Showing posts with label terrorist attack. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terrorist attack. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

First in Series of Entergy Originals

In the first of a series of Entergy Originals, Sherwood Martinelli and Green Nuclear Butterfly are pleased to post today a reproduction of an original pencil sketch that we are looking into putting into Poster Production for distribution around the Indian Point and Vermont Yankee facilities. Please feel free to print up and distribute this powerful art image.

Tuesday, August 21, 2007

Another NRC Email to GE On Commercial Airplanes Crashing Into Reactors

Time that the NRC comes clean, time that the aftermath of a plane crashing into a nuclear reactor like Entergy's Indian Point be included in the EIS and Environmental Scoping Process...and yes, this email also was found on ADAMS. For profit companies can know the TRUTH, but host communities cannot...what a crock of CRAP.

This is not the Official Agency Record. See the image file for the Official Agency Record.

R. Brown Ltr Re Issuance of Order Imposing Safeguards Information Protection Requirements and Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements.
Go To Best Hit Return to Results Find More Documents Like This One (This will delete your previous results.)

1 Safeguards Information is a form of sensitive, unclassified, security-related information that the Commission has the authority to designate and protect under Section 147 of the AEA.

June 15, 2007

Mr. Robert E. Brown
General Manager, Regulatory Affairs
General Electric Company
3901 Castle Hayne Rd, MC A-45
Wilmington, NC 28401

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF ORDER IMPOSING SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AND FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORDS CHECK REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

Dear Mr. Brown:

The Commission has decided to require, through rulemaking, that nuclear power plant designers perform a rigorous assessment of design features that could provide additional inherent protection to avoid or mitigate the effects of an aircraft impact, while reducing or eliminating the need for operator actions, where practicable. In anticipation of this requirement, and to assist designers in completing this assessment, the Commission has decided to provide the beyond design basis, large commercial aircraft characteristics specified by the Commission to plant designers who have the need-to-know and who meet the NRC [?] ’s requirements for the disclosure of such information. The specified aircraft characteristics that are the subject of the enclosed Order (Enclosure 1) are designated by the Order as Safeguards Information (SGI),1 in accordance with Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA).

In a letter dated June 26, 2004, General Electric Company (GE) requested authorization to possess certain information designated by the NRC [?] as SGI and described GE's program for protecting that SGI against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21. In its May 10, 2005, response to that letter, the NRC [?] agreed to provide GE with the requested SGI, and noted that, based on a review of GE's implementing procedures and observation of GE's facilities, it had determined that GE provided assurance that it will protect the SGI in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21. Though the NRC [?] recognizes that GE has continued to maintain that SGI protection program, and that implementation of that program is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21, GE is not legally-bound by the May 10, 2005 letter to comply with those provisions. Therefore, in order to provide a legally enforceable requirement for GE's continued protection of SGI, as well as to impose the additional fingerprinting requirements that have become effective pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) since GE implemented its SGI protection program in 2005, the NRC [?] is issuing the enclosed Order to GE to impose requirements for the protection of SGI, as well as for the fingerprinting of all persons who have or seek access to this SGI.

R. Brown - 2 -

Before GE grants an individual access to SGI, GE must submit the fingerprints of the individual to the NRC [?] for an FBI criminal history records check. The results of the FBI criminal history records check will be provided to GE and that information must be considered by GE when making a determination of whether an individual, who has a need-to-know SGI, may be given access to SGI (see Attachment to the Order and Enclosure 2 to this letter).

Certain categories of individuals are excepted by rule from the fingerprinting requirement [10 CFR 73.59], including Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel; Agreement State inspectors who conduct security inspections on behalf of the NRC [?] ; members of Congress; certain employees of members of Congress or Congressional Committees who have undergone fingerprinting for a prior U.S. government criminal history check; and representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency or certain foreign government organizations. In addition, the NRC [?] has determined that individuals who have active federal security clearances, or who have had a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history check within the last five (5) years, have already been subjected to fingerprinting and criminal history checks and, thus, have satisfied the EPAct fingerprinting requirement.

In order to implement the enclosed Order, GE must nominate an individual who will review the results of the FBI criminal history records check to make SGI access determinations. This individual, referred to as the “reviewing official,” must be someone who seeks access to SGI. Based on the results of the FBI criminal history records check, the NRC [?] staff will determine whether this individual may have access to SGI. If the NRC [?] determines that the individual may not be granted access to SGI, the enclosed Order prohibits that individual from obtaining access to any SGI. The NRC [?] process that will govern this determination, and the rights of the individual nominated to be the reviewing official, are described in Enclosure 3. Once the NRC [?] approves a reviewing official, that reviewing official, and only that reviewing official, can make SGI access determinations for other individuals who have been identified by GE as having a need to know SGI, and who have been fingerprinted and have had a criminal history records check. The reviewing official can only make SGI access determinations for other individuals, but cannot approve other individuals to act as reviewing officials. Only the NRC [?] can approve a reviewing official; therefore, if GE wishes to have a new or additional reviewing official, the NRC [?] must approve that individual before they can act in that capacity.

In the event that the individual nominated as the GE’s initial reviewing official is not approved by the NRC [?] to have access to SGI, the individual may appeal this decision by following the procedures in Enclosure 3. GE may then nominate a different individual to be the reviewing official. If GE decides to withdraw the nomination of an individual as a reviewing official after submitting fingerprints to the FBI through the NRC [?] , the NRC [?] will still complete the review process for determining access to SGI.

GE is required to submit fingerprints in accordance with the enclosed Order. The current processing fee is $27.00 per submission and payment must accompany the request. Details regarding fingerprint submittals and payment of fees are found in the Attachment to the Order. If the person GE nominates as reviewing official already has a national security clearance, please submit that person’s name along with documentation that supports the claim. NRC [?] staff will verify that the nominated individual has the necessary clearance to be able to be approved as reviewing official.

R. Brown - 3 -

The enclosed Order is effective immediately. These requirements will remain in effect until the Commission determines otherwise.

The enclosed Order requires that GE respond to the Order within twenty (20) days of the date of the Order, and implement the requirements of the Order before providing access to SGI to any individual. Please contact Anissa Coates at (301) 415-1897, or via email [?] to ARC3@nrc [?] .gov, to facilitate resolution of any issues or questions related to compliance with the requirements of the enclosed Order.

GE’s responses to the Order (not fingerprint cards) must be submitted to the Director, Office of New Reactors, and should be addressed to the attention of Anissa Coates, Mail Stop O-17F3. The following mailing addresses should be used:

For normal postal delivery, mail to:

Director, Office of New Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C., 20555-0001 Attn: Anissa Coates, Mail Stop O-17F3

For delivery services requiring a street address, mail to:

Director, Office of New Reactors
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
Attn: Anissa Coates, Mail Stop O-17F3

Please include the docket number listed below in all your correspondence to the NRC [?] . In addition, GE responses shall be marked as "Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390." The enclosed Order has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Nuclear Reactors and Airplane Attacks

Now, we are all aware that citizens are not allowed to have access to, or even discuss the DBT under the guise we could be tipping off terrorists by holding such discussions. Never mind a community being allowed to know the real risks associated with being forced to play host to a aging, fatigued, FAC plagued reactor such as Indian Point. Besides, the NRC and Entergy have told us that the chance of air planes crashing into Nuclear Reactors are so remote, that consideration of the risks associated with such a scenerio are not even worth considering.

OK, then maybe someone from the NRC (Sam Collins?) can explain to me why air planes flying into reactors, the danger of planes and immenent risks play such an important part of the NRC email (copied below)that discusses phone call protocols. Seems that the risks of planes being highjacked and flown into nuclear reactors is a far more real event than the NRC and Homeland Security want to let on. Said letter was found on the NRC Adams site doing a very simple search.

http://adamswebsearch.nrc.gov/scripts/rwisapi.dll/@pip1.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=IHUYSZYJNAWU&CQ_QUERY_HANDLE=124757&CQQNUM=3&CQ_DOCUMENT=YES&CQ_SAVE[ResultsReturnPage]=results_list.html&CQ_CUR_DOCUMENT=47

June 25, 2007

SECURITY ADVISORY FOR POWER REACTORS

SA-07-01 Rev. 1

SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY USE OF AUTHENTICATION CODES TO VALIDATE CALLER IDENTIFICATION DURING THREATS AND PHYSICAL ATTACKS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC [?] ) has identified the benefit of expediting the verification of caller identity in the case of a threat or attack to a nuclear power plant. This is especially important in the case of an airborne threat.

Background

Appendix G, “Reportable Safeguards Events,” to Title 10, Section 73.71, “Reporting of Safeguards Events,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 73.71) provides the current reporting requirements for security-related events. In addition, the Commission has previously advised licensees of the need to expedite their initial notifications to the NRC [?] in NRC [?] Bulletin 2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,” dated July 18, 2005. This Security Advisory (SA) provides guidance regarding a voluntary process intended to enhance the efficiency of initial notifications and reduce the resource impact of the existing caller identification protocol.

The current verification protocol involves several steps. First, the NRC [?] receives threat information from an external source (e.g., the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. Northern Command) and telephones the licensee main control room. To verify that the caller is actually the NRC [?] , the licensee has two options. While the licensee stays on the line, another member of the licensee’s staff can call the NRC [?] Operations Center to verify the authenticity of the call. Alternatively, the licensee can hang up the phone and call the NRC [?] Operations Center to perform the verification. NRC [?] staff would perform a similar process if the NRC [?] Operations Center receives a call from the licensee to notify the agency of a security threat or an actual attack.

The current verification protocol involves the use of resources that may be better suited to other tasks, such as licensee immediate actions for an imminent threat and notifying additional State and local first responders. Under the new protocol, the NRC [?] will exchange an authentication code with the licensee’s main control room to verify the caller’s identity whenever a caller makes a threat notification. The proper use of the code will provide a short, simple means of caller authentication that may eliminate the need to perform a callback, unless desired, and will still maintain reasonable assurance of the caller’s identity.

Due to feedback from industry representatives, the Agency is issuing this revision to remove the word “imminent” to avoid confusion with the use of the term with respect to aircraft threats. The revision also clarifies when use of the authentication code is appropriate. Specifically, the code is intended to be used as an operational aid by licensee main control room staff and NRC [?] Headquarters Operations Officers (HOOs) to facilitate rapid caller authentication during a threat or physical attack event.

Saturday, July 7, 2007

Anonymous Entergy Idiot

What kind of a Entergy idiot comes to a anti nuclear blog tossing out plant security information? I made a post regarding an explosive laden vehicle, pointing out how wrong sighted the NRC is in limiting the size to a 4x4 vehicle...someone who seems to know a whole lot about Indian Point posted a comment as Anonymous on the Green Nuclear Butterfly blog, pointing out all the reasons why I am an unreasonable person, explaining in great detail (be it real information or imaginary information) why Indian Point was/is immune from a terrorist successfully getting an explosives laden vehicle onto the plant sight.

A part of the reasoning employed by this person, is that any BIG TRUCK coming on to the Indian Point plant legally is going to already have some serious clearance, and it's travel will be traced from it's departure sight to Indian Point. Kind of like the over turned truck in North Carolina, or perhaps like the radioactive material Indian Point sent to the wrong facility kind of tracking? Or are we talking the kind of security that saw Indian Point's evacuation code software sent to a sister plant via the mail by mistake kind of security? Or perhaps this person is talking about the Indian Point security where intrusion alarms are ignored as it is assumed a small animal has comprimised security. Maybe it is the kind of Entergy security that saw a control room employee sleeping?

Seems that any AUTHORIZED large truck will be Lojack monitored, and voice coached all the way into the facility. Further, any such LARGE VEHICLE with special circumstances will even have helicopter surveillance as it heads towards, and arrives at the plant. Any unauuthorized vehicles, according to this comment poster would be STOPPED by berms and vehicle barriers, which are always in place. OK, we know about these vehicle barriers, and how inadequate they could be under the right situation.

The commenter then talks about Indian Points GREAT WALL...like the one along the river, where anyone can stand across the river from the plant any time they want? You mean the great wall, where someone could lob shoulder launched grenades/rockets at will for a limited period of time, the same shoulder launched grenades, rockets and even mortars that the NRC eliminated from the DBT. Further, lets keep something in mind as we explore security at Indian Point...a truck bomb set off in Iraq today killed 105 people...would this commenter have us believe, that Indian Point can stop vehicle bombs at the plant, when our military forces are having no such luck stopping suicide bombers in Iraq, who seem capable of attacking when and where they want at will?

The poster seems absolutely sure, that Indian Point's WALL of concrete can stop anything up to, and including a M1A1 Main Battle tank...ODD, Bush has told us a wall will not keep out illegal aliens, that building a fence/wall along our Souther border with Mexico will not stop illegal aliens from gaining entry, but we are too believe that Indian Point's comedy of errors security force can stop a determined group of say 20 well trained terrorists? Further, what if said explosives laden vehicle is not the main attack, but a diversion...oh, let us guess, the poster would have us believe Indian Point would know this, and thus ignore the attack, let the truck harmlessly explode...

Further, according to the commenter,Indian Point has posted deliberately misleading road signs at Indian Point, that will lead the intruders into a DISARM AND KILL zone far away from the reactors. Sure, a terrorist is going to be looking for road signs if they get onto the sight, they would not have taken the time to download from the internet the various assorted maps and aerial views of the sight. Further, sure a fake sign leading them away from the highly visiable reactors would FOOL THEM!

I've posted the commenters remarks below in their entirety...I give them little if any credibility, but do ask this question. If this person is really in the know, if some of the security enhancements he speaks about are true, what is he doing sharing them out on the internet?

Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "Terrorist Attack On Indian Point-Explosives Laden ...":
Porgie, should I just say right off that you are a VERY unrealistic individual, which means almost any objection you can bring up is nonsense, on its face. That said, lets dive into your "Large explosive laden truck" scenario.

First, large trucks are an oddity at Indian Point. Trucks over a certain size, length, and weight cannot enter the site by any means at all. Any such oversize arrivals must be tightly coordinated with a security sponsor, for a gate removal. The truck so favored will be Lojack-monitored (and voice-coached) every inch of its travel from its source, to its arrival outside, but not in, Indian Point. If any special circumstances attach, the said truck will even be overflown by helicopter surveillance during its entire trip.

The arrival/acceptance area at Indian Point is over a mile from any vital machinery, and is so situated that a series of earth mounds, or berms, intervene between the gate and the plant. Let us say that Indian Point decides to test these provisions by exploding a large truck at the arrival area. The force of the explosion will be directed upward, into the air , dissipating harmlessly.

Let us now revert to consideration of a hostile large truck, without an overflight, without a security sponsor. It can not enter the plant under any circumstances. The preventive vehicle barriers which are always in place, will not be removed, and so said truck can explode in Buchanan, or at 351 Dyckman Street Peekskill, but it cannot explode within a mile of Indian Point nuclear plant.

Moreover, even if the truck were aided and abetted by a sleeper Al Qaeda operative posing as its security sponsor, and gained a gate removal operation, the areas accessible for large vehicles outside "The Great Wall of IPEC" do not intersect with any vehicle lanes coming near any vital equipment.

Any vehicle-accessible area at IPEC is strictly segregated from any vital machinery, and the segregation is rather large and chunky--- 8 foot high, 8 foot thick reinforced concrete wall barriers insurmountable even by M1A1 Main Battle tanks.

Moreover, intentionally deceptive road signposts have been installed, to be ignored by those in the know, but directing any unsuspecting newbie into a "Disarm and Kill" area set aside for security problems, in a corner of the campus not containing any vital machinery.

To waste one's single martyrdom on such a guaranteed failure, is not in the spirit of Wahabb Sunnist correct action. A martyr must behave as the prophet would have behaved, and will target a less prepared enemy, for maximum effect.

Thursday, May 24, 2007

Sirens By August 24th...Who Cares, By The Time They Sound, It Will Be Too Late For Us

Entergy has informed the NRC that their new emergency siren system will be up and running properly no later than August 24th...over four months past the deadline is unacceptable, and the $130,000 fine inadequate as well. However, let's be honest with ourselves. If there is a nuclear incident or terrorist attack at Indian Point, by the time those alarms start sending out their warning, it will already be far to late for many of us.

Entergy can march Paul Newman through the plant, they can pay Patrick Moore big bucks to act as their corporate shill, and even bring in Christine Todd Whitman to lie to us about the glory of nuclear, and in the end it will not matter if the site is attacked, or a fast moving event strikes the facility known as Indian Point. Folks like myself can jump up and down, try to warn the general population about the risks, and that too does not matter if no one is paying us heed. There is never any joy in saying, " I told you so." We live in a time of apathy, three monkeys seeing, hearing and speaking no evils...where is and Indian Point employee stepping forth to speak the truth to the world? Where is a rightious man or woman on the inside ready to do what's right for humanity?

Wake up people, the siren system is nothing more than a placebo, and like the evacuation plan, like sheltering in place, it too shall fail us in our time of need.

Indian Point nuke plant owner pledges new siren system by Aug. 24

May 23, 2007, 5:56 PM EDT

WHITE PLAINS, N.Y. (AP) _ When the owner of the Indian Point nuclear power plant decided it couldn't meet an April 15 deadline for installing a new emergency siren system, it asked for an extension to Aug. 31.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission refused, fined Entergy Nuclear $130,000 and demanded that it come up with a new plan.

On Wednesday, Entergy said its new plan was to have the sirens up and running by Aug. 24, a week earlier than its original request.

The 150 sirens are meant to alert residents within 10 miles to any emergency at the two-reactor installation in Buchanan on the Hudson River, 35 miles north of midtown Manhattan. Despite extensive testing by Entergy and a 2 1/2-month extension granted by the NRC in January, many sirens failed to respond to a radio activation signal during their final test before the deadline.

An older system remains in place and can be used in emergencies.

Entergy submitted its new plan in a letter to the NRC, saying it anticipates being ready by July 18 but might need more time to deal with "potential schedule uncertainties."

"Therefore Entergy is committing to August 24, 2007, as the latest date anticipated for declaring the new siren system operable," the letter said.

NRC spokeswoman Diane Screnci said the commission would examine the plan "to make sure it's acceptable" and would have no immediate comment on it.

Copyright 2007 Newsday Inc.

Paul Newman Needs To Watch Martin Sheen's Greenpeace Video

This video was found over on You Tube, and sure any semblance to Indian Point's degrated and failing nuclear reactors was/is completely deliberate. Paul Newman needs to endorsement of the plant, and show it where the sun does not shine. Since he seems to LOVE Indian Point so very much, feels it so abundantly safe, how about he move himself and his family in a bit closer to the plant, place himself in a position of having to rely upon a non working evacuation plan, or worse, sheltering in place.

Monday, May 21, 2007

Preparing For A Nuclear Incident or Terrorist Attack on Indian Point-Our Right To Bear Arms


Looking,somewhat tongue and cheek,at our right to bear arms. How many of you are aware of the fact that in the case of a nuclear incident or terrorist attack, the first thing to be suspended will be the rule of law?

Leave no doubt, when a significant nuclear incident or terrorist attack strikes Entergy's Indian Point reactors, or one of the other nuclear reactors here in America the rule of law will cease to exist. Chaos will rule supreme, and it will be every man,woman and child for themselves as people try merely to survive...in short we will be a part of pure Anarchy, many first responders, members of law enforcement, the blue canaries will be dead and gone. Our own government is spending billions of dollars telling us to be ready, be prepared. Part of being prepared in a worst case scenario is SELF DEFENSE, and that means high fired weapons ready at hand.

Which is what NRC, DHS and all levels of government fail to tell you about, do not even want to discuss. They do not want us being ready to defend what is ours with heavy fire power if the need arises, and in the wake of a significant nuclear event, or terrorist attack that need will arise, and your family's ability to survive if ordered sheltered in place (which you will be) may very well depend on the fire power and ammunition you have readily at hand. If someone(s) desperate for food and/or shelter tries to break in, tries to take what is yours, do you really think trying to dial 911 is going to get you any help in the midst of a nuclear disaster?

Weapons and Ammunition sales should be the fastest growth industry there is around nuclear power plants and related facilities. A private dwelling and its citizens should not have just one weapon, they need several, at least one if not more for every member of the family, and lots of ammo. Don't think boxes here, think cases or pallet loads of ammo...after all, if it becomes every neighborhood for itself, you may have to arm your neighbors as well. Start thinking neighborhood watch on steroids.

A semi automatic 12 gauge, or a 22 pistol is not going to be adequate, you need heavier equipment for this job, and it's highly suggested you attend the next major gun show that comes to town...sure, folks like Mayor Bloomberg would prefer a public without ability of self defense, but then, he has his own personal security detail, all of them adequately armed and dangerous.

Start off with say a 9mm Glock, as it is a gun with a serious bite to it, and with ease you can tuck one into a shoulder holster with little trouble...you have to think Rambo here, be prepared with more than one gun at any given time, as you never know who will be busting down your door in a nuclear incident, and trust me, the odds are they will be armed, and more than willing too use deadly force to take what is yours. A 9mm Glock can be found online, most suppliers ready too UPS it right to your front door.

For distance shooting with accuracy, you might want to seriously consider a high grade Sniper Rifle with scope. When accuracy counts, you need to be prepared. If someone is taking pot shots at you in times of civil unrest, you have to have the right tools for the job of protecting you, your family, and your property...after all, what if someone is trying to steal the vehicle you have at the ready for a last ditch effort at evacuation? Are you willing to let your family perish because someone bigger and stronger than you decides they want to make off with the family hummer?

This article is to some degree tongue and cheek, but there is a certain sad truth in its presentation. Is this what we want in Westchester County? Is allowing Indian Point to remain open worth walking down this path painted before you? Just how prepared are you for the aftermath of a nuclear incident. Perhaps more importantly, how prepared do you want to have to be? With Indian Point up and running, we are a target, and if we are a target, we have to be prepared for the worst as we all have learned from 911.

Thursday, May 17, 2007

Nuclear Attack Chaos-This Article Needs Printed in New York Times

I've recieved some rude and threatening emails since starting GNB, most of them following my articles about what a significant nuclear event or terrorist attack at Indian Point would be like in the aftermath. The central theme of those attacks centered around the allegation that I was fear mongering...well, perhaps you should read this very frightening article from the San Francisco Chronicle...anyone living within 50 miles of Indian Points antiquated reactors should make this a must read article.

Contingencies for nuclear terrorist attack
Government working up plan to prevent chaos in wake of bombing of major city
James Sterngold, Chronicle Staff Writer

Friday, May 11, 2007

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/05/11/MNG2OPP22R1.DTL

As concerns grow that terrorists might attack a major American city with a nuclear bomb, a high-level group of government and military officials has been quietly preparing an emergency survival program that would include the building of bomb shelters, steps to prevent panicked evacuations and the possible suspension of some civil liberties.

Many experts say the likelihood of al Qaeda or some other terrorist group producing a working nuclear weapon with illicitly obtained weapons-grade fuel is not large, but such a strike would be far more lethal, frightening and disruptive than the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Not only could the numbers killed and wounded be far higher, but the explosion could, experts say, ignite widespread fires, shut down most transportation, halt much economic activity and cause a possible disintegration of government order.

The efforts to prepare a detailed blueprint for survival took a step forward last month when senior government and military officials and other experts, organized by a joint Stanford-Harvard program called the Preventive Defense Project, met behind closed doors in Washington for a day-long workshop.

The session, called "The Day After," was premised on the idea that efforts focusing on preventing such a strike were no longer enough, and that the prospect of a collapse of government order was so great if there were an attack that the country needed to begin preparing an emergency program.

One of the participants, retired Vice Adm. Roger Rufe, is a senior official at the Department of Homeland Security who is currently designing the government's nuclear attack response plan.

The organizers of the nonpartisan project, Stanford's William Perry, a secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, and Harvard's Ashton Carter, a senior Defense Department official during the Clinton years, assumed the detonation of a bomb similar in size to the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima in World War II.

Such a weapon, with a force of around 10 to 15 kilotons, is small compared with most Cold War-era warheads, but is roughly the yield of a relatively simple bomb. That would be considerably more powerful and lethal than a so-called dirty bomb, which is a conventional explosive packed with some dangerous radioactive material that would be dispersed by the explosion.

The 41 participants -- including the directors of the country's two nuclear weapons laboratories, Homeland Security officials, a number of top military commanders and former government officials -- discussed how all levels of government ought to respond to protect the country from a second nuclear attack, to limit health problems from the radioactive fallout and to restore civil order. Comments inside the session were confidential, but a number of the participants described their views and the ideas exchanged.

A paper the organizers are writing, summarizing their recommendations, urges local governments and individuals to build underground bomb shelters, much as people did in the early days of the Cold War; encourages authorities who survive to prevent evacuation of at least some of the areas attacked for three days to avoid roadway paralysis and damage from exposure to radioactive fallout; and proposes suspending regulations on radiation exposure so that first responders would be able to act, even if that caused higher cancer rates.

"The public at large will expect that their government had thought through this possibility and to have planned for it," Carter said in an interview. "This kind of an event would be unprecedented. We have had glimpses of something like this with Hiroshima, and glimpses with 9/11 and with Katrina. But those are only glimpses."

Perhaps the most sobering issue discussed was the possibility of a chaotic, long-term crisis triggered by fears that the attackers might have more bombs. Such uncertainty could sow panic nationwide.

"If one bomb goes off, there are likely to be more to follow," Carter said. "This fact, that nuclear terrorism will appear as a syndrome rather than a single episode, has major consequences." It would, he added, require powerful government intervention to force people to do something many may resist -- staying put.

Fred Ikle, a former Defense Department official in the Reagan administration who authored a book last year urging attack preparation, "Annihilation from Within," said that the government should plan how it could restrict civil liberties and enforce a sort of martial law in the aftermath of a nuclear attack, but also have guidelines for how those liberties could be restored later.

That prospect underscored a central divide among participants at the recent meeting, several said.

Some participants argued that the federal government needs to educate first responders and other officials as quickly as possible on how to act even if transportation and communication systems break down, as seems likely, and if the government is unable to issue orders.

"There was a clear consensus that a nuclear bomb detonated in the United States or a friendly country would be an earth-shaking event, and we need to know how we will respond beforehand," said Ikle. "I wish we had started earlier, because this kind of planning can make an important difference."

But others said the meeting made it clear that the results of any attack would be so devastating and the turmoil so difficult to control, if not impossible, that the lesson should have been that the U.S. government needs to place a far greater emphasis on prevention.

"Your cities would empty and people would completely lose confidence in the ability of the government to protect them," said Steve Fetter, dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. "You'd have nothing that resembles our current social order. I'm not sure any preparation can be sufficient to deal with that."

Fetter added, "We have to hold current policymakers more responsible" for taking all out measures to prevent a nuclear attack.

Raymond Jeanloz, a nuclear weapons expert at UC Berkeley and a government adviser on nuclear issues, said that California might be better prepared than most states because of long-standing plans for dealing with earthquakes and other natural disasters. Those plans, he said, could be a useful model for first responders.

He added, as others did, that the dislocation and panic caused by a nuclear strike could make any responses unpredictable.

"The most difficult thing is the fear that this kind of planning, even talking about it, can cause," Jeanloz said.

Michael May, a former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, defended the survival planning, saying that people should get used to the idea that such a crisis, while dire, could be managed -- a key step in restoring calm.

"You have to demystify the nuclear issue," said May, who now teaches at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. "By talking about this, you take away the feeling of helplessness."

E-mail James Sterngold at jsterngold@sfchronicle.com


The Project's Co-Directors are former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton B. Carter. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall serve as Senior Advisors. Additional contributors to the Project include member of President Clinton's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Robert J. Hermann and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White. Active on the Project’s track-two initiative with China are Dr. Michael H. Armacost, former Undersecretary of State and U.S. Ambassador to Japan and to the Philippines and Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, former Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command. The Project is pleased that the following experts have agreed to lend their expertise to our North Korea initiative: General John H. Tilelli, Jr., former Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea; Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth, Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea; and Dr. Kurt Campbell, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

The Preventive Defense Project is a multi-year effort supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Herbert S. Winokur, Jr. Public Policy Fund, the Richard Lounsbery Foundation and private sources. The Preventive Defense Project would also like to acknowledge the generous contributions of the Packard Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the Compton Foundation, Inc.

Tuesday, May 15, 2007

Demand That Government Gives Us Truth on Human Health and Safety Risks Regarding Indian Point

Picture of DTRA Mobile Sheltering Device For Medical Staff...where is OURS?
The government has its own agenda where nuclear energy is concerned, and from what we can tell, they stand fully ready to DUPE the public in their quest for their own selfish goals...problem is,they are playing Russian Roulette with our safety. Below is a letter we have just sent out too various agencies of our Federal Government, and we recommend those concerned with Indian Points continued operation use it as a model to create inquiry letters of your own.

Dear Dr. James Tegnelia
Major General Ramdal R Castro
DTRA Office of Inspector General
FOIA Office for DTRA, NRC, DHS,FEMA
Chairman of NRC
Secretary-Department of Homeland Security (or lack thereof.)
FEMA
Secretary-Department of Energy
Hugo Teufel III


My name is Sherwood Martinelli, a citizen stakeholder living within three miles of a nuclear facility owned by the commercial enterprise Entergy, and commonly known as Indian Point. It is common knowledge in our area, that in the case of a nuclear incident and/or terrorist attack, that the NRC (as is outlined in various official documents including their fatally flawed DBT) have the following expectations, or lack thereof:

1. In the case of a fast moving event at the nuclear facility, NRC's Sam Collins has admitted that evacuation of citizens would not be workable/possible, and citizens would be sheltered in place. Further, the various governmental agencies charged with Emergency Response have admitted this as well in establishing a new wedge policy wherein only a 2.5 mile pie shaped wedge determined to be MOST AT RISK would be evacuated in a fast moving nuclear event with all others ordered sheltering in place.
2. NRC, and it's licensee would rely heavily on first responders, law enforcement and military aid in dealing with the situation. In the case of Indian Point, the inadequate military base just up route nine, and perhaps West Point would be called into action to provide aid, or in the case of a terrorist attack military support and fire power.

Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, NRC and various agencies at local, state and federal levels have attempted to fabricate a public belief that we are safe from the effects of a radioactive event being sheltered in place, and in fact and deed the NRC has used that very criteria to justify in part their decision not to include evacuation plans, and terrorist attacks on the facility in their decision making process during the license renewal application process for their licensees for the aforementioned Indian Point reactors. They have coupled this reasoning with flawed and biased modeling written by the nuclear licensees lobbyist (NEI)that shows the likelihood of an attack on a nuclear reactor is so small as to be almost mathematically impossible. Assorted information on other government sites categorically refute these false assumptions by the NRC and NEI.

Living in New York, having been down in New York (not at Ground Zero) on Sept 11, 2001 I was/am more than skeptical, and so have done my due diligence in conducting my own investigation/research into matters directly and/or indirectly associated with nuclear incidents, terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, and evacuation plans, specifically giving careful attention to the now preferred method of protecting human health and safety through sheltering in place during a catastrophic event. No more damning condemnation of the shortcomings of shielding in place could be found than the CDC report that discusses the level of protection for the average citizen who has been ordered to shelter in place. For a citizen sheltered in their stick frame and/or brick home in a concrete basement, the protection level is only 40 percent shielding from Radioactive fallout. For those living in residential structures with no basement, said level of protection drops to a devastatingly alarming ten percent.

Armed with this disturbing news, I began visiting a host of government sites, and found some more forthcoming than others. For instance, if you visit Condi Rice's Department of State site dealing with these issues, they state sheltering in place in the event of a Terrorist Dirty Bomb explosion and/or attack on a nuclear facility could, in a worst case scenario, last for a period of weeks, not days as is claimed and all but codified by the NRC.

Further, each for their own reasons, it became apparent in my research, that the DOD, DOE, NRC,NEI, the Nuclear Industry and various other corporate and governmental agencies under the guise of National Interest, and National Security have been intimately, if not incestuously involved in pushing/moving forward the agenda of a Nuclear Renaissance both here in America and abroad with GNEP being used as placebo to assure us as citizens that our Federal Government is finally coming up with a plan to deal with the waste streams from the nuclear industry (both military and civilian). It (GNEP) at best is good intentions gone astray, and at worse, a governmental boondoggle that leaves WMD's (leaking spent fuel pools, and aging failing reactors) inadequately guarded and protected in and around MAJOR (emphasis added) population centers, while the NRC, blindly ignoring basic truths continues the wrongful rubber stamping of reactor license renewal applications, while turning a blind eye to known public health and safety concerns. For instance, the population living within a 50 mile radius of Indian Point exceeds 21 million citizens, and in the case of a significantly nuclear event at Indian Point, some estimates say we could see a immediate death toll running into the tens of thousands...that risk in the name of a Nuclear Renaissance is unacceptable, as is the inadequate protections of shielding citizens in place.

It also became apparent as I looked into these related issues, that First Responders, including members of our military tagged to be a part of the response team dealing with a National Emergency such as a significant nuclear incident/accident (as almost happened when the truck carrying nuclear materials from Japan tipped over on I-95 in North Carolina-yes, the story got partially out before and exclusion zone was thrown up) and/or a terrorist attack at a nuclear facility are being told a different truth than members of the general public, being given a different set of instructions regarding what they need in the way of equipment to be adequately protected than what is being distributed out to members of the general public. The polar opposite realities are not both possible, one or the other is a lie.

Today I called up the DTRA after doing some extensive reading on their web site, and examining their various and assorted course offerings and asked your spokesperson, a reticent and stubborn Mr. Gaines a very straightforward question, which he (like all other agencies I have spoken to) stealthily avoided giving a direct answer to. If first responders need to wear super protective clothing , self containing breathing apparatus, and a dosimeter device in responding to a nuclear event, would civilians ordered to be sheltered in the affected area require that same level of equipment/protection to adequately protect their own health and safety? If medical staff and personal working in a nuclear fallout area need to be protected by being placed in one of the self contained sheltering vehicles such as the one pictured on your web site, wouldn't citizens in the exclusion zone need a similarly personal shelter to have adequate protection of their health and safety?

Mr. Gaines tried to avoid answering the question with a dodge when he stated, "Our agency is concerned with, charged with aiding members of the DOD in performing their task as relates to terrorist threat reduction, or aiding them (DOD) in responding to a nuclear event if our help is requested from the DHS, so I cannot speak to issues of civilian protection. Undeterred, I took a different tack by rephrasing the question. Would you send your agency's personnel into an nuclear incident area without the equipment mandated and/or recommended by your agency's guidelines, to which he replied, "We don't deploy personnel without adequate protective gear. (Iraq aside?) I pointed out, that was not the question asked, at which point he got belligerent, and said he was not willing, could not go there...as in truthfully and honestly answering an American citizen stakeholder's straight forward question?

As a result of this government run around, and deliberate avoidance in honestly answering a stakeholder citizen's questions, I am taking the step of formalizing my inquiries in this email. As citizen stakeholders living near a nuclear facility, we should know the full extent of the risks we are facing when government asks/demands that we play host to a nuclear facility. As allowed in the broadest interpretation of your agency's rules and regulations (individually and/or collectively) this letter is to be interpreted as A) inquiry, B) FOIA request, and C) and allegation. I would like the following questions asked, and as a part of the answer, please include any and all underlying lying documents used in formulating the answer/response, including citations of law, inter/intra office memos, emails, studies and or reports.

1. If first responders need to wear super protective clothing , self containing breathing apparatus, and a dosimeter device in responding to a nuclear event, would civilians ordered to be sheltered in the affected area require that same level of equipment/protection to adequately protect their own health and safety? If not, please explain with specifics why not, and why your agency finds these differing levels of personal protection acceptable.

2. If medical staff and personal working in a nuclear fallout area need to be protected by being placed in one of the self contained sheltering vehicles, such as the one pictured on DTRA web site, wouldn't citizens in the exclusion zone need a similar personal shelter to have adequate protection of their health and safety? If not, please explain with specifics why not, and why your agency finds these differing levels of personal protection acceptable.

3. Would you send your agency's personnel into a nuclear incident area without the equipment mandated and/or recommended by your agencies guidelines? If not, please in detail explain your decision, specifically identifying the risk that said personal would/could face in said potentially contaminated area if they did not have these adequate health and safety protections and equipment.

4. Please identify any and all known safety, security and structural concerns/problems you are aware of, and/or are researching/examining as relates to the continued safe operation and protection of America's nuclear facilities, including Commercial Nuclear Reactors and their leaking spent fuel pools. Please specifically identify known and/or suspected risks to public health and safety in the event of a nuclear accident and/or successful terrorist attack at a nuclear facility, with special attention given to the public risk regarding commercial nuclear reactors.

5. What inadequacies and/or potential problems is the government aware of as relates to A) community evacuation plans, and B) sheltering in place in the case of a nuclear incident and/or terrorist attack on a nuclear facility, and what levels of potential loss and/or harm have been identified (human life, long term health effects, infrastructure loss and/or contamination, financial losses, specifically as affects private citizens since the Price Anderson act leaves us with no form of protecting our assets in the case of a nuclear event and/or a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility.

As a citizen stakeholder living within 3 miles of a governmentally licensed and policed nuclear facility that has applied for a 20 year license renewal, and should be entitled by law to honest and forthright answers to these questions, so that I can fully and completely evaluate the true risk I and my community are being asked to take in continuing to play host to two aging, failing nuclear reactors that are already threatening human health and/or the environment as they leak strontium 90 and tritium into both the area ground water, and the Hudson river.

Respectfully Submitted

Sherwood Martinelli
351 Dyckman
Peekskill, New York 10566

For those activists receiving a copy of this letter...please feel free to forward this to your elected officials, and/or other activists involved in this issue.

This letter also being posted to the Green Nuclear Butterfly blog...please feel free to distribute it to your list serves.

Official Request for Fee Waivers:

For the following reasons, Sherwood Martinelli requests a full and complete waiver of any and all fees associated with the FOIA components of this document.

1. Purpose-To ascertain full risks I, as a stakeholder face in living near a nuclear facility, and distribute said information to the public so they as well can understand their risks as we face the potential re-licensing of the failing Indian Point Nuclear Reactors. Said distribution will occur has occurred through my NRC recognized advocacy group, GNB (Green Nuclear Butterfly) at public events, such as last month's NRC open house in our community where the NRC gave us a presentation table, as well as our blog.

2. The information and answer requested in this document will be used first to educate the public TRUTHFULLY about the risks associated with specifically, Indian Point, and additionally said information will be used as is practical in our plans to act as and intervener in Entergy's license renewal application process.

3. If the information gained reinforces our/my initial findings regarding public safety as relates to a fast nuclear event (terrorist attack of nuclear facility), there is a probabilistic chance that the members of the General Public in and around the host community of Indian Point will become far more active and plugged into the regulatory process, and in demanding the closure of said facility.

4. We currently interact with, communicate (through our blog, public outreach, and phone) daily with over 150 people...on average, 80 percent of these contacts are disseminating our material for the first time. As the license renewal process moves forward, we have the very real capability (thanks to the Internet) of having direct involvement with potentially millions of stakeholders within 50 miles of Indian Point who oppose its license renewal application.

5. As answered before, we distribute this information at public events, formal NRC events/meetings, and via the Internet, and do not charge a fee for our distributed information.

6. My private interests in this information are only as a stakeholder living within 3 miles of a nuclear event.

For these reasons, it is requested that any and all fees associated with the FOIA components of this document be waved in their entirety.

Sherwood Martinelli

Tuesday, May 8, 2007

So, The Threat Of A Nuclear Incident Is Small-Documents You Should Browse/Read

The NRC wants to rubber stamp the license renewal application of Entergy's failing twin reactors known as Indian Point 2 and 3. To accomplish this, they are trying to take security concerns off the table in direct violation of NEPA regulations. To force their hand is going to take a monumental legal battle, and that is going to take financing...that financing is going too require the public getting involved in this fight, and donating to the cause, helping to fund a fight that is likely to end up at the Supreme Court. To refute Entergy and the NRC's assertions that we are safe, and that the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a reactor is slim, I've taken time today to collect a series of links to government documents found on other than NRC agency web pages that paint a very different picture. It is my sincere hope that providing this list will help in awakening the public in and around Indian Point up to the true risks we are faced with, wake people up to the fact that we cannot allow the NRC to grant Entergy a 20 year license renewal for this aging brittled reactors.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2006/CF176.pdf

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB200.pdf

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG441.pdf

http://radhealth.usuhs.mil/triageproceedings.pdf

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/population-monitoring-roundtable.pdf

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/shelter.pdf

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/radiation-evacuation.pdf

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/clinicianpocketguide.pdf

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/MassCasualtiesGuidelines.pdf
Major event at or near a nuclear facility (such as an airplane crash into a nuclear power plant or spent nuclear fuel pool) – Significant amounts of radioactive material have been released. There
are dozens of injured people at the facility, many experiencing symptoms related to acute radiation syndrome, and thousands of contaminated or exposed people in the surrounding area who have an increased probability of long-term health effects.

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/hospitalroundtablereport.pdf

http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation/about-radiation.html Page is NOT THERE.

http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/www/outreach/pdf/pcktcard.pdf

http://www1.va.gov/emshg/docs/Radiologic_Medical_Countermeasures_051403.pdf

http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/www/outreach/pdf/radiologicalhandbooksp99-2.pdf

http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=1224#toc
"This is the Bible that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and others use." --Thomas Cochran, Natural Resource Defense Council, New York Times, December 20, 1989

http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/www/outreach/pdf/2edmmrchandbook.pdf

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness.html
Emergency Preparedness and Response Good planning leads to good response. Our emergency preparedness programs enable emergency personnel to rapidly identify, evaluate, and react to a wide spectrum of emergencies, including those arising from terrorism or natural events such as hurricanes. Our incident response program integrates the overall NRC capabilities for the response and recovery of radiological incidents and emergencies involving facilities and materials regulated by the NRC or an Agreement State. Under the National Response Plan, the NRC will coordinate with other Federal, State, and local emergency organizations in response to various types of domestic events. The NRC emphasizes the integration of safety, security, and emergency preparedness as the basis for the NRC’s primary mission of protecting public health and safety. Our review of the emergency preparedness programs reaffirmed that our emergency planning bases remain valid under the current threat environment. The NRC's Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) has the primary responsibility for these essential agency functions. For more information Contact Us.

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/respond-to-emerg/response-terrorism.html

http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/www/outreach/pdf/pcktcard.pdf

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/firsthours/pdf/creativebrief_radioactive_materials.pdf

http://www.hhs.gov/emergency/mediaguide/PDF/HHSMedisReferenceGuideFinal.pdf

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ATTACK This is a radiological threat that does not involve a nuclear blast. Terrorists could attack a nuclear power plant by using explosives, hacking into the computer system, or crashing a plane into the reactor or other structures on site. Security measures are in place so that such attempts are likely to be detected early.

http://www.hhs.gov/emergency/mediaguide/field/HHSMediaFieldGuideFinal.pdf

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_JFO_FOG.pdf

http://www.orau.gov/hsc/RadMassCasualties/content/videos/2_Planning_Handout.pdf

http://www.orau.gov/hsc/RadMassCasualties/content/videos/3_Decon_Handout.pdf

http://www.orau.gov/hsc/RadMassCasualties/content/videos/4_Triage_Handout.pdf

http://www.orau.gov/hsc/RadMassCasualties/content/videos/5_Treatment_Handout.pdf

http://www.orau.gov/hsc/RadMassCasualties/content/videos/6_Pharmacotherapy_Handout.pdf

Sunday, April 29, 2007

Preparing For Battle-Indian Point's License Renewal

We cannot allow an American Host Community to Become the next Chernobyl
Last week, some important information came out of the Annual Assessment meeting, including a statement, that Entergy needs to submit their license renewal application by the end of the month. If the source (Sam Collins of the NRC) is correct, then the clock starts ticking on Wednesday, May 1st, 2007. NRC gives a 24-30 month time line for license renewals, but have accomplished the task with another Entergy reactor in as little as 17 months. There are hundreds of reasons to deny Indian Point's license renewal application, but if other reactors serve as example, the NRC is unwilling to consider any of them, which means we as a community need to make hard decisions, and depending on what they are, draw the proverbial line in the sand as we prepare our battle strategy.

With this reality before us, there was a second very important fact that came out in the NRC's Annual Assessment meeting. After Mark Jacobs delivered his impassioned condemnation of both Entergy's Indian Point facility, and NRC for their lack of any meaningful regulatory control, Sam Collins again spoke on behalf of his agency. Some may have missed two crucial admissions as he spoke. In case of a FAST MOVING EVENT, evacuation will not work, the NRC, Entergy and FEMA will have no choice but to rely on sheltering in place.

First, we have a key employee of the NRC admitting publicly in and open meeting that the evacuation plan will not work, cannot be implemented in the case of a fast moving event or terrorist attack at the Indian Point facility...within that admission is the cold tacit truth that none of the evacuation plans for every reactor in America are workable in the case of a fast moving incident or terrorist attack. If you look at the action plan, the only kind of event that would elevate to a level that the sirens and evacuation plan would come into play, is a fast moving event.

Secondly, Sam admitted that the Emergency Response teams would rely on sheltering in place in the case of a fast moving event. Being blunt, sheltering in our homes in the case of a fast breaking significant event will sentence many of us to death. The State Department's website envisions a scenario wherein citizens could be sheltered in place for a period of up to two weeks, perhaps longer. Without an adequately supplied and equipped shelter, we as citizens are vulnerable to the ravages of the radioactive fallout from a significant radiological event. The NRC attempts to mitigate this reality, by mitigating the odds of such an event occurring.

I've alienated some with my blunt assessments, with my in your face approach to this battle as it looms ever closer. Apologize for that, but we do not have time on our side, do not have the luxury of hammering out and reaching consensus between the various groups and factions in this fight...the leaders have to step up with a battle plan, or plans, and the foot soldiers need to be ready for deployment where and when needed, or we are doomed to failure, in this case failure being saddled with Indian Point for a period of forty more years.

So, what is a workable strategy? Sadly, I do not have a crystal ball, no soothsayer with whom to consult. However, do have some hunches, do feel we can greatly weaken the entire license renewal process by attaching the NRC's flanks, using their own bureaucracy to slow them down, if not stop it in its tracks. For the strategy to have a chance, we need volunteers, not just here in our own community, but in every reactor community in America.

The NRC's 10 CFR Rules and Regulations provide numerous avenues for citizen stakeholders to get involved in the process. There is the NRC's Office of The Inspector General, there is the ability to file for intervenor status, and there is the ability to file a petition for rule change. With these access tools, we have the ability to swamp if not collapse the NRC's regulatory process. Yes, we use their own rules and regulations to strangle them, we barage the agency with hundreds of thousands of pages of paperwork they have to deal with and address.

Magaret Mead stated, "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, devoted citizens can change the world; indeed it is the only thing that has" , and my idea takes that truth and multiplys it across America as Aging Reactor host communities join together as one to take on the entire nuclear industry. 104 reactors in 67 American communities, and almost every community hosting a reactor wants them shut down...it can happen if we use our grassroots organizations, and numbers to our favor and advantage.

In our own area of Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Dutchess counties how many individual citizens want Indian Point shut down? How many members can Riverkeeper, IPSEC and Clearwater rally to our cause? Multiply that times 67 reactor communities, and how many others around other dangerous sites such as Barnwell would join in the fight? Nationwide, we could have a veritable Army of activists waiting on their marching orders. So, what do we do?

We use the regulatory process to our advantage by having this citizen army file individual separate petitions for rule making. We have these citizens write up and mail in allegations to the NRC's Office of The Inspector General. We have this citizen army of activists all across the nation mailing in letters demanding intervener status for their own reactor sites. Imagine for a moment even 67,000 citizens (1000 from each reactor community) each mailing in one petition for rule making, one letter of allegation, and one letter demanding intervener status. That's 201,000 documents that the NRC has to deal with! With three simple letters from each activist, we have a great chance of bogging down the NRC, forcing them to come to the negotiation table, forcing them to end a re licensing process that is corrupt to its core.

NRC does NOT consider:

Fatally Flawed Emergency Evacuation Plan

Population changes/density of surrounding area,

Ongoing leaks of strontium 90 and tritium

Terrorism, or Plant security

The hour grows late, and our communities are running out of time. The call for and ISA is non-workable, and is not going to occur. Desperate times call for bold and decisive actions. If others have ideas, lets hear them now, and map out our plan. One thing is certain...we need a miracle, and most miracles come from a lot of hard work, and the willingness to take risks.

Wednesday, April 11, 2007

How Vulnerable Is Indian Point? Are We One Rocket Away From Chernobyl On Hudson?

Could Your Child Find The Water Intakes On This Diagram? If They Can, So Can A Terrorist!

Every time there is an incident at Entergy's failing, leaking, brittling reactors, such as Vermont Yankee or Indian Point 2 and 3 we know the party line of the NRC and its licensee, can almost recite it blind folded. There was no off site release of radioactive materials, and the general public was never at any immediate risk. First evil cruelty on the part of the NRC and its licensee is that little line of IMMEDIATE RISK. Unless metal scrapnel from the explosion at Indian Point had flown off site and struck someone dead, there is no immediate risk or danger...now, poisonous chemical fumes floating off site in a gentle breeze and being breathed in might cause someone some latent negative health effects or risks, but they don't want to discuss that. The claim of no immediate danger or risk somehow absolves them.

They want the host community to falsely believe there is no risk to living in the ten mile radius of death around a nuclear reactor, want you to buy into their lie of Nuclear Energy as a safe, vital and secure Green Energy that is going to save you and the world from Global Warming. They will even try to convince, that in the case of a major incident, you have NOTHING AT ALL TO WORRY ABOUT if you just shut your doors and windows, and SHELTER IN PLACE for a few hours or days. Kids in school, not a problem, they have it all planned out, the kids can duct tape plastic on the windows, eat no bake cookies and hide under their desks to ride out the radioactive fallout! Before you buy into that lie, might want to check out Condi Rice's State Department site...they speak of sheltering that could last a couple of weeks.

During the 2003 BLACKOUT, 21 nuclear reactors, all dependent on offsite power for safety operations, were immediately shut down in the US and Canada. Even more troubling, five nuclear power stations in New York and Wisconsin admitted that over half of their emergency sirens WERE NOT WORKING due to the outage! Any one want to place a bet that Indian Point was on that list? In severe weather, when off site electric goes down, NRC has a fist full of examples of onsite back up generators failing, including a case in a South Carolina nuclear power plant, where all four diesel generators were found inoperable due to a common mode failure.

Which begs the question, how safe are we if there is a terrorist attack at Indian Point, and how easily could they cause a core melt down? Three recent events at Indian Point show us that the reactors are in DEEP TROUBLE if the water intakes are some how impinged. First, Entergy makes it very easy to figure out the location of these intakes, as site maps smiliar to the one above are liberally posted all over the internet...show the map to an eight read old, and they can identify the location of said water intakes, so how hard would it be for a terrorist to put two and two together and come up with four?

Can here the pro nuke naysayers now accusing me of being and over imaginative freak who has smoked too much bud again...but ask yourselves this question. If a Penthouse Pet of The Month can drive a Prius almost up to the rivers edge and stare out across the Hudson River at Indian Point's reactor domes, what is to keep a band of determined terrorists from driving up to the same spot and drawing a bead on the plants 2 and 3 intake valves? With no water, the control room staff cannot save any of us.

You can ignore the truth right in front of your eyes, pretend that you and your children aare safe, or you can join the crusade to shut down and decommission these reactors before it is to late.

Betcee Checking Out The Reactor Domes!


Saturday, February 17, 2007

Googlism for "Indian Point"

I never heard of Indian Point till I saw the 'one singular focus' on your website.
Googlism for "Indian Point" says:
indian point is a red flag for terrorists; shut it down
indian point is safe? that's hard to believe
indian point is safe regardless of the lack of being educated
indian point is now available on vhs
indian point is unsafe
indian point is unsurpassed in its offering of the largest variety of lengths
indian point is essential to our environment and economy
indian point is no safer closed than operating
indian point is robustly protected against terrorist attack
indian point is considerably more problematic now
indian point is intensifying
indian point is nothing new announces new plan with entergy to protect spent fuel pools
indian point is likely to drift toward the economic fallout from enron
indian point is not someone else's problem
indian point is simply in the wrong place
indian point is perfect for a honeymoon
indian point is widely considered a joke except there's nothing funny about it
indian point is a life and death issue
indian point is a time bomb slowly going off in the mouths of our children
indian point is a catastrophe waiting to happen
indian point is how much the region can reduce its energy demand through conservation
indian point is situated to the east of disney

Much more on www.googlism.com
Scott Blake
www.barcodeart.com

Monday, January 29, 2007

So, It's OFFICIAL...IF There Is Incident, WE ARE ALL DEAD

Let's stop the games, lets spell out REALITY...Indian Point's two reactors have some serious issues. They are brittling with age, the fuel pools are leaking, they are out of space, and the only way to continue operations at the site is DRY CASK STORAGE. The reactors themselves are cobbled together old relics held together with tons of welds and patches, and the NRC just does not care...they are intent on relicensing the facility.
Today, all over America reactor host communities found out that we are being SET UP TO PLAY THE PART OF VICTIMS...The NRC has voted 5-0 that reactors do not need to be set up to defend against a LARGE ATTACKING FORCE OF TERRORISTS, or against a LARGE AIRPLANE. The NRC merely instructs them to do the best they can to mitigate radiation releases AFTER THE INCIDENT.
You see, it would be UNREASONABLE to expect reactors to actually PROTECT US from a major incident at the facility...in this case, Indian Point. We all know that the evacuation plan is USELESS, it's a piece of SHIT...yes, a piece of shit...let's stop being nice about this, when are the 20 million people around Indian Point GOING TO WAKE UP. Entergy is all but guaranteed not to pick up the tab for a major incident. In short, if we do live through the incident, if we do not die shortly there after, we will be financially RUINED.
So, where is the ANGER, were is the citizenship WAKING UP? We have 20 million people within 50 miles of Indian Point...if every one of those people tossed in ONE FREAKING DOLLAR, we can start a MOVEMENT, and that is what we need here. We needed hundreds of protectors all over that site, and if possible, on a daily basis...we need protest signs, we need IN YOUR FACE FULL PAGE ADS. We need human chains around the entire plant...question is, WHERE IS THE OUTRAGE? It's real simple...do we want to shut down Indian Point, or do we NOT want to shut down Indian Point.
If you want the facility SHUT DOWN, you are going to have to work for it. First, it takes money...right now, Green Nuclear Butterfly has NO BUDGET, no money for full page ads, no money to print up protest signs, no money to do mailings to every house in one of the five counties around the plant. Ask yourselves...Are Riverkeeper's tactics showing any real chance of VICTORY, victory meaning no relicense, and if we are lucky, an immediate order to shut the site down, not even giving Entergy another six-eight years of operation? IPSEC, is there plan going to work? SIMPLY PUT...NO! They want to be nice, they want to bake cookies and send out nice little notes to their list serves! IT WILL NOT SUCCEED.
Ask some Union Workers about being nice in negotiations, ask them where it gets them. We need to do some serious ball crushing, we need in your face, whatever it takes, we are shutting you down Entergy activism here! So, what's it going to be? Green Nuclear Butterfly is calling the citizens to action. We are calling for donations, we are calling for volunteers, we are calling for a ARMY OF PROTESTORS. Leave no doubt about it, we can shut down the reactors, we can start a movement that will close down a lot of these unsafe reactors...but not through apathy, not by expecting someone else to do it.
If you have read the writing on the wall, if you realize that it will take serious citizens involvement to shut Indian Point down, then we at the Green Nuclear Butterfly are challenging you to PLUG INTO THE MOVEMENT in the following ways.
1. Make a donation. Let's not be naive...it takes money to build a movement, it takes money to run ads, it takes money to get everyone together and working towards a common cause.
2. Sign up to volunteer. Email us at roycepenstinger@aol.com with your name, address, email and phone number.
3. Work the power of ten...if you are on board to SHUT DOWN INDIAN POINT, speak with ten of your friends and bring them on board. Talk to ten of your co-workers, ten people you go to church with.
Yes, it will take a movement, and the question is...are you going to be a part of that movement, or instead are you content to see Indian Point operating on the banks of the Hudson through 2055? Entergy is prepared to spend WHATEVER IT TAKES to relicense those two facilities, so yes we are asking for donations, and will need every penny we can get our hands on to WAGE THIS WAR, and a war it will be. Ask the people around Vermont Yankee who have watched Entergy run full page advertisements in every newspaper in Vermont, each ad filled with lies and half truths. Where do you stand? Our readership is growing, through the power of tens we can drive this movement where it needs to go, but the time has come where we need the public's help, need the public's involvement in the process.

Monday, January 29, 2007

Defending nuke plants from jet attack 'impractical,' US sez

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON ­ The Nuclear Regulatory Commission concluded Monday that it is impractical for nuclear power plant operators to try to stop terrorists from crashing an airliner into a reactor.

Plant operators instead should focus on limiting radioactive release from any such airborne attack, the agency said in a revised defense plan for America's nuclear plants.

The agency approved the new defense plan, most of which is secret, by a 5-0 vote at a brief hearing in which it was not discussed in any detail.

The new plan spells out what the operators of the nation's commercial nuclear power plants must be capable of defending against. It assumes that a terrorist attack force would be relatively small­ and that its weapons would be limited.

Critics of the NRC have said the revisions, which have been in the works for more than a year, do not fully take into account the threats to nuclear reactors in light of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

"Rather than requiring measures to prevent a plane crash from damaging vulnerable parts of a nuclear plant ... the government is relying on post-crash measures and evacuation plans," said Michele Boyd of Public Citizen's Energy Program, a nuclear industry watchdog group.

Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., in a letter to the NRC last Friday, said the agency's defense requirements should "ensure that ... the plants are prepared to defend against large attacking forces and commercial aircraft." Boxer is chair of the Senate committee with jurisdiction over the NRC.

While NRC officials have all along declined to discuss specifics of the defense plan for nuclear power plants, formally known as the Design Basis Threat, it is known to assume a relatively small attack force of no more than a half dozen attackers.

Also, the plan does not assume that any such attacking force would be armed with certain weapons like rocket-propelled grenades or other weapons frequently used by terrorists in the Middle East.

NRC officials have emphasized that the defense plan should require what is "reasonable" to be expected of a civilian security force at the 103 commercial nuclear power reactors.

The nuclear power industry has argued that it would be unreasonable to expect them to guard against any attack that employed a large, hijacked aircraft. They contend that protection againstthat sort of attack ­ or one using a large ground attack force ­ should instead be a responsibility of the government.