is. Put up, or shut up. Since Governor Pitzer, Hillary Clinton, John Hall, Muarice Hinchey, Nita Lowey and Spano all insist the plant be safe, would challenge these politicians to file this request jointly as a Petition for Rule Makking (2.208) but since it is doubtful they have those kind of balls, will do it myself when I return home this afternoon.

Entergy Says: "Toxic Waste is Good for You!"

With a little help from:
Center for Media and Democracy
www.sourcewatch.org

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is intimately tied into Hill & Knowlton which explains the kid glove treatment given to CASEnergy, and Moore's endorsement of nuclear. These guys control a whole lot of ad dollars.

In December 1953, H&K designed the tobacco industry's strategy for counteracting scientific evidence which linked cigarette smoking to lung cancer, authoring the Frank Statement to the public printed throughout the USA in January 1954. H&K also helped organize the Council for Tobacco Research. As a result, H&K was named a co-defendant of Philip Morris in numerous tobacco lawsuits.

H&K represented the Catholic bishops in America in their campaign against legalized abortion, and the Body Shop International when it came under criticism for making false claims about itself and its products.

Hill & Knowlton also represents Debswana - a joint venture between De Beers diamond mining companty and the government of Botswana. De Beers owns the rights to mine diamonds in the Kalahari, and through Debswana, has played a role in evicting indigenous Kalahari Bushmen from their land. According to Lord Pearson of Rannoch – a Peer in the British House of Lords, "Many of them (Kalahari Bushmen) felt that they had been evicted because Debswana wanted their land for its diamonds".

Hill & Knowlton claims on its website that "an information campaign generated support [for Debswana] among members of Congress, UK Parliamentarians, Members of the Japanese Diet and Members of the European Parliament, as well as numerous media outlets."

Paul Taaffe is Chairman and Chief Executive of Hill & Knowlton, Inc.

Entergy just as ugly and incestuous as they are tied into Burson-Marsteller.

Burson-Marsteller part of Young & Rubicam Brands, working as partners for some of the world's strongest brands, is led by Richard Mintz, who ran the media shop at the Department of Transportation during the Clinton administration. He also served as staff director for Hillary Clinton during the 1992 campaign.

In March 2005, PR Week reported that Burson-Marsteller won a $4.6 million contract, through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Urban Area Security Initiative grant program.

Executives at the Burson-Marsteller PR firm are saying as little as possible about their pro-biotech PR campaign for the Monsanto company.

In January 2004, the Observer (UK) reported that European Women for HPV Testing was a front group being run by B-M campaign for the US biotechnology company Digene. The Observer reported that some of the celebrities cited as endorsing the campaign on the groups website were not aware of the links of the group with Digene.

In April 2005, Jack O'Dwyer's Newsletter reported that Burson-Marsteller had joined with Quinn Gillespie & Associates to launch 360 Advantage, a public affairs shop filled with "key players in George W. Bush's successful presidential campaigns." 360 Advantage is headed by Russ Schriefer, who did advertising with the Bush/Cheney 2000 and 2004 campaigns and produced the 2004 Republican National Convention, and by Stuart Stevens, a "Bush adman and veteran political strategist."

The Executive Board, as of December 2005, consists of:

Harold Burson, Founding Chairman
Mark Penn, Worldwide Chief Executive Officer
Chris Komisarjevsky, President & CEO Worldwide, Emeritus
Carlos Lareau, Chief Operating Officer, Worldwide
Ken Rietz, Vice-Chairman, Worldwide and CEO US
Celia Berk, Human Resources Worldwide
Fred Hawrysh, Director of Global Client Service
Per Heggenes, Chief Executive Officer UK, Co-CEO Europe
John Maltese, Chief Financial Officer Worldwide
Heidi Sinclair, CEO Continetal Europe, CoCEO Europe
Bill Rylance, President & CEO, Asia/Pacific
Santiago Hinojosa, President & CEO, Latin America
Leslie Gaines-Ross, Chief Knowledge & Research Officer, Worldwide
Pat Ford Chair, Global Corporate Practice / New York Market Leader
Richard Mintz, Chair, Global Public Affairs Practice/Director of Global New Business Development
Jennifer Graham, Chair, Global Technology Practice
Ame Wadler, Chair, Global Healthcare Practice

More here:
www.prwatch.org/prwissues/2005Q1/nuke2.html