Inside Security Breach At Entergy, Or Pro Nuke Nut Job?

WE are sharing a comment sent in on our "What If" article from this weekend, but doing it in the form of an article so that we can address some of the points that it raises. Secondly, we are sharing it for another reason...if the writer of the comment is putting out this information, and (a big if) the details about Indian Point Security are for real, this comment amounts to a very serious Security Breach at the Indian Point Plant...one of their own, or at least someone with some very serious inside information is posting it onto the Green Nuclear Butterfly Blog to refute the points made in Royce Penstinger's historical fiction piece. For ease of reading, Green Nuclear Butterfly's responses have been bolded and GREENED.

Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "Indian Point...A Story of What If? Will You Survi...":

Hey man ! You've outdone yourself! Great fiction piece.

Thank You...I prefer to think of it as Historical Fiction. IF you follow many of the links embedded in the story, you'll see the events are not as far fetched as Indian Point and the NRC would like us to think they are.

I have some questions, though. Since it was blizzard conditions, how did the commando force get to the two jump-off spots? Didn't the coast guard cutter pick them up on radar, as they approached? Why didn't the Coast Guard's quadruple 50's Gatling guns hit them while on the rock face?

First, the work is fiction, but since we are on the subject, I could think of several ways. Further, not so sure that Coast Guard Cutter is docked in front of the plant 27/4 as your question infers. You, much like the NRC wants to give the licensee every assumed advantage that you can. IE, our troops, Indian Point's security staff would and could do everything right. Despite George Bush and the NRC sweeping the web clean, there is still plenty of anecdotal evidence to be found that would leave the average person shaking their head at the nuclear industry's ability to take care of a serious terrorist attack on the facilities. For instance, though they claim it is nothing, Entergy cannot even locate a simple leak in the spent fuel pool of Reactor 2...yet, you would have us believe their security staff would function perfectly. Perfectly like the control room personnel found sound asleep in one of the Entergy plants?

How did they go up the rock face in the snow? Did they use cross country skis? Didn't the cross country skis fuck them up at the jersey barriers?

Sure you would disagree, but this author believes a small force under cover of darkness could approach the facility unseen in kayaks from either direction on the Hudson...further, they could stage across the river to shorten distances. Again, you seem intent on convincing the public that Indian Point is not assailable. Until the NRC conducts a real force on force test at Nuclear Reactors based on some of the real life scenarios that could happen, their assertion that the sites are safe are nothing more than water cooler assurances.

Where did they practice?

Does it matter? Canada, Russia, Alaska to name just three locations that would provide adequate weather conditions for Arctic training, as well as areas of remoteness away from prying eyes. Again, does it matter where they trained? The hijackers that smashed planes into the World Trade Centers trained right here in the United States, right under the noses of those keeping and eye out for them. They did not target just one facility, they targets four planes, and four buildings....they succeeded in seven out of eight of their primary objectives.

If it was real blizzardy, kayaks would have obviously swamped. Power boats might have, too.

Nice try...I did not say it was BLIZZARDY! I stated the system had STALLED, that there was NOT ENOUGH WIND to blow the system north, or out to sea. Tipping motor boats? What, are you saying the NRC and Indian Point need to factor in a typhoon in helping them keep terrorists away from the nuclear reactors?

How come the dogs didn't start barking? Those fuckin dogs bark at turkeys, and deers, and even squirrels. Were they very small commandos, smaller than a turkey?

First, you would have us believe that carefully trained guard dogs are being left out on a bitterly cold winter night in the middle of a snow storm with eighteen inches of snow already on the ground? Do the ANIMAL RIGHTS GROUPS KNOW THIS? Secondly, dogs and other animals have a habit of HUNKERING down during a storm of this magnitude. Lastly, you discount the reality that dogs can be taken out with silent means of death.

How come the remote capacitive motion sensors on the hillside didn't pick them up? Deer set them off all the time.How did they get past the razor wire, without breaking the circuit? (I can understand video being whited out, but not the other systems).

There's a good one...remote capactitive motions sensors...even states the location of these things. Deers set them off all the time. Let me guess, in the middle of a snow storm like the one in the story, there is NO CHANCE that a brief trip of these censors wouldn't be discounted, written off as a deer? Though I do thank you for admitting one layer of Reactor Safety could be rendered ineffective with something as a snow storm.

How come the covert iron foxhole firing positions didn't set up a cross fire? How about the elevated firing towers? How did they get a vehicle past the 8 foot high 360 degree concrete wall? How come the resident national guard tanks didn't respond? How the fuck did they get into, and out of, all the confusing razor wire cul-de-sacs in the second fence line, or the third fence line, or the fourth?(they are ALL electrified).

I see, the FENCE at Indian Point is safe, secure and vital, but the fence at our Southern Border will not work? To use the adage oft quoted by the Pro-Illegal Alien factions, built a 25 foot fence, and someone will build a 26 foot tall ladder. Sure that these obstacles would not be enough to stop our own nation's special forces, but we are TOLD TO BELIEVE no other nation, or terrorist group has the ability to have similarly trained forces that they can insert into any given area in America?

Did the two nearby state trooper barracks fail to respond?

Here's a wake up call for you...in most snow storms, staff at Highway Patrol barracks are STRETCHED, most of the officers dealing with various accidents or motorist emergencies.

Did the Regular Army troops at camp smith get taken out beforehand? Their 12 tanks, and heavy weapons are only 6 minutes away, usually.

Like the way you snuck in that word USUALLY...nice try. Problem is, many of the reservists that do their time there go out to dinner and for a few drinks at various locations here in Peekskill. Those tanks might be six miles away, but they are not ready for RAPID DEPLOYMENT in the best weather, let alone a snow storm as described in the article.

And just how did these birds get a major meltdown to go out of the dome? didn't the dome hold it in, like at three mile island?

IAEA documents admit that they cannot come up with formula to completely discount either a hydrogen or steam explosion of a reactor core. Further, numerous documents are out there that admit the industry and NRC don't really understand brittling at a reactor, nor what the effects of this brittling would have in such a case as a hydrogen explosion inside the core. In fact, despite the NRC's wrongful generic re licensing hoodoo voodoo, one of the Commissioners at the NRC has admitted publicly that no two reactors are alike, each has their own unique set of risks.

Did they send another team to try to make a hole in the dome? How did they get near the dome, since the outside is totally inaccessible at the bottom, made so by the 345 KV high tension lines, the ones where the tree cutter got zapped 4 years ago.? If they went inside the dome to blow a hole in it, how did they find their way through the 5 successive airlocks into the radiation area? Who told them all the security codes? Did they blow the airlocks with C4? If they did , an automatic scram would have locked them in, AND shut the plant down.

I'm not the security expert, though you seem to desperately want our readers to believe you are. How many of us have watched controlled explosives take down buildings 50 times as large as the reactors at Indian Point in less than 30 seconds? Yet, you would have us believe that it's impossible for dedicated professions would not have the know how to overcome various obstacles in their desire to complete their mission. If terrorists have managed to get their hands on weapons to pierce the armor of tanks, surely they can find something that would open four or five doors? I'm sure they are not worried about making it all look pretty.

Didn't the isolation breakers at Buchanan switch yard operate to prevent the blackout spreading? Did your guys send a team over there first to lock those breakers shut?

Let's reverse this question...has the NRC factored this into their Force on Force exercises? In their mock attacks, have they sent a security detail over to guard these isolation breakers?

Were they old retired Con Ed guys, only Con Ed knows how to open or shut that stuff, or even where the controls are in the yard.

Oh, that's reassuring? Such important controls, and no one knows how to open or shut the stuff, or where it is located except old Con Ed guys?

Did they try to find the control room? Weren't they fooled by the ten dead end fake cul-de-sac mock control room passages, the ones nobody but the operators know about?

How reassuring...if no one but the operators know about these ten dead end fake cul-de-sac mock control room passages, HOW DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THEM?

Didn't the automatic bulletproof stainless steel shutters and isolation blast doors operate to isolate the control room? Did the control room go on its emergency air system? Didn't the second team evacuate like they're supposed to, into the alternate safe shutdown bunker, so that even if a nuke worker was a commando, the main control room would have lost the ability to melt the place down anyway?

For starters, if someone had actually gotten this far into Indian Point, there are all kinds of ways to create problems that could result in core meltdown. For instance, one would assume, that those bent on mischief in this case, destruction of the reactor's core could attack the reactor at it's weakest point...say for instance the flow through pipe that drives the steam turbines? Not sure here, but I would think someone shutting down the flow pipe that allows steam/pressure to leave the reactor would cause a serious issue of concern? Further, find it interesting here, that in your entire rebuttal of my piece of fiction you STEERED AWAY from discussing the very vulnerable spent fuel pools. What, afraid to admit that a few armor piercing rounds fired into the bottom of said pools would create serious havoc in and of itself?

Other than those few obvious mistakes, the rest makes quite a story. Hangin out with ME, might make a writer out of you yet, Sherm! Just be honest with me. You lit a spliff before writing it, right?

Be nice if ME identified him/herself for our readers, for the NRC, for the plant. If any of what "ME" shared is true, Indian Point has a VERY SERIOUS SECURITY BREACH, and it would seem one on the inside.

The Commenter's Full Original Text is below:

Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "Indian Point...A Story of What If? Will You Survi..."

Hey man ! You've outdone yourself! Great fiction piece. I have some questions, though. Since it was blizzard conditions, how did the commando force get to the two jump-off spots? Didn't the coast guard cutter pick them up on radar, as they approached? Why didn't the coast guard's quadruple 50's gatling guns hit them while on the rock face?how did they go up the rock face in the snow? Did they use cross country skis? Didnt the cross country skis fuck them up at the jersey barriers?Where did they practice? If it was real blizzardy, kayaks would have obviously swamped. Power boats might have, too. How come the dogs didn't start barking? Those fuckin dogs bark at turkeys, and deers, and even squirrels. Were they very small commandoes, smaller than a turkey? How come the remote capacitive motion sensors on the hillside didn't pick them up? Deer set them off all the time.How did they get past the razor wire, without breaking the circuit? (I can understand video being whited out, but not the other systems). Howcome the covert iron foxhole firing positions didn't set up a cross fire? How about the elevated firing towers? How did they get a vehicle past the 8 foot high 360 degree concrete wall? How come the resident national guard tanks didn't respond? How the fuck did they get into, and out of, all the confusing razor wire cul-de-sacs in the second fence line, or the third fence line, or the fourth?(they are ALL electrified). Did the two nearby state trooper barracks fail to respond? Did the Regular Army troops at camp smith get taken out beforehand? Their 12 tanks, and heavy weapons are only 6 minutes away, usually. And just how did these birds get a major meltdown to go out of the dome? didn't the dome hold it in, like at three mile island? Did they send another team to try to make a hole in the dome? How did they get near the dome, since the outside is totally inaccessible at the bottom, made so by the 345 KV high tension lines, the ones where the tree cutter got zapped 4 years ago.? If they went inside the dome to blow a hole in it, how did they find their way through the 5 successive airlocks into the radiation area? Who told them all the security codes? Did they blow the airlocks with C4? If they did , an automatic scram would have locked them in, AND shut the plant down. Didn't the isolation breakers at Buchanan switchyard operate to prevent the blackout spreading? Did your guys send a team over there first to lock those breakers shut? Were they old retired Con Ed guys, only Con Ed knows how to open or shut that stuff, or even where the controls are in the yard. Did they try to find the control room? Weren't they fooled by the ten dead end fake cul-de-sac mock control room passages, the ones nobody but the operators know about? Didn't the automatic bulletproof stainless steel shutters and isolation blast doors operate to isolate the control room? Did the control room go on its emergency air system? Didn't the second team evacuate like they're supposed to, into the alternate safe shudown bunker, so that even if a nuke worker was a commando, the main control room would have lost the ability to melt the place down anyway? Other than those few obvious mistakes, the rest makes quite a story. Hangin out with ME, might make a writer out of you yet, Sherm! Just be honest with me. You lit a spliff before writing it, right?

Democrats, John Hall Pass 9/11 Commission Legislation...Sort Of

Let's Have Some TRUTHINESS On This One John...How Come No Committees Were Done Away With?

I suppose that Nancy Pelosi thinks voters have a short memory, or perhaps that we can be very easily fooled with a slight of hand trick? Tom Staudter has released a lengthy press release on John Hall's voting for for 9/11 Recommendations Bill to Make America Safer. Now, there are some potentially good things in the bill which I read earlier this evening, but there are some things MISSING, including the single BIGGEST recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Let's not play games here.

Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.

Document Page Number: 421, PDF Page Number: 439, View in context: page, section, chapter

Keeping only HALF A PROMISE is not keeping a promise...especially when the Democrats don't want to pass this specific 9/11 Recommendation for one VERY SELFISH REASON, the nine committees that would be eliminated, that would be obsolete.

U. S. Representative John Hall
Democrat – New York 19th CD

For Immediate Release
January 9, 2007

Hall Votes for 9/11 Recommendations Bill to Make America Safer
Lauds the Correction of Homeland Security Funding for NY

Washington, D.C. – U. S. Representative John Hall, acting on a pledge to make our nation safer from terrorism, voted today for legislation that will implement the unfulfilled recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. The new bill, H.R. 1, marks a serious and resolute commitment toward improving homeland security, preventing terrorists from acquiring Weapons of Mass Demolition and developing strategies for preventing the spread of terrorism.

The House passed the bill this evening by a vote of 299 to 128. It is one of the first pieces of legislation brought to the House floor by the new Democratic leadership.

“I’m proud to stand here in Congress with colleagues who know the threat of terrorism remains real in our country, and that the time for long overdue action protecting the safety of American families has finally arrived,” said Hall. (12-20 MILLION illegal aliens here in American is not a threat to American Families? Abandoning the fence, and not securing our Southern Border...uhhh...isn't that a serious security problem?)

Noting that the bipartisan 9/11 Commissioners assailed Congress and the Administration last year for practically ignoring the Commission’s recommendations, Hall said, “This critical bill puts forth specific steps that address the shortfalls the 9/11 Commissioners highlighted.” (Not exactly)

The bill is comprised of a number of vital provisions that will substantially improve homeland security, most notably improved explosives detection at the nation’s airports, required phasing-in of 100% inspection of carry-on cargo on passenger aircraft and 100% scanning of U.S.-bound shipping containers, plus providing first responders with equipment that allows them to communicate with one another in emergencies.

Also included in the bill are steps that will help prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD and will also bolster international efforts to stem nuclear weapons proliferation. (So curious here...how does this goal jive with the DOE/NRC plan for wanting to build all those new reactors, which will actually HELP to perpetuate NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION? ) Reducing the appeal of extremism through the promotion of economic opportunities, education reform, human rights and democratic processes in the countries of the Middle East, along with as education opportunities for youths in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries is included in the new legislation as well.

“The bill put forward in Congress today is a broad, comprehensive package that finally takes action and meaningfully advances the entire spectrum of the 9/11Commission recommenda-tions,” Hall remarked. “Prominent among these is the recommendation to allocate most of our resources to where the threats are greatest. My state of New York has already experienced the brutal realities of terrorist attacks and remains a top target nationwide. In my district alone there is the Indian Point nuclear power plant, which is 35 miles away from New York City, as well as military facilities including West Point, and major highways and rail lines. The federal government needs to provide the bulk of anti-terror resources to protect targets like these in the New York City area and Hudson Valley. Today's legislation will allow it to do just that.”

Continued Hall: “Not only will this bill correct the flawed homeland security funding formula, it will finally take steps to plug the gaping holes in our air security, secure our ports from the nightmare of nuclear terrorism (Indian Point-Large aircraft, attack on spent fuel rod storage facilities.), and push this Administration to undertake an aggressive foreign policy that will attack the fundamental drivers of terrorism around the world.”

“Today is the first step toward real homeland security, but ensuring the security of the American people will require a sustained effort, aggressive oversight, and a commitment to a tough, smart, strategic approach,” said Hall. “We remain committed to pursuing this effort.” Is a part of this effort going to include SHUTTING DOWN INDIAN POINT?

Foster V Zeh, Whistle Blower Hammered By The NRC-CHILLING EFFECT AMONG EMPLOYEES at Nuclear Reactor Facilities

Foster V. Zeh should be a hero within the Green Community, groups like Riverkeeper, IPSEC and Greenpeace should have used whatever it took to protect him for coming forward, but that did not happen, he quickly faded out of the limelight, only to have the NRC use him as a symbol to others within the nuclear industry thinking of coming forward to shine light and attention on Indian Point, Entergy and the nuclear industry as a whole. His story needs retold in light of the NRC's 54 Page report that gives Entergy 30 days to resolve issues that have created a chilling pall among employees who are now AFRAID, even FEARFUL to come forward with their concerns regarding both safety and security at the Indian Point plant...the document and its demands are laughable, as the NRC itself has shown it is far more concerned with keeping its licensees dirty laundry outside of the public domain, and that they are willing to burn a whistle blower at the stake to send their own chilling message down to the employees at Nuclear Facilities throughout America.

How many times have we all heard about the nuclear industry's mock security drills, modeled (supposedly) to keep us safe, secure, and alive? After each and every one, the licensee is given a Gold Star, and we are told they performed within acceptable parameters...well, for starters those security drills are not performed out in the field most of the time, but instead played in a room with observers, and the players moving their magnetic pieces around a simulation board. Scenarios are created and set up that allow the licensees to WIN, to receive their GOLD STARS in a wrong sighted attempt to give the public a FALSE SENSE of Security.

Enter one Foster V. Zeh...former security guard at Indian Point, working at both reactors 2 and 3. What Foster V. Zeh did was simple...he disobeyed the unwritten but often exercised rule in these simulated attacks. He played for real, played for keeps instead of playing to let Entergy win their Gold Star. Less than 60 seconds into the simulation that eventually saw to his termination, he'd SUCCESSFULLY gained access to the now leaking Spent Fuel Rod Storage Facilities, was in a position to cause that worst case scenario that the NRC and Entergy falsely and maliciously tell us cannot happen...Foster V. Zeh was in a position to breach and do significant damage to the containment facility, potentially starting Indian Point down the road to a Chernobyl type incident of biblical proportions.

OH MY GAWD, what a great learning experience, what an opportunity Entergy and the NRC have been presented with...because of this brave man, they can actually participate in a mock security drill where anything and everything IS GOING WRONG. Hold the phones, stop the presses as that is NOT WHAT OCCURRED. Instead of seizing on this opportunity, Zeh's boss called a TIME OUT! While the NCR's observer stood around with his clipboard, Zeh was taken out into the hall, screamed and yelled at, and TAKEN OFF THE TEAM, replaced by someone willing to play by the unwritten rule that the licensee MUST WIN at all costs, even if that meant deliberately THROWING THE GAME.

Foster Zeh took his concerns to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations in a letter dated December 20, 2002. That letter is a veritable smoking gun even today as we look at the NRC's 54 page letter and 30 day DECREE that instructs Entergy to come up with a plan that encourages rather than discourages employees to come forward with their complaints and worries about safety and security at the two reactors. For brevity, I'll only share some of the highlights from this letter:

I participated in a planned security drill at Indian Point 2 in mid August of this year. During the drill, I was able to gain access to the spent fuel pool building within 60 seconds. In earlier drills, the mock assault team was also able to gain quick access to the spent fuel building – on one occasion, in 36 seconds – and simulate placing explosives throughout the building. Had the mock assault been real, the damage would have been catastrophic. (A February 2001 NRC report - NUREG 1738, reveals that the loss of life and illnesses from a spent fuel pool release would be significant and health impacts would be felt hundreds of miles away.) Regrettably, the NRC did not penalize Entergy or Wackenhut for this poor showing. In fact, the NRC passed Indian Point 2 security with high marks.

In light of the vulnerability of the spent fuel storage buildings, which house much of the high level radioactive material on site, one would expect the highest level of security. However, these buildings are lacking proper security and are extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack.

Foster V Zeh's letter then goes on to include a summary of Security Concerns, of which I share here only the more disturbing ones:

Most security guards believe they can not defend the plant against a terrorist attack for the following reasons:

Guards believe that they are not properly armed with weapons to defeat attackers.

Guards admit that they are under-qualified and under-trained with respect to gun handling qualifications, physical fitness tests, and training exercises.

Guards are being hired with very little experience; in some cases guards are hired who meet just the minimum requirement of possessing a pistol permit.

Guards reported that qualifying exams for carrying weapons had been rigged, in some cases, to ensure guards could pass.

Guards say that security drills are carefully staged to ensure that mock attackers would be repelled.

Guards forced to work overtime (i.e. forced to work 6 or 7 straight days involving 12
hour to 16 hour shifts, (even when ill).

Guards suffer from a high fatigue level.

• The facilities that house the highly dangerous irradiated or “spent” fuel at Indian Point are vulnerable to attack. In a recent exercise at the main reactor campus, one security guard was able to penetrate security on five occasions and was able to carry a mock satchel charge of explosives into the highly radioactive spent fuel pool three times – without being challenged by security

• The Code of Federal Regulations pertaining to safeguards information has been violated numerous times.

• Security guards are being suspended and terminated by Wackenhut and Entergy without proper representation and cause due to the fact that they are bringing serious security concerns to the attention of management. Note-security now handled at least partially by presidential hopeful Rudi Guiliani.

• A “chilled” environment exists at the plant and security guards do not feel safe speaking with management about their concerns.
• Entergy Nuclear management have asked security personnel to alter incident reports so that an incident becomes a less serious offense and non-reportable

• Company officials sugarcoat and cover up real problems regarding the missing handgun incident, forging documents, giving guards a third chance to pass re-qualifying tests, watering down mock attack drills

• Numerous recommendations made by guards to improve security have not been implemented resulting in the same problems resurfacing time and again.

• Many incidents involving sexism, racism, homophobia and anti-Semitism.

This entire list of summary highlights is very disturbing, but none more so than the one which alleges a "Chilled Environment" existing at the Entergy plant...does that not sound eerily familiar in light of the recently published 54 pages report? Almost four years to the day that Foster V. Zeh made his allegations, they are finally coming home to roost...or ARE THEY?

Reasonable people would think that Foster V. Zeh would now be a vindicated Whistle Blower, rewarded for bringing serious problems to the attention of his superiors, and the larger oversight community (NRC), and in that assumption one would be horribly WRONG. The NRC's 54 page reports talks about the "CHILLING EFFECT" that Zeh brought up in 2002, says they want to see CHANGE AT THE FACILITY, yet secretly, outside the public eye they are sending a completely DIFFERENT MESSAGE...if you go public, if you blow the whistle, if you air our DIRTY LAUNDRY in public, we will HURT YOU BADLY.

You see, Foster V. Zeh lost his job, and has spent these past four years being hounded, and trying to resolve the issues through a process called Alternative Dispute Resolution...some have said this is where they send you after sternly letting you know they could imprison you if they wanted to. On June 20th, 2006 the case (Foster V. Zeh !A-05-051) was finally resolved. We would hope, that the NRC took serious sanctions against Entergy, and we again would be disappointed. Instead, they SILENCED THIS WHISTLE BLOWER. Here is the skinny on what Foster V. Zeh had to agree to.

1. He agrees to NEVER AGAIN seek employment with ANY NRC licensee.

2. He agrees to have no involvements with NRC licensees activities for a period of THREE YEARS from the date of this order. (HELLO...so, just when Entergy is going for a relicensing, the BIG SMOKING GUN WHISTLE BLOWER is forced to SHUT UP and STAY QUIET?)

3. He agrees not disclose Safeguards Information regarding the Indian Point security program to any unauthorized individuals. (In short, no more TELLING ANY ONE, INCLUDING THE PRESS THE TRUTHS HE KNOWS. )

In exchange for this, the NRC has agreed NOT TO SEEK FURTHER SANCTIONS (as in prosecution) against Foster V. Seh. Even more disturbing about this agreement, was how it was kept SECRET, and for a very good reason. You see, Foster V. Zeh is the smoking gun that the ANTI Nuclear side needs, his testimony and statements on record at a public hearing on relicensing would be incredibly damaging, but he has been silenced for a period of three years. Included as a part of that hearing was the right of STAKEHOLDERS to appeal of intervene in this agreement, which conveniently expired 20 days AFTER IT WAS ISSUED, and quietly slide into the appropriate but mostly out of site registry.

The reporters and network who broke this story originally back in 2003 need to revisit it, for Foster V. Zeh, and for those of us in the stakeholder community who need his story told openly and publicly for the record when the relicensing hearings begin.

We thank the Fink On Entergy Blog for suggesting we look into this story.