Historic Time Line For Indian Point, Including Some Early Historical Nuclear MomentsThe Indian Point nuclear power plant has a long history of safety problems. Indian Point 2, in particular, has a poor safety performance record and ranks among the nation's worst-run reactors. In fact, Indian Point 2, until recently, ranked dead last among the nation's 103 reactors. As Indian Point 2 and 3 continue to age, it will continue to suffer from age-related component degradation that will reduce the margins of safety at the facility and jeopardize public health and safety.
1898: Pierre and Marie Sklodowska Curie discover radium, a powerful radiation source which is soon used for medical treatment and atomic physics research.
1905: Albert Einstein shows how large releases of energy can come from the breakdown of small amounts of matter in the atom.
1942: First nuclear reactor is built at the University of Chicago.
1945: Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan-it is estimated that 214,000 innocent civilians were killed in these two bombings.
1946: Atomic Energy Commission is formed.
1951: World's first nuclear plant built near Arco, Idaho, starts up in 1955.
1952: The Atomic Energy Commission brings Con Edison together with other energy companies to develop commercial nuclear plants. The commission had already developed a prototype, but it was found to be inefficient.
Jan. 5, 1954: The Buchanan Village Board holds a 10-minute public hearing on rezoning the area known as Indian Point, formerly a popular park with beaches, trails, swimming pools and two piers receiving thousands of people by boat out for a day of fun. The plan is passed without opposition. According to terms of the deal, Con Edison is to pay 70 percent of the Hendrick-Hudson school district’s taxes, install a village-wide sewer system, pave streets and provide mercury streetlights.
October 1954: Consolidated Edison buys Indian Point Park and an adjacent tract, totaling 350 acres on the banks of the Hudson River at Indian Point, which is a popular park with beaches, trails, swimming pools and two piers. The plants are sited on the Hudson River, the Ramapo earthquake fault line, and 24 miles from the New York City line.
1955 After considering several reactor types, Con Edison, selected for development a pressurized-water thorium-uranium converter reactor. This concept was proposed by the B&W Co ., the contractor for basic nuclear engineering and the designer and manufacturer of the major items of nuclear plant equipment.
1955 Babcock & Wilcox issued construction permit for IP1 for Con Ed; AEC has no citing criteria for nuclear plants, thus the plant, which is on the Hudson River, on an active earthquake fault line, and is 24 miles from the NYC line, is approved without discussion of any of these factors (when such criteria are proposed in 1979, the IP plants are the only operating plants in the country to fail 5 of the 6 proposed criteria; theNRC refuses to adopt the new criteria, instead reverting to its 1962 "interim" rules). When it comes on-line in 1962, the construction costs total 2 1/2 times higher than projected. Within a year of operation, its generating system fails, and is replaced with a Westinghouse system.
1962 BXWT Designed and furnished reactor systems for first commercial reactor, Indian Point, using HEU 233.
Dec. 10, 1962. Con Edison applies for a permit to build another reactor, in Ravenswood, Queens. The application is withdrawn on Jan. 6, 1964, after public protests.
1963: The 265 megawatt Indian Point 1 plant starts operating.
May 27, 1965. Seven Congressmen from New York State accuse state officials of covering up the killing of fish in the Hudson River near the Indian Point power plant. The fish kills are blamed on hot water the plant discharges into the river from its cooling systems.
Nov. 23, 1965. Con Edison's directors approve plans to build a second nuclear reactor at Indian Point. Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller calls the move "of major importance to our state and its expanding atomic industry."
1966 Westinghouse issued construction permit for IP2, to be operated by ConEd.
1966: Indian Point 2 starts construction.
April 1967. Con Edison applies for permission to build a third nuclear plant at Indian Point. Permission is granted in August 1969.
1969 Westinghouse issued construction permit for IP3, to be operated by Con Ed
1969 Indian Point 3 starts construction; Con Ed starts operation in 1976.
May 13, 1970. The state charges Con Edison with serious violations of state conservation laws in the operation of its nuclear generating plant and asks that the plant be closed until "suitable methods" to protect the Hudson River can be developed. State seeks $5 million in damages for the loss of fish.
1970, 5th June - INDIAN POINT, NY, U.S.A. Reactor had a major plumbing problem which required the use of 700 men (for a few minutes each) over a 7 month period to weld in the radioactive area. ("Les Amis de la Terre"; "L`Escroquerie Nucleaire").
June 30, 1970. Indian Point 1 is shut down because of defects in the stainless steel piping used to help keep the reactor cool. Meanwhile, the plant is fined $1.6 million for fish kills in Hudson caused by its hot water discharge.
1971 An arsonist sets fire to a building housing much of the cooling system, causing $10 million in damage.
Feb 1972 a 1/2 million gallon water tank spills at IP2.
1972, 8th March - INDIAN POINT, NY, U.S.A. Pressures in the primary cooling circuit increased by 30%. Water released subsequently killed 150,000 fish in the Hudson River. Studies in the U.S. have found that there is a slight increase in radiation levels in rabbits and fish around all sites in the U.S. ("New York Times" - 16th June, 1974)
May 1972. The state levies $1.5 million in fines against Con Edison for "massive" fish kills in the Hudson. The total fine is based on a civil penalty of $500 plus $10 for each fish killed.
Aug 1972 Westinghouse replaces defective fuel system at IP2 at $10 million cost.
Nov 1972 ConEd President expresses disappointment at nuke plants' operations, noting that frequent breakdowns and repairs make plants uneconomical. Plants were built with promises of 80% or better capacity; IP1 has operated at less than 50% capacity, and nationally nuke plants operate at only 60% capacity.
June 26, 1973. In a test, Indian Point 2 produces power for the first time. It goes into full operation more than a year later in October 1974, after repairs to the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome protecting the reactor.
Nov, 1973 Engineers shut down IP1, hearing a "hammering noise." A 300-degree steam leak buckles the "heat proof" steel liner of the containment vessel,and leaking water fills the reactor vessel 4 1/2 feet deep. The reactor is shut down until March, 1974.
Dec. 1, 1973. Con Edison acknowledges that its new power plant, Indian Point 2, has significant problems, after an accident forced it to shut down. Con Edison officials says the problems centered around a buckling and bulging of the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome in which the nuclear plant is housed.
Sept. 18, 1974. The State Legislature votes to allow the Power Authority of the State of New York to take over Con Edison's Indian Point 3 plant, which is still under construction, to help save the financially ailing Con Edison.
Oct 1974 IP1 ordered to shut down, as it lacks mandated ECCS (emergency cooling systems). The reactor was never issued a full-term operating license, but ran for 12 years on its 18-month "provisional" license.
1975, 22nd May - CON EDISON INDIAN POINT AEC, NY, USA Inspection shows that, despite corrective measures taken for earlier violations, reactor workers are still exposed to above maximum permissible levels set by A.E.C. (Nucleus, 25th July, 1979, p.16
Dec. 30, 1975. Under pressure from Gov. Hugh L. Carey, Con Edison agrees to sell Indian Point 3 to the State Power Authority. The action disappoints environmentalists who hoped the sale could be blocked and the plant closed down as a threat to the Hudson River and adjacent areas of Westchester County.
1975 As part of a controversial state bail-out of ConEd, IP3 is bought by NYPA for $349 million.
Jan, 1976 Robert D. Pollard, NRC chief safety engineer and project manager for IP2 resigns, calling IP2 "an accident waiting to happen," and citing design deficiencies in both IP plants.
Jan. 20, 1976. William N. Anders, chairman of the N.R.C., orders two separate investigations of two Indian Point reactors a week after Robert D. Pollard, the commission's project manager for Indian Point 3, questioned plant safety and resigned from the N.R.C. staff. After hearings in Washington, the N.R.C. decided to take no action.
Aug. 30, 1976. Indian Point 3 goes into operation.
1976 IP2 operates at 29% capacity for the year, due to extensive repairs. Con Ed is fined for overexposing a worker to radiation.
July 1977: A transformer explosion at Indian Point triggers a major blackout, causing dozens of people, fearing a major accident, to flee.
1977 A leak spills tens of thousands of gallons of radioactive water into the basement of the reactor building.
MARCH 28, 1979 A pressure relief valve sticks at Three Mile Island, a reactor in central PA, leading to a major accident (a partial meltdown) and forcing the evacuation of nearly 100,000 people.
Sept 1979 UCS, NYPIRG, and WESPAC petition the NRC to decommission IP1 and suspend operations at IP2 &3, citing over 60 unresolved safety deficiencies, including problems in plant design.
Dec 1979 IP2 cited for one of the highest rates of worker radiation exposure in the nuke industry.
Dec. 18, 1979. The N.R.C. says that emergency evacuation plans for Indian Point are "lacking." The commission gives Con Edison and the State Power Authority two months to submit revisions.
1979 In a 1979 report to the president's commission on the Three Mile Island accident, Mr. Ryan stated: ''I think it is insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in Westchester County, 40 miles from Times Square, 20 miles from the Bronx. And if you describe that 50-mile circle . . . you've got 21 million people. . . . I just don't think that that's the right place to put a nuclear facility. . . . It's a nightmare from the point of view of emergency preparedness.''
1980 According to a report released at the beginning of September by the Environmental Policy Institute (E.P.I.) workers at the 69 operating U.S. nuclear power plants received 35% more radiation in 1980 than in 1979, even though only one new nuclear power plant went into operation during that time. The study, compiled from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (N.R.C.) data, states that 80,200 workers were exposed to 53,797 perso-rems in 1980.
This compares with 64,073 workers exposed to 39,759 person-rems in 1979. The average exposure was an all-time high of 791 person-rems per reactor. "Person-rems measure the sum of all exposure to all workers.
Although there is a regulated limit to the amount of radiation any individual worker can be exposed to in a three months period, no U.S. Government agency limits the total amount of radiation that a nuclear plant gives its total work force. Nuclear plants, therefore, must rely on thousands of temporary workers, called "jumpers", to do high radiation impact jobs in major repairs.
April 1967. Con Edison applies for permission to build a third nuclear plant at Indian Point. Permission is granted in August 1969.
1969 Westinghouse issued construction permit for IP3, to be operated by Con Ed
1969 Indian Point 3 starts construction; Con Ed starts operation in 1976.
May 13, 1970. The state charges Con Edison with serious violations of state conservation laws in the operation of its nuclear generating plant and asks that the plant be closed until "suitable methods" to protect the Hudson River can be developed. State seeks $5 million in damages for the loss of fish.
1970, 5th June - INDIAN POINT, NY, U.S.A. Reactor had a major plumbing problem which required the use of 700 men (for a few minutes each) over a 7 month period to weld in the radioactive area. ("Les Amis de la Terre"; "L`Escroquerie Nucleaire").
June 30, 1970. Indian Point 1 is shut down because of defects in the stainless steel piping used to help keep the reactor cool. Meanwhile, the plant is fined $1.6 million for fish kills in Hudson caused by its hot water discharge.
1971 An arsonist sets fire to a building housing much of the cooling system, causing $10 million in damage.
Feb 1972 a 1/2 million gallon water tank spills at IP2.
1972, 8th March - INDIAN POINT, NY, U.S.A. Pressures in the primary cooling circuit increased by 30%. Water released subsequently killed 150,000 fish in the Hudson River. Studies in the U.S. have found that there is a slight increase in radiation levels in rabbits and fish around all sites in the U.S. ("New York Times" - 16th June, 1974)
May 1972. The state levies $1.5 million in fines against Con Edison for "massive" fish kills in the Hudson. The total fine is based on a civil penalty of $500 plus $10 for each fish killed.
Aug 1972 Westinghouse replaces defective fuel system at IP2 at $10 million cost.
Nov 1972 ConEd President expresses disappointment at nuke plants' operations, noting that frequent breakdowns and repairs make plants uneconomical. Plants were built with promises of 80% or better capacity; IP1 has operated at less than 50% capacity, and nationally nuke plants operate at only 60% capacity.
June 26, 1973. In a test, Indian Point 2 produces power for the first time. It goes into full operation more than a year later in October 1974, after repairs to the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome protecting the reactor.
Nov, 1973 Engineers shut down IP1, hearing a "hammering noise." A 300-degree steam leak buckles the "heat proof" steel liner of the containment vessel,and leaking water fills the reactor vessel 4 1/2 feet deep. The reactor is shut down until March, 1974.
Dec. 1, 1973. Con Edison acknowledges that its new power plant, Indian Point 2, has significant problems, after an accident forced it to shut down. Con Edison officials says the problems centered around a buckling and bulging of the steel liner in the reinforced concrete dome in which the nuclear plant is housed.
Sept. 18, 1974. The State Legislature votes to allow the Power Authority of the State of New York to take over Con Edison's Indian Point 3 plant, which is still under construction, to help save the financially ailing Con Edison.
Oct 1974 IP1 ordered to shut down, as it lacks mandated ECCS (emergency cooling systems). The reactor was never issued a full-term operating license, but ran for 12 years on its 18-month "provisional" license.
1975, 22nd May - CON EDISON INDIAN POINT AEC, NY, USA Inspection shows that, despite corrective measures taken for earlier violations, reactor workers are still exposed to above maximum permissible levels set by A.E.C. (Nucleus, 25th July, 1979, p.16
Dec. 30, 1975. Under pressure from Gov. Hugh L. Carey, Con Edison agrees to sell Indian Point 3 to the State Power Authority. The action disappoints environmentalists who hoped the sale could be blocked and the plant closed down as a threat to the Hudson River and adjacent areas of Westchester County.
1975 As part of a controversial state bail-out of ConEd, IP3 is bought by NYPA for $349 million.
Jan, 1976 Robert D. Pollard, NRC chief safety engineer and project manager for IP2 resigns, calling IP2 "an accident waiting to happen," and citing design deficiencies in both IP plants.
Jan. 20, 1976. William N. Anders, chairman of the N.R.C., orders two separate investigations of two Indian Point reactors a week after Robert D. Pollard, the commission's project manager for Indian Point 3, questioned plant safety and resigned from the N.R.C. staff. After hearings in Washington, the N.R.C. decided to take no action.
Aug. 30, 1976. Indian Point 3 goes into operation.
1976 IP2 operates at 29% capacity for the year, due to extensive repairs. Con Ed is fined for overexposing a worker to radiation.
July 1977: A transformer explosion at Indian Point triggers a major blackout, causing dozens of people, fearing a major accident, to flee.
1977 A leak spills tens of thousands of gallons of radioactive water into the basement of the reactor building.
MARCH 28, 1979 A pressure relief valve sticks at Three Mile Island, a reactor in central PA, leading to a major accident (a partial meltdown) and forcing the evacuation of nearly 100,000 people.
Sept 1979 UCS, NYPIRG, and WESPAC petition the NRC to decommission IP1 and suspend operations at IP2 &3, citing over 60 unresolved safety deficiencies, including problems in plant design.
Dec 1979 IP2 cited for one of the highest rates of worker radiation exposure in the nuke industry.
Dec. 18, 1979. The N.R.C. says that emergency evacuation plans for Indian Point are "lacking." The commission gives Con Edison and the State Power Authority two months to submit revisions.
1979 In a 1979 report to the president's commission on the Three Mile Island accident, Mr. Ryan stated: ''I think it is insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in Westchester County, 40 miles from Times Square, 20 miles from the Bronx. And if you describe that 50-mile circle . . . you've got 21 million people. . . . I just don't think that that's the right place to put a nuclear facility. . . . It's a nightmare from the point of view of emergency preparedness.''
1980 According to a report released at the beginning of September by the Environmental Policy Institute (E.P.I.) workers at the 69 operating U.S. nuclear power plants received 35% more radiation in 1980 than in 1979, even though only one new nuclear power plant went into operation during that time. The study, compiled from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (N.R.C.) data, states that 80,200 workers were exposed to 53,797 perso-rems in 1980.
This compares with 64,073 workers exposed to 39,759 person-rems in 1979. The average exposure was an all-time high of 791 person-rems per reactor. "Person-rems measure the sum of all exposure to all workers.
Although there is a regulated limit to the amount of radiation any individual worker can be exposed to in a three months period, no U.S. Government agency limits the total amount of radiation that a nuclear plant gives its total work force. Nuclear plants, therefore, must rely on thousands of temporary workers, called "jumpers", to do high radiation impact jobs in major repairs.
This explains why the number of workers exposed to radiation has risen dramatically from 145 at an average plant in 1969, to 1,010 in 1980. FRED MILLER, researcher with E.P.I., discounts industry claims that this increase comes from a "one-shot" fix of problems at nuclear plants and therefore won't happen again; MILLER says "the exposure comes from the increased radioactivity in permanent nuclear components".
Jan 1980 An earthquake measuring 3 on the Richter Scale shook twin reactors at Indian Point, New York. Luckily the reactors were not functioning at the time. The plants are built on the Ramapo Fault. (W.I.S.E. Ibid.)
Jan. 29, 1980. The two nuclear plants at Indian Point have been shut down for five months for refueling, maintenance and repairs, and the N.R.C. says safety improvements must be completed before they can resume operation. Indian Point 2 is restarted in early February and Indian Point 3 returns to service on Feb. 16.
Feb. 27, 1980. Con Edison accedes to the wishes of the N.R.C. and retires Indian Point 1 permanently.
May, 1980 After a bombing at the Statue of Liberty, police receive a threatening call that "IP is next."
June, 1980 NYPIRG releases a citizens task force report prepared with WESPAC, SHAD, and others, criticizing IP evacuation plan and IP2 safety record, and calling for shut down of the plant.
Oct 17, 1980 to 1982 Con Ed discovers over 100,000 gallons of radioactive water spilled in the containment building of IP2, with water rising 25 feet in a floor cavity and eventually rising nine feet up the reactor vessel. No one had checked the area since Oct 3, despite warning lights showing water build-up, hence it is unclear how long the water had been leaking.
Con ED then attempts to restart the reactor three times, without first checking on possible damage from the spill. Neither the NRC, local officials, or the public are notified of the accident for three days. A UCS study showed 24 equipment failures and 21 management & operations errors in the period from Oct 1 to 20.
IP2 is shut for 8 months; ConEd attempts to recoup losses from the shut down, estimated at $800,000/day, with a 10% rate hike; WESPAC, NYPIRG, and 20 other groups organize a rate payers boycott, which by Dec includes nearly 1 million customers; WESPAC also calls for a public takeover of ConEd.
Oct. 24, 1980. The N.R.C. orders Indian Point 2 shut down until Con Edison determines how the leak went unnoticed. Five days later, the commission initiates an investigation to determine why Con Edison failed to notify the commission about the leak.
Dec. 10, 1980. The N.R.C. fines Con Edison $210,000 for the flooding in October.
Jan 15, 1981 Small amounts of radiation found leaking, possible since early December, into auxiliary steam system and then into Hudson River from Indian Point Plant in New York State. (W.I.S.E. Vol.3 No.2 p.18)
Jan 31,1981 The New York State Power Authority's nuclear plant at Indian Point on the Hudson River about 35 miles north of New York City shut down on Saturday 31st January following a breakdown of one of its turbines. It will remain out of operation for "a minimum of several weeks. a spokesperson for the Authority said. No radioactivity was released following the breakdown, according to Mr. CLIFF SPIELER, the spokesperson. The plant has a history of problems with its turbines, which were made by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. It only recently went back into service after repairs to the turbines. ("Financial Review" 3/2/1981)
April 7, 1981. The technical staff of the N.R.C. says the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, clearing the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announces it has run into still another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and will not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.
May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.
May 1981 Cancer may be caused by much lower levels of radiation than previously believed, according to a new study of the World War II atomic bomb blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Reports on research being done at the Lawrence Livermore Weapons Laboratory in California and at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, although tentative, indicate that the risk of dying of cancer after exposure to low level gamma radiation could double and the probability of contracting cancer after gamma radiation could be quadrupled. Some scientists believe the new information strengthens the argument that there is no safe level of radiation; that every incremental bit of exposure increases the chances of injury. ("The Age", 16th May 1981)
June 3, 1981 Indian Point No.2 nuclear plant in New York shut down automatically for six hours after the failure of an electrical relay - part of the plant's generator protection circuiting designed to monitor voltage generated by the plant and take corrective action if problems develop. (W.I.S.E. Vol.3 No.4 p.18)
July 7, 1981 On 7th July, three U.S. national safe energy groups sent a letter to members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission charging the N.R.C. with dangerous negligence in failing to enforce a nuclear power plant emergency regulation. The rule in question requires plants to acquire the means to alert residents within a ten-mile radius of an accident at the plant within 15 minutes of its occurrence. Although the deadline for compliance to the rule was 1st July, approximately one half of the more than 70 U.S. nuclear plants have failed to comply, according to the "New York Times". "The only protection the public has is the ability to flee following an accident", the group says. "Failure to enforce the prompt notification requirement will strip the public of its only assurance of safety".
Dec. 11, 1981. Con Edison is fined $40,000 by the N.R.C. for not protecting workers from radiation at its Indian Point 2 plant.
1980-82 UCS, NYPIRG, and WESPAC initiate legal action to close IP pending NRC analysis of the consequences of a major accident. Subsequent NRC hearings on IP operations and emergency planning are stalled when the hearing board chair resigns in protest of a ruling that excludes much anti-nuclear testimony.
The board declines the activists' petition. A NY Times editorial calls the hearing a "kangaroo conference," and states that the "regulatory game" is likely rigged against anti-nuke activists. Former NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford states afterwards, "Nowhere has the commission majority's hostility to fundamental legal concepts of fairness been more clearly shown than in the Indian Point hearings."
March 3, 1982. Indian Point simulates a major accident to test emergency evacuation plans. Federal officials say later that the drill was "generally good," although there were areas that need strengthening.
April 1982 Forty nuclear power plants in the United States have weak tubes in their steam generators and it is virtually impossible to make the needed design changes according to a recent report by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The tube problem is causing higher operating costs and is exposing plant staff to radiation. When a unit closes for the tube repairs, the report says, replacement power costs between $500,000 and $1 million and these costs are passed onto consumers.
It notes that the Southern California Edison Company which operates the troubled San Onofre plant 144 km south of Los Angeles, has used a process called Cleaving., in which a smaller tube is inserted into each damaged tube. Tube problems at San Onofre were discovered during a routine inspection which led to a shut-down of the plant lasting more than a year.
The plant did not resume operations until April 1981. The report says the tube problems in more than half the country's nuclear units are responsible for about 25 per cent of nuclear plant shut-downs that are unrelated to scheduled refueling of stations. The report says there is tube 'degradation' in at least 40 power plants. ("The Australian" 3rd April 1 1982)
Aug. 2, 1982. The N.R.C. threatens to close Indian Point unless flaws in the emergency evacuation plans for the area surrounding the plant are corrected within four months. The commission cites deficiencies in provisions for notifying residents in the area, for educating the public in advance about what to do, for making agreements with bus companies to provide emergency service and for limiting exposure of emergency workers to radiation.
Sept. 2, 1982. The chairman of a three-judge panel conducting hearings on safety of the two Indian Point plant resigns, saying the N.R.C. was not giving opponents of the plant a fair chance to state their case. The chairman, Administrative Law Judge Louis J. Carter, had been presiding at hearings ordered by the commission.
Dec. 17, 1982. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is charged with evaluating preparations to cope with an accident at Indian Point, says the emergency plants were "not feasible" because of significant deficiencies. The agency says it will decide whether to fine the utility operators, suspend the plant's operating licenses or take other action.
Dec. 22, 1982. The N.R.C. votes 3 to 2 to permit the Indian Point nuclear reactors to operate and to wait until an accident drill in March to determine whether deficiencies in emergency planning had been corrected.
Jan 24, 1983 U.S. nuclear plants may be using faulty parts supplied by a now bankrupt company. ("Daily News" 24/1/1983)
March 9, 1983. Two thousand people, from bus drivers to county executives, test their ability to respond to a major accident at the Indian Point plants, under the observation of 55 Federal inspectors and one of the five members of N.R.C.
April 19, 1983 The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency reported that plans for coping with an accident at the Indian Point nuclear reactors near New York have two major flaws and the safety of 288,000 people living within ten miles of the reactors could not be guaranteed. The plants have already missed deadlines for correcting flaws and debate has occurred whether or not they should be shut down. ("Financial Review" 19th April 1983)
July 1983 Nuclear Regulatory Commission findings have revealed small cracks in the cooling pipes of thirteen nuclear power plants which could lead to meltdowns. Although the plants can resume operations after patching the cracks, a permanent solution will coat hundreds of millions of dollars to replace the pipes entirely. All the reactors were made by General Electric. Another five reactors suspected of having the came problem were advised to shut down within 30 days for inspection. The shutdowns were the first ordered by the NRC since 1979. ("The West Australian" / "The Age" 16th July 1983)
Aug. 26, 1983. FEMA says officials had remedied deficiencies in the plans for coping with an accident at Indian Point and prepares a report for the N.R.C., ending what was then the plant's most serious threat to its license.
1984, February A 25 cent coin caused a loss of $150 million in revenue when it fell into the generator of a nuclear power plant. ("The Age 2/1984). If a quarter could do this much damage innocently dropped into a generator at a nuclear facility, how much damage could a few grenades dropped into said generator cause?
Feb 13, 1984 The IndianPoint II nuclear power plant in Buchanan was shut down after radioactive water started to leak into its steam generating system. The plant is expected to be closed after radioactive water started to leak into its one litre of water per minute seeping into the heat exchanger. ("Daily News" 13th February 1984)
July 24, 1984 At about 10:15 P.M six security guards at Indian Point entered into the local police record that they witnessed a giant UFO hover over reactor number three no more than 30 feet above the exhaust tower for fifteen minutes.
Jan 1980 An earthquake measuring 3 on the Richter Scale shook twin reactors at Indian Point, New York. Luckily the reactors were not functioning at the time. The plants are built on the Ramapo Fault. (W.I.S.E. Ibid.)
Jan. 29, 1980. The two nuclear plants at Indian Point have been shut down for five months for refueling, maintenance and repairs, and the N.R.C. says safety improvements must be completed before they can resume operation. Indian Point 2 is restarted in early February and Indian Point 3 returns to service on Feb. 16.
Feb. 27, 1980. Con Edison accedes to the wishes of the N.R.C. and retires Indian Point 1 permanently.
May, 1980 After a bombing at the Statue of Liberty, police receive a threatening call that "IP is next."
June, 1980 NYPIRG releases a citizens task force report prepared with WESPAC, SHAD, and others, criticizing IP evacuation plan and IP2 safety record, and calling for shut down of the plant.
Oct 17, 1980 to 1982 Con Ed discovers over 100,000 gallons of radioactive water spilled in the containment building of IP2, with water rising 25 feet in a floor cavity and eventually rising nine feet up the reactor vessel. No one had checked the area since Oct 3, despite warning lights showing water build-up, hence it is unclear how long the water had been leaking.
Con ED then attempts to restart the reactor three times, without first checking on possible damage from the spill. Neither the NRC, local officials, or the public are notified of the accident for three days. A UCS study showed 24 equipment failures and 21 management & operations errors in the period from Oct 1 to 20.
IP2 is shut for 8 months; ConEd attempts to recoup losses from the shut down, estimated at $800,000/day, with a 10% rate hike; WESPAC, NYPIRG, and 20 other groups organize a rate payers boycott, which by Dec includes nearly 1 million customers; WESPAC also calls for a public takeover of ConEd.
Oct. 24, 1980. The N.R.C. orders Indian Point 2 shut down until Con Edison determines how the leak went unnoticed. Five days later, the commission initiates an investigation to determine why Con Edison failed to notify the commission about the leak.
Dec. 10, 1980. The N.R.C. fines Con Edison $210,000 for the flooding in October.
Jan 15, 1981 Small amounts of radiation found leaking, possible since early December, into auxiliary steam system and then into Hudson River from Indian Point Plant in New York State. (W.I.S.E. Vol.3 No.2 p.18)
Jan 31,1981 The New York State Power Authority's nuclear plant at Indian Point on the Hudson River about 35 miles north of New York City shut down on Saturday 31st January following a breakdown of one of its turbines. It will remain out of operation for "a minimum of several weeks. a spokesperson for the Authority said. No radioactivity was released following the breakdown, according to Mr. CLIFF SPIELER, the spokesperson. The plant has a history of problems with its turbines, which were made by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. It only recently went back into service after repairs to the turbines. ("Financial Review" 3/2/1981)
April 7, 1981. The technical staff of the N.R.C. says the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor apparently suffered no damage from the flooding incident, clearing the way for the unit to be restarted. But one month later, Con Edison announces it has run into still another mechanical problem with Indian Point 2 and will not be able to put plant back in service until the end of May.
May 26, 1981. Indian Point 2 resumes service.
May 1981 Cancer may be caused by much lower levels of radiation than previously believed, according to a new study of the World War II atomic bomb blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Reports on research being done at the Lawrence Livermore Weapons Laboratory in California and at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, although tentative, indicate that the risk of dying of cancer after exposure to low level gamma radiation could double and the probability of contracting cancer after gamma radiation could be quadrupled. Some scientists believe the new information strengthens the argument that there is no safe level of radiation; that every incremental bit of exposure increases the chances of injury. ("The Age", 16th May 1981)
June 3, 1981 Indian Point No.2 nuclear plant in New York shut down automatically for six hours after the failure of an electrical relay - part of the plant's generator protection circuiting designed to monitor voltage generated by the plant and take corrective action if problems develop. (W.I.S.E. Vol.3 No.4 p.18)
July 7, 1981 On 7th July, three U.S. national safe energy groups sent a letter to members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission charging the N.R.C. with dangerous negligence in failing to enforce a nuclear power plant emergency regulation. The rule in question requires plants to acquire the means to alert residents within a ten-mile radius of an accident at the plant within 15 minutes of its occurrence. Although the deadline for compliance to the rule was 1st July, approximately one half of the more than 70 U.S. nuclear plants have failed to comply, according to the "New York Times". "The only protection the public has is the ability to flee following an accident", the group says. "Failure to enforce the prompt notification requirement will strip the public of its only assurance of safety".
Dec. 11, 1981. Con Edison is fined $40,000 by the N.R.C. for not protecting workers from radiation at its Indian Point 2 plant.
1980-82 UCS, NYPIRG, and WESPAC initiate legal action to close IP pending NRC analysis of the consequences of a major accident. Subsequent NRC hearings on IP operations and emergency planning are stalled when the hearing board chair resigns in protest of a ruling that excludes much anti-nuclear testimony.
The board declines the activists' petition. A NY Times editorial calls the hearing a "kangaroo conference," and states that the "regulatory game" is likely rigged against anti-nuke activists. Former NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford states afterwards, "Nowhere has the commission majority's hostility to fundamental legal concepts of fairness been more clearly shown than in the Indian Point hearings."
March 3, 1982. Indian Point simulates a major accident to test emergency evacuation plans. Federal officials say later that the drill was "generally good," although there were areas that need strengthening.
April 1982 Forty nuclear power plants in the United States have weak tubes in their steam generators and it is virtually impossible to make the needed design changes according to a recent report by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The tube problem is causing higher operating costs and is exposing plant staff to radiation. When a unit closes for the tube repairs, the report says, replacement power costs between $500,000 and $1 million and these costs are passed onto consumers.
It notes that the Southern California Edison Company which operates the troubled San Onofre plant 144 km south of Los Angeles, has used a process called Cleaving., in which a smaller tube is inserted into each damaged tube. Tube problems at San Onofre were discovered during a routine inspection which led to a shut-down of the plant lasting more than a year.
The plant did not resume operations until April 1981. The report says the tube problems in more than half the country's nuclear units are responsible for about 25 per cent of nuclear plant shut-downs that are unrelated to scheduled refueling of stations. The report says there is tube 'degradation' in at least 40 power plants. ("The Australian" 3rd April 1 1982)
Aug. 2, 1982. The N.R.C. threatens to close Indian Point unless flaws in the emergency evacuation plans for the area surrounding the plant are corrected within four months. The commission cites deficiencies in provisions for notifying residents in the area, for educating the public in advance about what to do, for making agreements with bus companies to provide emergency service and for limiting exposure of emergency workers to radiation.
Sept. 2, 1982. The chairman of a three-judge panel conducting hearings on safety of the two Indian Point plant resigns, saying the N.R.C. was not giving opponents of the plant a fair chance to state their case. The chairman, Administrative Law Judge Louis J. Carter, had been presiding at hearings ordered by the commission.
Dec. 17, 1982. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is charged with evaluating preparations to cope with an accident at Indian Point, says the emergency plants were "not feasible" because of significant deficiencies. The agency says it will decide whether to fine the utility operators, suspend the plant's operating licenses or take other action.
Dec. 22, 1982. The N.R.C. votes 3 to 2 to permit the Indian Point nuclear reactors to operate and to wait until an accident drill in March to determine whether deficiencies in emergency planning had been corrected.
Jan 24, 1983 U.S. nuclear plants may be using faulty parts supplied by a now bankrupt company. ("Daily News" 24/1/1983)
March 9, 1983. Two thousand people, from bus drivers to county executives, test their ability to respond to a major accident at the Indian Point plants, under the observation of 55 Federal inspectors and one of the five members of N.R.C.
April 19, 1983 The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency reported that plans for coping with an accident at the Indian Point nuclear reactors near New York have two major flaws and the safety of 288,000 people living within ten miles of the reactors could not be guaranteed. The plants have already missed deadlines for correcting flaws and debate has occurred whether or not they should be shut down. ("Financial Review" 19th April 1983)
July 1983 Nuclear Regulatory Commission findings have revealed small cracks in the cooling pipes of thirteen nuclear power plants which could lead to meltdowns. Although the plants can resume operations after patching the cracks, a permanent solution will coat hundreds of millions of dollars to replace the pipes entirely. All the reactors were made by General Electric. Another five reactors suspected of having the came problem were advised to shut down within 30 days for inspection. The shutdowns were the first ordered by the NRC since 1979. ("The West Australian" / "The Age" 16th July 1983)
Aug. 26, 1983. FEMA says officials had remedied deficiencies in the plans for coping with an accident at Indian Point and prepares a report for the N.R.C., ending what was then the plant's most serious threat to its license.
1984, February A 25 cent coin caused a loss of $150 million in revenue when it fell into the generator of a nuclear power plant. ("The Age 2/1984). If a quarter could do this much damage innocently dropped into a generator at a nuclear facility, how much damage could a few grenades dropped into said generator cause?
Feb 13, 1984 The IndianPoint II nuclear power plant in Buchanan was shut down after radioactive water started to leak into its steam generating system. The plant is expected to be closed after radioactive water started to leak into its one litre of water per minute seeping into the heat exchanger. ("Daily News" 13th February 1984)
July 24, 1984 At about 10:15 P.M six security guards at Indian Point entered into the local police record that they witnessed a giant UFO hover over reactor number three no more than 30 feet above the exhaust tower for fifteen minutes.
April 26, 1986 Chernobyl accident: a Ukrainian reactor explodes, releasing most (if not all) of its radioactive matter.
Aug, 1987 A GAO report notes that the NRC is slow to require corrective action in plants with chronic safety violations, takes 10 years or more to act on even the riskiest safety problems, and lacks guidelines that identify safety violations severe enough to shut nuke plants. Note-almost 20 years later, these quidelines still do not exist.
May, 1992 IP3 fined for failing to maintain critical safety systems.
Sept, 1992 IP3 fined for failing to fix leaky coolant pipes. A control room operator who failed a July drug test is back on the job, without a retest.
Oct, 1992 An NRC report card on IP3 finds declining performance in 5 of seven areas evaluated, including dropping the "engineering and technical support" grade from good to acceptable. The NRC points to a backlog of 3,500 pairs needing attention at IP3. (10)
Dec, 1992 The FBI seizes NYPA records regarding a meeting at which a senior plant manager knowingly lied to the NRC; in addition, the FBI seizes records showing that 25-30 plant operators admitted to "occasionally" falsifying log entries.
Feb 27, 1993 NYPA shuts IP3, after a series of violations over the past year that led to fines totaling $462,500. NYPA spokespeople hope for a restart in 2-3 months.
June-Oct, 1993 NRC fines NYPA $300,000 for 17 safety violations disclosed in April, 1993, including defects that caused a six month failure in a backup reactor shutdown system. NYPA also admits that it has been issuing inaccurate reports on radiation releases for 13 years. The utility was issuing the information assuming that a filtering device that was disconnected in 1980 had still been operable; the NRC's resident inspector notes "They released more (radiation) than they thought they released."
June 22, 1993: Indian Point 3 is placed on the NRC’s “Watch List” of troubled plants. NRC fines Indian Point 3 $300,000 for 17 safety violations.
Sept, 1993 NRC report shows backup cooling pumps went for ten years without fuses; the report also cites a backup generator that operated 11 years longer than recommended by the manufacturer, louvers stuck shut due to lack of simple maintenance, and a reactor shield fastened with incorrect bolts--and missing nuts.
September 14, 1993: Plant workers accidentally dump 900 gallons of radioactive water into the Hudson; four days later, 1,000 gallons of boric acid solution are spilled at the plant.
Nov, 1993 A senior operator, after getting caught submitting a bogus urine sample, tests positive for cocaine and marijuana, forcing his resignation. He is the 2nd senior operator testing positive for drugs at IP3.
Nov, 1993 Two original safety valves at IP3 found to be insufficiently rated; in the rush to replace them before an upcoming NRC inspection, engineers install them backwards, blocking both cooling systems and disabling backup generators. (18)
Dec 93-Jan-1994 Parts of a secret nuclear industry document is leaked, revealing dangerous conditions at IP3 that both NYPA and the NRC were aware of for months or years before the Feb '93 shut down, including defects in the same kind of valves implicated in the 1979 meltdown at 3 Mile Island.
Dec. 30, 1993. Ten months after Indian Point 3 was shut down because of mismanagement and safety problems, Federal regulators tell plant managers they are concerned that personnel there cannot handle the plant safely even when it is shut down. It does not reopen until July 1995.
April, 1994 Lehman Brothers ranks IP3 one of 8 US nuclear plants as "poor performers" in a report on nuclear investments.
May, 1994 After an NRC directive forces the utility to inspect its spent fuel pool at IP1, Con Ed admits that water has been leaking the site for four years, with estimates of up to 150 gallons of radioactive water leaking each day.
June, 1994 An underground pipe at the shut down IP3 plant breaks, spilling 1,600 gallons of toxic waste into the Hudson. The spill continues for nine days before the rupture is discovered.
July 1994 A ma intenance worker at IP3 accidentally opens a valve and spills 500 gallons of water.
Sept, 1994 Assemblymen Richard Brodsky holds hearings on IP3 that challenge the notion that the plants' generate energy cheaply enough to balance the public safety, health, and environmental costs. Testimony shows that other energy options are cheaper, that IP3 has run at only 42% efficiency over its lifetime, and that it ranks 95th out of 109 US nuclear plants in its lifetime capacity factor. Testimony shows rate payers could save up to $140 million/year from closing IP3. (22)
Oct, 1994 Another maintenance worker at IP3 accidentally opens a valve and spills 1500 gallons of water.
April, 1995 Steam generator tube cracking discovered in 25% of tubes at IP2; despite recent findings at the Maine Yankee plant that such cracking can be missed by standard testing procedures, the NRC refuses to require that both IP plants immediately institute enhanced tests, despite their regulations that require such testing. (23)
July 19, 1995 IP3 restarted after 2 1/2 year shut down. NYPA, having replaced 19 of its top 27 managers, claims that a "nuclear religion" instituted at the plant will insure safe operations.
July, 1995 NYPA runs IP3 improperly for three days, risking safety system failures; the violation brings an NRC citation in Oct 95.
July 18, 1995 28 thousand gallons of water spill from IP1 into the Hudson. At 2:10 p.m., an unplanned radiological liquid discharge occurred through the Indian Point 2 discharge canal into the Hudson River. The liquid release was approximately 9000 liters with a total radiological content of 150 GBq. Overflow of an uncontaminated water tank, due to a malfunction of a valve that lasted for 15 minutes until corrected by plant personnel.
The tank overflow which was uncontaminated water, went into the site's storm drain system and some of the water entered the Unit -1 curtain drain system, which is currently contaminated. Through a series of drainage pathways, the water was discharged through the site's discharge canal. The initially uncontaminated water became contaminated as it flowed through this path. The release occurred for a period of 77 minutes.
The licensee obtained and analyzed water samples taken during the discharge and performed an after-the-fact discharge permit. The licensee estimates that 9100 liters of water were discharged to the canal with a total release of 9250 MBq, with Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137 as the primary contributors.
August, 1995 NRC reports on July-August operations at IP3 criticizes operators for using strict procedural standards as loose guidelines and failing to report deviations from standards. (26)
September 14, 1995 NYPA shuts IP3, again, citing need to review safety & operational procedures. NYPA expects shutdown to last 2-3 months.
Dec 1995 Indian Point-3 woes continue. Preparations for another restart attempt at New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) Indian Point-3 went awry, again, on December 2 when a relief valve on the component cooling water (CCW) side of RHR heat exchanger inside containment was found leaking. A CCW pump auto-started and caused a pressure surge that momentarily lifted the relief valve. The valve did not reseat properly and discharged 5700 liters of water over a 16-hour period before it was discovered. Corrective actions to prevent this problem, implemented less than two years ago during the unit’s 2.5-year shutdown, were not successful. NYPA is investigating further solutions to the problem as well as why operators did not detect the leak earlier. The reactor heat-up was halted at 110°C.
Jan, 1996 NRC fines NYPA $50,000 for safety violations involving running while backup safety pumps are inoperable. (27)
April 6, 1996 IP3 restarted after a 7 month shutdown.
June, 1996 A hydrogen gas leak causes an explosion at IP3.
October 1996 IP3 is cited as one of the nation's worst plants by PublicCitizen, who note the plant's 22 safety system failures over three years --three times the national average. Although not on the list, IP2
is ranked third worst in the nation for safety system actuation and ninthworst for worker exposure.
Oct, 1996 Con Ed announces reorganization plans, including moving its IP2 plant into a state regulated subsidiary, thereby shielding the plant from potential free market competition. Meanwhile, a NYPA deal to turn over management of IP3 to a private company falls through, as negotiators cannot agree on terms. (29)
Jan, 1997 IP3 shut down for heater repairs. IP2 shut down due for valve repairs.
Feb, 1997 Assemblyman R. Brodsky excoriates IP3 President Robert Schoenberger at a public hearing for secret NYPA dealings to turn over management to a private company, and accuses the NYPA executive of
misleading the Assembly. (30)
May, 1997 A GAO report notes lax oversight at the NRC, echoing the 1987 GAO report. (31)
June 25, 1997 IP3 removed from NRC Watch List. Plant spokespeople assert that management's pursuit of excellence has turned things around, and will insure safe operations.
August, 1997 IP3 is cited by the NRC for an "apparent" violation of safety standards, by failing to correctly translate design basis information into procedures. The utility is fined $55,000 by the NRC for
inadequacies in its emergency safety procedures. (33)
Aug 6-15, 1997 IP2 shut down, due to questionable pressurizer safety valve settings; also, the plant's fire protection systems are found in a degraded condition.
October 8, 1997 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed $110,000 in fines against Consolidated Edison Company of New York for four violations of agency requirements at
its Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant. All of the violations pertain to equipment not being properly maintained and/or operated at the facility, located in Buchanan, N.Y.
October 15, 1997 More problems with a pump cause the plant to shut down.
October 29, 1997 Notice of violations for IP2 - " Procedure non-adherence has been a recurrent theme in NRC inspectin reports for the last two years "
1997: Indian Point 3 is cited by the NRC for safety violations.
1997 Brookhaven National Lab Study claims that a disaster from a spent fuel pool could cause anywhere from 1,500 to 143,000 cancer deaths and $800 million to $566 billion in damage, and could make a radius of 1 to 2,790 square miles around the plant uninhabitable.
November 19, 1998, Indian Point 3 shut down in response to unauthorized entry into protected area.
February 15, 2000: First full scale alert declared at Indian Point when Indian Point 2 reactor manually tripped due to indications of steam generator tube rupture in generator number 24. Contaminated steam is released. The NRC later reveals that hundreds of gallons of radioactive water leaked into the Hudson River and the Buchanan water system.
Indian Point 2 is shut down until December 2000. Steam generator tube rupture was initially estimated at greater than 285 litres/per minute. The reactor was manually tripped and all rods fully inserted into the core. The faulted steam generator was isolated. The licensee declared an Alert because of the large amount of water out of the reactor coolant system.
In 1975, the NRC was informed by Westinghouse that several Westinghouse plants had experienced steam generator tube degradation in the form of a reduction in tube diameter, later termed "tube denting." Indian Point -2 was one of the plants that suffered steam generator tube denting. It was noted at that time that dented tubes were susceptible to stress corrosion cracking.
These steam generator tubes were formed from Alloy 600, a corrosion-resistant high-nickel blend. 8 nuclear plants, including Indian Point -2, had Westinghouse Model 44 steam generators that used Alloy 600 material for tubing.. The reason these steam generator tubes have required repairs was corrosive products (typically magnetite and cooper) accumulating in and around the tube and tube support plates. These corrosive products cause tubes to dent, which can result in the tubes developing stress corrosion cracks.
The degradation problems particular to Westinghouse Model 44 steam generators resulted in seven plants replacing their steam generators. Indian Point -2 is the only plant with Westinghouse Model 44 steam generators that has not replaced its steam generators.
In August 1990, the NRC issued the Information Notice "Stress Corrosion Cracking in PWR Steam Generator Tubes" to holders of nuclear power plant operating licenses or those requesting construction permits for PWRs. The information notice was intended to inform licensees of problems involving stress corrosion cracking in PWR steam generator tubes. The IN stated that in light of available technology, reliable detection and sizing of stress corrosion cracking during inservice inspections posed a significant challenge.
April 2, 2000: NRC rates Indian Point 2 most trouble-plagued nuclear power plant in the country.
August 9, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for multiple violations that were assessed as White SDP findings. These White findings involved failures to met NRC emergency planning standards for (1) the timely augmentation by the emergency response organization, (2) the timely accountability of onsite radiation emergency workers, and (3) the factual and consistent dissemination of information to the media and a local official. These failures contributed to emergency response deficiencies that were exhibited during the course of the SGTF Alert event.
November 2000: Entergy, an energy conglomerate based in New Orleans , purchases Indian Point 3 & the James A. Fitzpatrick for $967 million. Entergy’s Northeast regional headquarters in White Plains announced the plant was worth more than $152 million a year to the local economy.
November 20, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Red SDP finding. The violation involved the licensee's failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality involving the presence of primary water stress corrosion cracking flaws in the steam generator tubes, despite opportunities during the 1997 refueling outage. As a result, one of the tubes failed on February 15, 2000, when the reactor was at 100% power.
September 2001: Entergy purchases Indian Point 1 and 2 for $502 million.
September 21, 2001: NRC admits uncertainty that the nation’s 103 plants could withstand the same kind of impact that leveled the World Trade Center.
May 18, 2002: Christopher Kozlow, Westchester ’s deputy commissioner of emergency services, is dismissed after about six months on the job. Kozlow is to claim the county wouldn’t let him change the evacuation plan.
June 5, 2002: Testimony before the U.S. Senate states that security guards at the nation's 104 nuclear power plants are not equally paid, trained or armed. Some earn less than janitors and carry shotguns that would be no defense against terrorists with automatic weapons, say lawmakers and security experts.
June 8, 2002: Westchester County gives away potassium iodide pills at first of three public distributions. Thousands show up to receive pills.
July 2002 Report titled Making The Nation Safer: The Role Of Science And Technology In Countering Terrorism , "the potential for 9/11 type attacks on nuclear power plants is high." The report, released by the National Research Council , describes the threat risk as high with potential consequences "ranging from reactor shutdowns to core meltdowns with very large releases of radioactivity."
July 2002 A consortium of European and American nuclear companies wants to establish a uranium enrichment plant for 1.1 billion dollar in the USA. Shortly an appropriate request is placed at the atomic supervisory authority NRC. The project would be the first of this kind in the United States for approximately 50 years and would break with ist realization the inland monopoly held by the enterprise Usec.
In order to be able to operate nuclear power stations, the fissile uranium 235, occurring in rocks as ore, must be increased from 0,7 per cent to three per cent, which happens in such plants. The consortium Louisiana Energy Services owns the British-Netherlands-German company Urenco, the world largest uranium supplier Cameco (Canada), the US power station and engineer companies Westinghouse and Fluor Daniel as well as the US power station operators Exelon, Entergy and Duke Energy. The German participation in Urenco is held over by the company Uranit of RWE and Eon. Possible locations for the plant are Lynchburg (Virginia), Wilmington (North Carolina) and Erwin (Tennessee).
August 2002: Governor Pataki Hires James Lee Witt Associates to evaluate emergency plans for Indian Point and other state nuclear facilities.
September 11, 2002: Entergy shuts down Indian Point 2 to prevent a growing hydrogen gas leak from reaching potentially explosive levels in the air outside the nuclear power plant.
November 8, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving a white SDP finding involving a moderate degradation of the control room west wall fire barrier. The violation cited the Entergy's failure from the time of initial construction in 1978 to August 2002, to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved fire protection program.
January 10, 2003: The Witt Report, an independent study of the evacuation plan commissioned by Governor George Pataki, is made public. Report states evacuation plan can’t protect public.
January 14, 2003: County executives from Westchester, Putnam, Rockland and Orange counties refuse to sign evacuation plan.
February 2, 2003: FEMA tells the state it must ignore the counties' protest and make its own decision about the emergency evacuation plans.
February 4, 2003: Invoking the principle of home rule, SEMO rejects the federal directive, saying it will not overrule the counties’ decision to refuse to sign their annual certification letters.
February 21, 2003: FEMA refuses to certify the emergency evacuation plans, saying it cannot give "reasonable assurance" that they can protect the public.
February 28, 2003: Riverkeeper releases study by Synapse Energy Economics that demonstrates closure of the Indian Point Nuclear Plant would have little or no effect on reliable electric service for New Yorkers.
April 9, 2003: Justice Thomas W. Keegan orders the State Department of Environmental Conservation to issue a draft permit for Indian Point's cooling system by Nov. 14, in response to a lawsuit brought by Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, Clearwater , Riverkeeper, Pete Seeger, and others. Millions of fish eggs, larvae, and young fish are killed every year by the power plant’s water-intake system.
Aug, 1987 A GAO report notes that the NRC is slow to require corrective action in plants with chronic safety violations, takes 10 years or more to act on even the riskiest safety problems, and lacks guidelines that identify safety violations severe enough to shut nuke plants. Note-almost 20 years later, these quidelines still do not exist.
May, 1992 IP3 fined for failing to maintain critical safety systems.
Sept, 1992 IP3 fined for failing to fix leaky coolant pipes. A control room operator who failed a July drug test is back on the job, without a retest.
Oct, 1992 An NRC report card on IP3 finds declining performance in 5 of seven areas evaluated, including dropping the "engineering and technical support" grade from good to acceptable. The NRC points to a backlog of 3,500 pairs needing attention at IP3. (10)
Dec, 1992 The FBI seizes NYPA records regarding a meeting at which a senior plant manager knowingly lied to the NRC; in addition, the FBI seizes records showing that 25-30 plant operators admitted to "occasionally" falsifying log entries.
Feb 27, 1993 NYPA shuts IP3, after a series of violations over the past year that led to fines totaling $462,500. NYPA spokespeople hope for a restart in 2-3 months.
June-Oct, 1993 NRC fines NYPA $300,000 for 17 safety violations disclosed in April, 1993, including defects that caused a six month failure in a backup reactor shutdown system. NYPA also admits that it has been issuing inaccurate reports on radiation releases for 13 years. The utility was issuing the information assuming that a filtering device that was disconnected in 1980 had still been operable; the NRC's resident inspector notes "They released more (radiation) than they thought they released."
June 22, 1993: Indian Point 3 is placed on the NRC’s “Watch List” of troubled plants. NRC fines Indian Point 3 $300,000 for 17 safety violations.
Sept, 1993 NRC report shows backup cooling pumps went for ten years without fuses; the report also cites a backup generator that operated 11 years longer than recommended by the manufacturer, louvers stuck shut due to lack of simple maintenance, and a reactor shield fastened with incorrect bolts--and missing nuts.
September 14, 1993: Plant workers accidentally dump 900 gallons of radioactive water into the Hudson; four days later, 1,000 gallons of boric acid solution are spilled at the plant.
Nov, 1993 A senior operator, after getting caught submitting a bogus urine sample, tests positive for cocaine and marijuana, forcing his resignation. He is the 2nd senior operator testing positive for drugs at IP3.
Nov, 1993 Two original safety valves at IP3 found to be insufficiently rated; in the rush to replace them before an upcoming NRC inspection, engineers install them backwards, blocking both cooling systems and disabling backup generators. (18)
Dec 93-Jan-1994 Parts of a secret nuclear industry document is leaked, revealing dangerous conditions at IP3 that both NYPA and the NRC were aware of for months or years before the Feb '93 shut down, including defects in the same kind of valves implicated in the 1979 meltdown at 3 Mile Island.
Dec. 30, 1993. Ten months after Indian Point 3 was shut down because of mismanagement and safety problems, Federal regulators tell plant managers they are concerned that personnel there cannot handle the plant safely even when it is shut down. It does not reopen until July 1995.
April, 1994 Lehman Brothers ranks IP3 one of 8 US nuclear plants as "poor performers" in a report on nuclear investments.
May, 1994 After an NRC directive forces the utility to inspect its spent fuel pool at IP1, Con Ed admits that water has been leaking the site for four years, with estimates of up to 150 gallons of radioactive water leaking each day.
June, 1994 An underground pipe at the shut down IP3 plant breaks, spilling 1,600 gallons of toxic waste into the Hudson. The spill continues for nine days before the rupture is discovered.
July 1994 A ma intenance worker at IP3 accidentally opens a valve and spills 500 gallons of water.
Sept, 1994 Assemblymen Richard Brodsky holds hearings on IP3 that challenge the notion that the plants' generate energy cheaply enough to balance the public safety, health, and environmental costs. Testimony shows that other energy options are cheaper, that IP3 has run at only 42% efficiency over its lifetime, and that it ranks 95th out of 109 US nuclear plants in its lifetime capacity factor. Testimony shows rate payers could save up to $140 million/year from closing IP3. (22)
Oct, 1994 Another maintenance worker at IP3 accidentally opens a valve and spills 1500 gallons of water.
April, 1995 Steam generator tube cracking discovered in 25% of tubes at IP2; despite recent findings at the Maine Yankee plant that such cracking can be missed by standard testing procedures, the NRC refuses to require that both IP plants immediately institute enhanced tests, despite their regulations that require such testing. (23)
July 19, 1995 IP3 restarted after 2 1/2 year shut down. NYPA, having replaced 19 of its top 27 managers, claims that a "nuclear religion" instituted at the plant will insure safe operations.
July, 1995 NYPA runs IP3 improperly for three days, risking safety system failures; the violation brings an NRC citation in Oct 95.
July 18, 1995 28 thousand gallons of water spill from IP1 into the Hudson. At 2:10 p.m., an unplanned radiological liquid discharge occurred through the Indian Point 2 discharge canal into the Hudson River. The liquid release was approximately 9000 liters with a total radiological content of 150 GBq. Overflow of an uncontaminated water tank, due to a malfunction of a valve that lasted for 15 minutes until corrected by plant personnel.
The tank overflow which was uncontaminated water, went into the site's storm drain system and some of the water entered the Unit -1 curtain drain system, which is currently contaminated. Through a series of drainage pathways, the water was discharged through the site's discharge canal. The initially uncontaminated water became contaminated as it flowed through this path. The release occurred for a period of 77 minutes.
The licensee obtained and analyzed water samples taken during the discharge and performed an after-the-fact discharge permit. The licensee estimates that 9100 liters of water were discharged to the canal with a total release of 9250 MBq, with Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137 as the primary contributors.
August, 1995 NRC reports on July-August operations at IP3 criticizes operators for using strict procedural standards as loose guidelines and failing to report deviations from standards. (26)
September 14, 1995 NYPA shuts IP3, again, citing need to review safety & operational procedures. NYPA expects shutdown to last 2-3 months.
Dec 1995 Indian Point-3 woes continue. Preparations for another restart attempt at New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) Indian Point-3 went awry, again, on December 2 when a relief valve on the component cooling water (CCW) side of RHR heat exchanger inside containment was found leaking. A CCW pump auto-started and caused a pressure surge that momentarily lifted the relief valve. The valve did not reseat properly and discharged 5700 liters of water over a 16-hour period before it was discovered. Corrective actions to prevent this problem, implemented less than two years ago during the unit’s 2.5-year shutdown, were not successful. NYPA is investigating further solutions to the problem as well as why operators did not detect the leak earlier. The reactor heat-up was halted at 110°C.
Jan, 1996 NRC fines NYPA $50,000 for safety violations involving running while backup safety pumps are inoperable. (27)
April 6, 1996 IP3 restarted after a 7 month shutdown.
June, 1996 A hydrogen gas leak causes an explosion at IP3.
October 1996 IP3 is cited as one of the nation's worst plants by PublicCitizen, who note the plant's 22 safety system failures over three years --three times the national average. Although not on the list, IP2
is ranked third worst in the nation for safety system actuation and ninthworst for worker exposure.
Oct, 1996 Con Ed announces reorganization plans, including moving its IP2 plant into a state regulated subsidiary, thereby shielding the plant from potential free market competition. Meanwhile, a NYPA deal to turn over management of IP3 to a private company falls through, as negotiators cannot agree on terms. (29)
Jan, 1997 IP3 shut down for heater repairs. IP2 shut down due for valve repairs.
Feb, 1997 Assemblyman R. Brodsky excoriates IP3 President Robert Schoenberger at a public hearing for secret NYPA dealings to turn over management to a private company, and accuses the NYPA executive of
misleading the Assembly. (30)
May, 1997 A GAO report notes lax oversight at the NRC, echoing the 1987 GAO report. (31)
June 25, 1997 IP3 removed from NRC Watch List. Plant spokespeople assert that management's pursuit of excellence has turned things around, and will insure safe operations.
August, 1997 IP3 is cited by the NRC for an "apparent" violation of safety standards, by failing to correctly translate design basis information into procedures. The utility is fined $55,000 by the NRC for
inadequacies in its emergency safety procedures. (33)
Aug 6-15, 1997 IP2 shut down, due to questionable pressurizer safety valve settings; also, the plant's fire protection systems are found in a degraded condition.
October 8, 1997 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed $110,000 in fines against Consolidated Edison Company of New York for four violations of agency requirements at
its Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant. All of the violations pertain to equipment not being properly maintained and/or operated at the facility, located in Buchanan, N.Y.
October 15, 1997 More problems with a pump cause the plant to shut down.
October 29, 1997 Notice of violations for IP2 - " Procedure non-adherence has been a recurrent theme in NRC inspectin reports for the last two years "
1997: Indian Point 3 is cited by the NRC for safety violations.
1997 Brookhaven National Lab Study claims that a disaster from a spent fuel pool could cause anywhere from 1,500 to 143,000 cancer deaths and $800 million to $566 billion in damage, and could make a radius of 1 to 2,790 square miles around the plant uninhabitable.
November 19, 1998, Indian Point 3 shut down in response to unauthorized entry into protected area.
February 15, 2000: First full scale alert declared at Indian Point when Indian Point 2 reactor manually tripped due to indications of steam generator tube rupture in generator number 24. Contaminated steam is released. The NRC later reveals that hundreds of gallons of radioactive water leaked into the Hudson River and the Buchanan water system.
Indian Point 2 is shut down until December 2000. Steam generator tube rupture was initially estimated at greater than 285 litres/per minute. The reactor was manually tripped and all rods fully inserted into the core. The faulted steam generator was isolated. The licensee declared an Alert because of the large amount of water out of the reactor coolant system.
In 1975, the NRC was informed by Westinghouse that several Westinghouse plants had experienced steam generator tube degradation in the form of a reduction in tube diameter, later termed "tube denting." Indian Point -2 was one of the plants that suffered steam generator tube denting. It was noted at that time that dented tubes were susceptible to stress corrosion cracking.
These steam generator tubes were formed from Alloy 600, a corrosion-resistant high-nickel blend. 8 nuclear plants, including Indian Point -2, had Westinghouse Model 44 steam generators that used Alloy 600 material for tubing.. The reason these steam generator tubes have required repairs was corrosive products (typically magnetite and cooper) accumulating in and around the tube and tube support plates. These corrosive products cause tubes to dent, which can result in the tubes developing stress corrosion cracks.
The degradation problems particular to Westinghouse Model 44 steam generators resulted in seven plants replacing their steam generators. Indian Point -2 is the only plant with Westinghouse Model 44 steam generators that has not replaced its steam generators.
In August 1990, the NRC issued the Information Notice "Stress Corrosion Cracking in PWR Steam Generator Tubes" to holders of nuclear power plant operating licenses or those requesting construction permits for PWRs. The information notice was intended to inform licensees of problems involving stress corrosion cracking in PWR steam generator tubes. The IN stated that in light of available technology, reliable detection and sizing of stress corrosion cracking during inservice inspections posed a significant challenge.
April 2, 2000: NRC rates Indian Point 2 most trouble-plagued nuclear power plant in the country.
August 9, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for multiple violations that were assessed as White SDP findings. These White findings involved failures to met NRC emergency planning standards for (1) the timely augmentation by the emergency response organization, (2) the timely accountability of onsite radiation emergency workers, and (3) the factual and consistent dissemination of information to the media and a local official. These failures contributed to emergency response deficiencies that were exhibited during the course of the SGTF Alert event.
November 2000: Entergy, an energy conglomerate based in New Orleans , purchases Indian Point 3 & the James A. Fitzpatrick for $967 million. Entergy’s Northeast regional headquarters in White Plains announced the plant was worth more than $152 million a year to the local economy.
November 20, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Red SDP finding. The violation involved the licensee's failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality involving the presence of primary water stress corrosion cracking flaws in the steam generator tubes, despite opportunities during the 1997 refueling outage. As a result, one of the tubes failed on February 15, 2000, when the reactor was at 100% power.
September 2001: Entergy purchases Indian Point 1 and 2 for $502 million.
September 21, 2001: NRC admits uncertainty that the nation’s 103 plants could withstand the same kind of impact that leveled the World Trade Center.
May 18, 2002: Christopher Kozlow, Westchester ’s deputy commissioner of emergency services, is dismissed after about six months on the job. Kozlow is to claim the county wouldn’t let him change the evacuation plan.
June 5, 2002: Testimony before the U.S. Senate states that security guards at the nation's 104 nuclear power plants are not equally paid, trained or armed. Some earn less than janitors and carry shotguns that would be no defense against terrorists with automatic weapons, say lawmakers and security experts.
June 8, 2002: Westchester County gives away potassium iodide pills at first of three public distributions. Thousands show up to receive pills.
July 2002 Report titled Making The Nation Safer: The Role Of Science And Technology In Countering Terrorism , "the potential for 9/11 type attacks on nuclear power plants is high." The report, released by the National Research Council , describes the threat risk as high with potential consequences "ranging from reactor shutdowns to core meltdowns with very large releases of radioactivity."
July 2002 A consortium of European and American nuclear companies wants to establish a uranium enrichment plant for 1.1 billion dollar in the USA. Shortly an appropriate request is placed at the atomic supervisory authority NRC. The project would be the first of this kind in the United States for approximately 50 years and would break with ist realization the inland monopoly held by the enterprise Usec.
In order to be able to operate nuclear power stations, the fissile uranium 235, occurring in rocks as ore, must be increased from 0,7 per cent to three per cent, which happens in such plants. The consortium Louisiana Energy Services owns the British-Netherlands-German company Urenco, the world largest uranium supplier Cameco (Canada), the US power station and engineer companies Westinghouse and Fluor Daniel as well as the US power station operators Exelon, Entergy and Duke Energy. The German participation in Urenco is held over by the company Uranit of RWE and Eon. Possible locations for the plant are Lynchburg (Virginia), Wilmington (North Carolina) and Erwin (Tennessee).
August 2002: Governor Pataki Hires James Lee Witt Associates to evaluate emergency plans for Indian Point and other state nuclear facilities.
September 11, 2002: Entergy shuts down Indian Point 2 to prevent a growing hydrogen gas leak from reaching potentially explosive levels in the air outside the nuclear power plant.
November 8, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving a white SDP finding involving a moderate degradation of the control room west wall fire barrier. The violation cited the Entergy's failure from the time of initial construction in 1978 to August 2002, to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved fire protection program.
January 10, 2003: The Witt Report, an independent study of the evacuation plan commissioned by Governor George Pataki, is made public. Report states evacuation plan can’t protect public.
January 14, 2003: County executives from Westchester, Putnam, Rockland and Orange counties refuse to sign evacuation plan.
February 2, 2003: FEMA tells the state it must ignore the counties' protest and make its own decision about the emergency evacuation plans.
February 4, 2003: Invoking the principle of home rule, SEMO rejects the federal directive, saying it will not overrule the counties’ decision to refuse to sign their annual certification letters.
February 21, 2003: FEMA refuses to certify the emergency evacuation plans, saying it cannot give "reasonable assurance" that they can protect the public.
February 28, 2003: Riverkeeper releases study by Synapse Energy Economics that demonstrates closure of the Indian Point Nuclear Plant would have little or no effect on reliable electric service for New Yorkers.
April 9, 2003: Justice Thomas W. Keegan orders the State Department of Environmental Conservation to issue a draft permit for Indian Point's cooling system by Nov. 14, in response to a lawsuit brought by Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, Clearwater , Riverkeeper, Pete Seeger, and others. Millions of fish eggs, larvae, and young fish are killed every year by the power plant’s water-intake system.
April 28/29, 2003: Mechanical problems cause Reactor 2 to trip due to offsite electrical problems on April 28. On April 29 a fire breaks out in Reactor 3; it took over 45 minutes to bring the fire under control. Both reactors are taken off-line.
May 1, 2003: Over 175 first responders state they cannot guarantee safety of residents.
July 25, 2003: FEMA and the NRC overrule the counties’ and state’s determination that the emergency evacuation plans can’t protect the public. County inquiries and Congressional hearings are called in the aftermath.
July 2003: NRC reports that IP 2 & 3 received 28 whistleblower complaints for 2002, a 22 percent increase. 75% of the complaints primarily involved issues of security. National median was four.
August 12, 2003: NRC launches investigation into cause of 9 unplanned shutdowns at IP during the past 18 months. The national average is less than one unplanned shutdown per reactor.
Aug14, 2003: Blackout 2003. The entire region regains power without IP being online for nearly a week. This was an historic day for the nuclear power industry, as nine nuclear reactors at seven power plants in New York, Ohio, Michigan, and New Jersey were forced to shut down during largest and most severe electricity blackout in U.S. history. The infamous Indian Point NPP in New York reported its two reactors having suffered an "Automatic reactor scram due to a loss of offsite power. All rods fully inserted.
July 25, 2003: FEMA and the NRC overrule the counties’ and state’s determination that the emergency evacuation plans can’t protect the public. County inquiries and Congressional hearings are called in the aftermath.
July 2003: NRC reports that IP 2 & 3 received 28 whistleblower complaints for 2002, a 22 percent increase. 75% of the complaints primarily involved issues of security. National median was four.
August 12, 2003: NRC launches investigation into cause of 9 unplanned shutdowns at IP during the past 18 months. The national average is less than one unplanned shutdown per reactor.
Aug14, 2003: Blackout 2003. The entire region regains power without IP being online for nearly a week. This was an historic day for the nuclear power industry, as nine nuclear reactors at seven power plants in New York, Ohio, Michigan, and New Jersey were forced to shut down during largest and most severe electricity blackout in U.S. history. The infamous Indian Point NPP in New York reported its two reactors having suffered an "Automatic reactor scram due to a loss of offsite power. All rods fully inserted.
Supplying power to vital buses via emergency diesel generators. All systems operating properly." The event was later updated, with a declaration that "RPS Actuation (loss of flow) due to loss of site ' power. Auto actuation of AFW in response to the unit trips. Auto Start and Load of Emergency diesel generators in response to the loss of off-site power."
September 8, 2003: The Union of Concerned Scientists and Riverkeeper formally petition the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to order the immediate shutdown of both nuclear power reactors, because the plant’s drainage pits (also known as containment sumps) are “almost certain” to be blocked with debris during an accident.
September 9, 2003: NRC conducts a special inspection of IP’s emergency-alert system to examine a discrepancy between Entergy and the 4 EPZ counties over the reliability of 154 sirens.
September 13, 2003: Nearly 600 electrical workers at Indian Point ask a federal court to block managers from shifting them between the Indian Point 2 & 3. The electrical workers claim that cuts in the work force have led to unsafe working conditions and poses safety issues for the public. Local 1-2 of the Utility Workers Union of America requests a restraining order against Entergy Nuclear Operations, a subdivision of Entergy Nuclear Northeast.
September 16, 2003: Project on Government Oversight (POGO) releases a letter it sent to the NRC criticizing the agency for making the security tests at Indian Point nuclear plant too easy. The letter based criticism of the “force-on-force” test on information gathered from participants and observers of the test.
September 18, 2003: The NRC initiates a special inspection of Indian Point’s emergency-alert system to examine a discrepancy between Entergy Nuclear and the four emergency planning zone counties over the reliability of 154 sirens.
November 20, 2003: 276 rank-and-file workers at the Indian Point 3 unit schedule a strike authorization vote for Dec. 4, Local 1-2 Utility Workers Union of America. Manny Hellen, president of the local, said a strike would occur if a new contract isn't reached by Jan. 17.
October 22, 2003: An Entergy official admits on NRP-affiliate station WAMC that there is no updated seismic hazard analysis for Indian Point.
December 22, 2003: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues a report that examined numerous unplanned outages at Indian Point. The report reveals that during the August 14th blackout key back-up systems were not in operation. The NRC found that Entergy had not corrected a known problem with some of the plant’s back-up diesel generators. As a result the diesel generators, needed to power air-conditioning to cool emergency response equipment, failed during the blackout.
December 29, 2003: Entergy sends a letter to the NRC formally notifying the agency of their intent to store irradiated nuclear fuel in dry casks on the site of the Indian Point nuclear power plant, in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Industry whistleblowers and nuclear safety watchdogs have raised concerns about design flaws with the Holtec dry cask model Entergy proposes to use at Indian Point and about Holtec’s inadequate quality assurance program.
January 18, 2004: Entergy and Local 1-2 Utility Workers Union of America reach a tentative four-year agreement, averting a strike.
March 1, 2004: William Lemanski – a town councilman of Tuxedo, NY and a retired software manager at Indian Point 2 publicly announces at a town board meeting his concerns regarding improperly sorted electric cables at the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant.
March 9, 2004: Indian Point 2 & 3 receives NRC green rating for safety. As a result, Indian Point will receive less intense oversight from the NRC.
April 15, 2004: A hundred concerned residents attend an NRC open meeting to discuss Entergy’s plans to store high-level radioactive waste in above-the-ground casks.
April 26, 2004: The Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition calls on the NRC to conduct a realistic drill that includes a terrorist scenario with a fast-breaking release for the emergency plans for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone near Indian Point.
May 5, 2004: Stamford , CT emergency officials request to be on the Emergency Notification list for Indian Point.
May 2004: For the first time in US nuclear power history, the NRC ends the public’s right to a hearing on safety issues.
May 25, 2004: Westchester County hires Boston-based Levitan & Associates to determine if and how the Indian Point nuclear plants can be closed and replaced with an alternative energy source.
June 2, 2004: Dr. Erik Larsen, medical director of the STAT Flight emergency helicopter operation at the Westchester Medical Center , raises concerns that the facility could “fall apart” with as few as 50 people seeking treatment after an accident at Indian Point.
June 8, 2004: Biennial emergency evacuation drill for Indian Point conducted. Elected officials and the public are outraged when it is learned that the drill included a “terrorist-type attack” but no radiation was released in the scenario. FEMA and the NRC quickly rubber stamp the test as adequate.
June 2004: The 9/11 commission and its witnesses divulge that additional air-based terrorist attacks have already been attempted, that more major attacks are likely in the near future, and that nuclear power plants are top al-Qaeda targets.
June 23, 2004: Entergy employee raises concerns that emergency sirens may not operate properly during hot summer days.
July 15, 2004: Over 100 concerned residents attend NRC open house to discuss Entergy’s proposed dry cask storage system. IPSEC and nuclear safety experts argue that large casks containing deadly toxic waste are attractive terrorist targets, particularly since Entergy’s plan is to place them on a concrete pad with no protective structures or barriers.
July 22, 2004: The 9/11 commission report suggests that the 9/11 plot’s ringleader had considered crashing a commercial airliner into a nuclear power plant in the New York area. The report explains that Mohamed Atta, who piloted one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center , “considered targeting a nuclear facility he had seen during familiarization flights near New York .”
August 9, 2004: The NRC announces that it will no longer make available to the public the results of physical assessments of nuclear plant security or enforcement actions associated with such evaluations.
September 2, 2004: Entergy announces plans to cut work force at Indian Point by up to 500 workers.
September 2, 2004: Indian Point 2 shutdown for valve failure.
September 3, 2004: A new patrol boat is approved to be permanently stationed at Indian Point. Oversight of the boat will fall to the authority of the state Division of Military and Naval Affairs, which uses National Guard troops to staff its marine force.
September 8, 2004: Riverkeeper releases a study that finds the potential health consequences of a successful terrorist attack on the Indian Point nuclear plant could cause as many as 518,000 long-term deaths from cancer and as many as 44,000 near-term deaths from acute radiation poisoning, depending on weather conditions. Dr. Edwin Lyman , a senior staff scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, authored the report entitled “Chornobyl-on-the-Hudson?: The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant.”
September 15, 2004: Indian Point 2 shutdown for valve failure.
September 6, 2004: Entergy announces that it will seek a power uprate for Indian Point. The company wants to increase power generation by 90 megawatts.
September 20, 2004: Entergy drops its interest in building a small onsite gas plant at Indian Point site.
September 21, 2004: Congresswoman Sue Kelly (R-Katonah) calls on the NRC to inspect wiring at Indian Point after former worker raised allegations of improper cable separation at Indian Point.
September 24, 2004: Indian Point 2 shutdown for valve failure.
September 24, 2004: Orange County Board of Legislators Public Safety Committee passes resolution calling on federal authorities to investigate the safety of spent fuel storage at the Indian Point nuclear plant.
October 1, 2004: Indian Point security guards ratify a new five-year contract, averting a possible strike.
October 19, 2004: A labor dispute at Indian Point 2 triggers a sickout by approximately 40 electricians and other craft union workers after several workers were fired for allegedly raising safety concerns.
October 27, 2004: The NRC approves a 3.26% increase of electricity generating capacity for Indian Point 2.
November 2004: Up to 300 Indian Point workers are exposed to asbestos. Charles Pencola, a steam-fitter who has worked at Indian Point for 35 years, said Entergy managers declined to stop work in the area until the problem was properly corrected.
September 8, 2003: The Union of Concerned Scientists and Riverkeeper formally petition the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to order the immediate shutdown of both nuclear power reactors, because the plant’s drainage pits (also known as containment sumps) are “almost certain” to be blocked with debris during an accident.
September 9, 2003: NRC conducts a special inspection of IP’s emergency-alert system to examine a discrepancy between Entergy and the 4 EPZ counties over the reliability of 154 sirens.
September 13, 2003: Nearly 600 electrical workers at Indian Point ask a federal court to block managers from shifting them between the Indian Point 2 & 3. The electrical workers claim that cuts in the work force have led to unsafe working conditions and poses safety issues for the public. Local 1-2 of the Utility Workers Union of America requests a restraining order against Entergy Nuclear Operations, a subdivision of Entergy Nuclear Northeast.
September 16, 2003: Project on Government Oversight (POGO) releases a letter it sent to the NRC criticizing the agency for making the security tests at Indian Point nuclear plant too easy. The letter based criticism of the “force-on-force” test on information gathered from participants and observers of the test.
September 18, 2003: The NRC initiates a special inspection of Indian Point’s emergency-alert system to examine a discrepancy between Entergy Nuclear and the four emergency planning zone counties over the reliability of 154 sirens.
November 20, 2003: 276 rank-and-file workers at the Indian Point 3 unit schedule a strike authorization vote for Dec. 4, Local 1-2 Utility Workers Union of America. Manny Hellen, president of the local, said a strike would occur if a new contract isn't reached by Jan. 17.
October 22, 2003: An Entergy official admits on NRP-affiliate station WAMC that there is no updated seismic hazard analysis for Indian Point.
December 22, 2003: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues a report that examined numerous unplanned outages at Indian Point. The report reveals that during the August 14th blackout key back-up systems were not in operation. The NRC found that Entergy had not corrected a known problem with some of the plant’s back-up diesel generators. As a result the diesel generators, needed to power air-conditioning to cool emergency response equipment, failed during the blackout.
December 29, 2003: Entergy sends a letter to the NRC formally notifying the agency of their intent to store irradiated nuclear fuel in dry casks on the site of the Indian Point nuclear power plant, in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Industry whistleblowers and nuclear safety watchdogs have raised concerns about design flaws with the Holtec dry cask model Entergy proposes to use at Indian Point and about Holtec’s inadequate quality assurance program.
January 18, 2004: Entergy and Local 1-2 Utility Workers Union of America reach a tentative four-year agreement, averting a strike.
March 1, 2004: William Lemanski – a town councilman of Tuxedo, NY and a retired software manager at Indian Point 2 publicly announces at a town board meeting his concerns regarding improperly sorted electric cables at the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant.
March 9, 2004: Indian Point 2 & 3 receives NRC green rating for safety. As a result, Indian Point will receive less intense oversight from the NRC.
April 15, 2004: A hundred concerned residents attend an NRC open meeting to discuss Entergy’s plans to store high-level radioactive waste in above-the-ground casks.
April 26, 2004: The Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition calls on the NRC to conduct a realistic drill that includes a terrorist scenario with a fast-breaking release for the emergency plans for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone near Indian Point.
May 5, 2004: Stamford , CT emergency officials request to be on the Emergency Notification list for Indian Point.
May 2004: For the first time in US nuclear power history, the NRC ends the public’s right to a hearing on safety issues.
May 25, 2004: Westchester County hires Boston-based Levitan & Associates to determine if and how the Indian Point nuclear plants can be closed and replaced with an alternative energy source.
June 2, 2004: Dr. Erik Larsen, medical director of the STAT Flight emergency helicopter operation at the Westchester Medical Center , raises concerns that the facility could “fall apart” with as few as 50 people seeking treatment after an accident at Indian Point.
June 8, 2004: Biennial emergency evacuation drill for Indian Point conducted. Elected officials and the public are outraged when it is learned that the drill included a “terrorist-type attack” but no radiation was released in the scenario. FEMA and the NRC quickly rubber stamp the test as adequate.
June 2004: The 9/11 commission and its witnesses divulge that additional air-based terrorist attacks have already been attempted, that more major attacks are likely in the near future, and that nuclear power plants are top al-Qaeda targets.
June 23, 2004: Entergy employee raises concerns that emergency sirens may not operate properly during hot summer days.
July 15, 2004: Over 100 concerned residents attend NRC open house to discuss Entergy’s proposed dry cask storage system. IPSEC and nuclear safety experts argue that large casks containing deadly toxic waste are attractive terrorist targets, particularly since Entergy’s plan is to place them on a concrete pad with no protective structures or barriers.
July 22, 2004: The 9/11 commission report suggests that the 9/11 plot’s ringleader had considered crashing a commercial airliner into a nuclear power plant in the New York area. The report explains that Mohamed Atta, who piloted one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center , “considered targeting a nuclear facility he had seen during familiarization flights near New York .”
August 9, 2004: The NRC announces that it will no longer make available to the public the results of physical assessments of nuclear plant security or enforcement actions associated with such evaluations.
September 2, 2004: Entergy announces plans to cut work force at Indian Point by up to 500 workers.
September 2, 2004: Indian Point 2 shutdown for valve failure.
September 3, 2004: A new patrol boat is approved to be permanently stationed at Indian Point. Oversight of the boat will fall to the authority of the state Division of Military and Naval Affairs, which uses National Guard troops to staff its marine force.
September 8, 2004: Riverkeeper releases a study that finds the potential health consequences of a successful terrorist attack on the Indian Point nuclear plant could cause as many as 518,000 long-term deaths from cancer and as many as 44,000 near-term deaths from acute radiation poisoning, depending on weather conditions. Dr. Edwin Lyman , a senior staff scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, authored the report entitled “Chornobyl-on-the-Hudson?: The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant.”
September 15, 2004: Indian Point 2 shutdown for valve failure.
September 6, 2004: Entergy announces that it will seek a power uprate for Indian Point. The company wants to increase power generation by 90 megawatts.
September 20, 2004: Entergy drops its interest in building a small onsite gas plant at Indian Point site.
September 21, 2004: Congresswoman Sue Kelly (R-Katonah) calls on the NRC to inspect wiring at Indian Point after former worker raised allegations of improper cable separation at Indian Point.
September 24, 2004: Indian Point 2 shutdown for valve failure.
September 24, 2004: Orange County Board of Legislators Public Safety Committee passes resolution calling on federal authorities to investigate the safety of spent fuel storage at the Indian Point nuclear plant.
October 1, 2004: Indian Point security guards ratify a new five-year contract, averting a possible strike.
October 19, 2004: A labor dispute at Indian Point 2 triggers a sickout by approximately 40 electricians and other craft union workers after several workers were fired for allegedly raising safety concerns.
October 27, 2004: The NRC approves a 3.26% increase of electricity generating capacity for Indian Point 2.
November 2004: Up to 300 Indian Point workers are exposed to asbestos. Charles Pencola, a steam-fitter who has worked at Indian Point for 35 years, said Entergy managers declined to stop work in the area until the problem was properly corrected.
December 2004: A nuclear watchdog group releases data showing that there is no backup power for sirens, in the event of loss of electricity. Indian Point is one of many U.S nuclear plants without backpower to emergency sirens.
December 3, 2004: Indian Point 2 is shutdown for welding problems.
December 10, 2004: Emergency sirens fail to rotate properly.
January 2005: For the third consecutive year Westchester, Rockland , and Orange County officials refuse to submit their Annual Certification Letters, a checklist for the Indian Point emergency evacuation plans. For the second year in a row Putnam County Executive Robert Bondi submits his county’s paperwork, despite no material changes to the plan since the Witt Report concluded that the plan is gravely flawed and probably cannot be fixed.
January, 19 2005: Westchester County hosts State Emergency Management Office Open House for Indian Point. Potassium Iodide pills are distributed to the public.
December 3, 2004: Indian Point 2 is shutdown for welding problems.
December 10, 2004: Emergency sirens fail to rotate properly.
January 2005: For the third consecutive year Westchester, Rockland , and Orange County officials refuse to submit their Annual Certification Letters, a checklist for the Indian Point emergency evacuation plans. For the second year in a row Putnam County Executive Robert Bondi submits his county’s paperwork, despite no material changes to the plan since the Witt Report concluded that the plan is gravely flawed and probably cannot be fixed.
January, 19 2005: Westchester County hosts State Emergency Management Office Open House for Indian Point. Potassium Iodide pills are distributed to the public.
January 24, 2005: IP guard discovered drunk while acting as a safety supervisor at a firing range where other Entergy security workers were undergoing firearms training on the job at Indian Point. He receives a two week suspension.
January 26, 2005: Congressional delegates, Eliot Engel (D-NY), Nita Lowey (D-Westchester/Rockland) and Sue Kelly (R-NY) notify the NRC that any failure of emergency sirens at Indian Point is unacceptable.
January 31, 2005: At a Press Club luncheon NYS Attorney General Eliot Spitzer says he supports the closure of Indian Point, if energy reliability can be assured.
January 26, 2005: Congressional delegates, Eliot Engel (D-NY), Nita Lowey (D-Westchester/Rockland) and Sue Kelly (R-NY) notify the NRC that any failure of emergency sirens at Indian Point is unacceptable.
January 31, 2005: At a Press Club luncheon NYS Attorney General Eliot Spitzer says he supports the closure of Indian Point, if energy reliability can be assured.
February 8, 2005: Westchester County Executive Andy Spano calls on the NRC to investigate emergency sirens at Indian Point.
February 10/11, 2005: Control rods fail to load properly at Indian Point.
February 10, 2005: Ulster County Board of Legislators overwhelmingly votes in favor of opposing a 20-year license extension on Indian Point. Ulster County becomes fourth county board, and joins an addition 16 municipal boards that have passed a similar resolution opposing the relicensing of Indian Point.
February 14, 2005: Due to Entergy’s improper handling of radioactive waste, an Indian Point shipment of low-level radioactive waste is discovered leaking upon arrival at the Barnwell Waste Management Facility in Barnwell , South Carolina . According to the NRC at least one worker was exposed to radioactive materials; this is in violation of South Carolina laws regulating the handling of nuclear waste at the Barnwell facility.
April 6, 2005: The long awaited study by the National Academy of Sciences on the vulnerability of spent fuel pools at U.S. nuclear power plants is released. The report, released yesterday, confirms what Riverkeeper has maintained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: the spent fuel pools at nuclear power plants are soft targets, vulnerable to terrorist attack by aircraft or high explosives, and pose a high risk to public health and safety due to the high levels of volatile radionuclides present in the irradiated fuel. Riverkeeper calls on Governor Pataki and Congressional delegates to immediately appoint an independent commission to review Indian Point’s spent fuel pools, their vulnerability to terrorist attack, and possible solutions to minimize the grave risks posed to the public in the event of a terrorist attack at Indian Point.
April 12, 2005: The Government Accountability Office issues a scathing report of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and nuclear power plant owners, including Entergy, for their ineffective oversight, poor inventory management, and lax safety and security management of high-level radioactive spent fuel at the 103 nuclear power plants in the United States . In 2004 Entergy lost high-level radioactive spent fuel rods at its Vermont Yankee nuclear plant.
May 18, 2005: NRC issues a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear, Indian Point 2, following an inspection revealing that Entergy failed to respond adequately to a buildup of nitrogen gas in the safety injection pump system, which controls water flow in the emergency backup cooling system. The buildup of nitrogen gas had continued for 77 days before the NRC notified Entergy of the seriousness of the problem, knocking out one pump completely and damaging two others.
June 9, 2005: Levitan Associates releases a report commissioned by Westchester County to study the feasibility of retiring Indian Point before its licenses expire. The report states that the energy currently supplied by Indian Point 2 & 3 could be easily replaced through a combination of new plants and increased energy efficiency measures at the state level, with the increase to ratepayers estimated to be “less than a slice of pizza per month.”
June 20, 2005: Congresswoman Nita Lowey authors The Nuclear Power Licensing Reform Act of 2005. If passed, it would require that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must apply the same licensing standards to old nuclear power plants as new nuclear power plants, must take into account changes in population around a nuclear power plant, must require adequate emergency evacuation plans for populations within a 50-mile radius of a nuclear power plant, and must take into account threats to the population due to security and safety vulnerabilities at a nuclear power plant.
July 2005: Power to Indian Point’s emergency siren system is knocked out on two different occasions, once for six hours before officials were aware of the problem.
July 29, 2005: Entergy Nuclear NE publicly commits to replacing the malfunctioning emergency siren system, following repeated failed tests and power outages earlier in the summer. NY Senator Hillary Clinton’s amendment to the 2005 Energy Bill– which was signed into law by President Bush – mandates that Indian Point’s sirens have reliable backup power.
August/September 2005: The emergency siren system fails to operate properly during testing on several occasions, due to problems with Verizon’s phone lines and software failures that resulted in all of Rockland County ’s sirens failing to sound for nearly an hour.
August 1, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving leakage of water from a safety injection accumulator which contained absorbed nitrogen gas. The licensee's evaluation and correction of this condition adverse to quality was inadequate. The violation cited the licensee's failure to (1) recognize the potential for nitrogen gas intrusion into the safety injection system and the resultant potential challenge to safety injection pump operation; and (2) adequately assess industry operating experience related to safety injection accumulator back leakage.
September 12-15, 2005: Department of Homeland Security conducts a review of security and emergency planning at Indian Point, as part of the federal government’s “Comprehensive Assessment” of the vulnerability of the nation’s infrastructure to terrorist attack. A siren test conducted during the review once again fails to activate a significant number of sirens. The review is unrelated to the widespread criticism of FEMA/DHS following Hurricane Katrina.
September 20, 2005: NRC and Entergy notify the public that radioactive water is leaking from IP2’s spent fuel pool. The leak was discovered by contractors excavating earth from the base of the pool in preparation for the installation of a new crane, for use in transferring spent fuel from the pool to dry cask storage. NRC assures the public there is no “immediate risk to public health or the environment.” NRC later admits that Entergy first discovered the leak twenty days earlier, but did not believe it was serious enough to warrant public notification. NRC orders a special inspection to determine the source of the leak.
September 29, 2005: A control rod malfunction at IP3 forces the reactor to cut power by 35% immediately and notify the NRC. The control rods are designed to operate in unison, dropping into the reactor core to slow the fission process if a problem arises. In this case, a single rod dropped into the core without warning.
October 2-9, 2005: Indian Point 3 is completely shut down following the control rod malfunction. The electrical switch the NRC believes caused the problem is replaced. Despite the loss of 1,000 MW to the NY power grid, there are no disruptions or significant price increases during the week that IP3 is inoperative.
October 5, 2005: Entergy notifies the NRC that a sample from a monitoring well located in the IP2 transformer yard shows tritium contamination that is ten times the EPA drinking water limit for the radionuclide, and is consistent with tritiated water from a spent fuel pool. The NRC broadens its special inspection to include this new information. The NRC also states in its report that the monitoring well had not been checked since its installation in 2000, following the transfer of IP’s ownership from ConEd to Entergy.
October 7, 2005: The NRC updates its Special Inspection Charter for the IP2 Tritium Leak to include a review of Entergy’s efforts to control the ongoing leak from the IP1 Spent Fuel Pool.
October 18, 2005 : The NRC and Entergy confirm that the radioactive leak discovered in August is greater than initially believed. The radioactive isotope, tritium, has been discovered in five sampling wells around Indian Point 2, while the leak at the spent fuel pool has increased to about two liters per day. Exposure to tritium increases the risk of developing cancer. The company plans to test more wells, inspect the liner of the leaking fuel pool, and install additional monitoring wells.
October 18, 2005: A test of the Indian Point sirens failed again today. Ten of 15 sirens in Orange County and another four of the 156 total sirens within the 10-mile evacuation zone failed to sound during the routine test.
October 28, 2005: NRC Region 1 Director Sam Collins formally requests permission from the agency’s Executive Director of Operations to increase oversight at Indian Point on two matters, the tritium leak and the continued problems with the emergency sirens. Permission is granted three days later.
November 16, 2005: The NRC holds a public meeting with Entergy to discuss the company’s plan for replacing the emergency siren system at Indian Point. Entergy announces their commitment to completely replacing the system by January 2007 with new sirens that will have backup battery power. However, statements by DHS officials regarding a lengthy approval process for the sirens put the time schedule in doubt. In addition, NRC official Erik Leeds argued that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required that the NRC enforce the order within 18 months, not that backup power be installed within 18 months.
November 26, 2005: The tritium leak at IP2 remains unsolved, nearly three months after its discovery. Entergy’s use of underwater cameras and divers to visually inspect and test for leaks at three locations on the steel liner’s surface yield no results. Entergy must now employ different cameras to inspect the liner near the bottom of the pool, where the radiation is too high for a human diver to enter.
December 1, 2005: Entergy reports to the NRC that an initial sample from a new monitoring well five feet from the wall of the IP2 Spent Fuel Pool shows tritium levels in the groundwater at thirty times the EPA limit, the highest level of tritium contamination yet discovered. In addition, the NRC announces that preliminary tests of tritiated water found in the IP1 Pool Collection System contain too much tritium to be from the IP1 Pool, suggesting that tritium-laced water is being collected in the IP1 Drain from another, unknown source. The NRC still does not know where the leak is coming from, how long it has been leaking, or the extent of groundwater contamination under the plant.
December 2006: Right before the kickoff of the Christmas holiday, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an inspection report on the Indian Point nuclear power plant which notes a “potentially chilling effect” amongst workers who identify safety problems at the site.
December 21, 2006 In letter to Entergy’s site Vice President, Fred Dacimo, NRC Director for the Division of Reactor Projects David C. Lew noted, “the NRC has become aware of incidents through insights gained during these inspections and from the allegation program where workers perceived that individuals were treated negatively by management for raising issues. As a result of these incidents, some workers expressed reluctance to raise issues under certain circumstances.” In addition, Lew notes that Entergy had “deferred action” on an “alleged potential chilling effect in the Maintenance department.”
January 5, 2007: “Unusual event” declared at IP3 due to rapidly lowering cooling water levels- Intake pipe screens on Hudson riverfront found to be clogged with ice and debris. (no shutdown)
January 16, 2007: The Journal News reported that four of twelve fish samples taken from the Hudson by Entergy showed detectable levels of strontium-90 in their flesh, raising new concerns as to the level of environmental damage caused by the leak of radioactive water containing strontium-90 from the Indian Point 1 spent fuel pool. Of the four showing higher levels, one was collected near Indian Point, and the other three near the Newburgh-Beacon bridge, about fifteen miles north of the plant. Riverkeeper immediately called on state and federal regulators to broaden their sampling program, so that a better picture of the extent of contamination could be ascertained. This toxic radionuclide, known as a “bone seeker” because it mimics calcium and concentrates in bone, can cause leukemia and bone cancer if ingested in high amounts. Despite Entergy’s claim to the contrary, Indian Point is known to be at least one source of strontium-90 in the Hudson, and the only one currently known to be discharging this toxic substance into the river. Low levels of strontium-90 remain in the global environment from nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 60s, and the Knolls Atomic Laboratory dumped radioactive waste into the Mohawk River near Schenectady during the same time period. The Mohawk is a tributary of the Hudson.
February 16, 2007: First test of Entergy’s new siren system is “unsuccessful”, according to Westchester county Emergency Management commissioner Tony Sutton.
February 10/11, 2005: Control rods fail to load properly at Indian Point.
February 10, 2005: Ulster County Board of Legislators overwhelmingly votes in favor of opposing a 20-year license extension on Indian Point. Ulster County becomes fourth county board, and joins an addition 16 municipal boards that have passed a similar resolution opposing the relicensing of Indian Point.
February 14, 2005: Due to Entergy’s improper handling of radioactive waste, an Indian Point shipment of low-level radioactive waste is discovered leaking upon arrival at the Barnwell Waste Management Facility in Barnwell , South Carolina . According to the NRC at least one worker was exposed to radioactive materials; this is in violation of South Carolina laws regulating the handling of nuclear waste at the Barnwell facility.
April 6, 2005: The long awaited study by the National Academy of Sciences on the vulnerability of spent fuel pools at U.S. nuclear power plants is released. The report, released yesterday, confirms what Riverkeeper has maintained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: the spent fuel pools at nuclear power plants are soft targets, vulnerable to terrorist attack by aircraft or high explosives, and pose a high risk to public health and safety due to the high levels of volatile radionuclides present in the irradiated fuel. Riverkeeper calls on Governor Pataki and Congressional delegates to immediately appoint an independent commission to review Indian Point’s spent fuel pools, their vulnerability to terrorist attack, and possible solutions to minimize the grave risks posed to the public in the event of a terrorist attack at Indian Point.
April 12, 2005: The Government Accountability Office issues a scathing report of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and nuclear power plant owners, including Entergy, for their ineffective oversight, poor inventory management, and lax safety and security management of high-level radioactive spent fuel at the 103 nuclear power plants in the United States . In 2004 Entergy lost high-level radioactive spent fuel rods at its Vermont Yankee nuclear plant.
May 18, 2005: NRC issues a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear, Indian Point 2, following an inspection revealing that Entergy failed to respond adequately to a buildup of nitrogen gas in the safety injection pump system, which controls water flow in the emergency backup cooling system. The buildup of nitrogen gas had continued for 77 days before the NRC notified Entergy of the seriousness of the problem, knocking out one pump completely and damaging two others.
June 9, 2005: Levitan Associates releases a report commissioned by Westchester County to study the feasibility of retiring Indian Point before its licenses expire. The report states that the energy currently supplied by Indian Point 2 & 3 could be easily replaced through a combination of new plants and increased energy efficiency measures at the state level, with the increase to ratepayers estimated to be “less than a slice of pizza per month.”
June 20, 2005: Congresswoman Nita Lowey authors The Nuclear Power Licensing Reform Act of 2005. If passed, it would require that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must apply the same licensing standards to old nuclear power plants as new nuclear power plants, must take into account changes in population around a nuclear power plant, must require adequate emergency evacuation plans for populations within a 50-mile radius of a nuclear power plant, and must take into account threats to the population due to security and safety vulnerabilities at a nuclear power plant.
July 2005: Power to Indian Point’s emergency siren system is knocked out on two different occasions, once for six hours before officials were aware of the problem.
July 29, 2005: Entergy Nuclear NE publicly commits to replacing the malfunctioning emergency siren system, following repeated failed tests and power outages earlier in the summer. NY Senator Hillary Clinton’s amendment to the 2005 Energy Bill– which was signed into law by President Bush – mandates that Indian Point’s sirens have reliable backup power.
August/September 2005: The emergency siren system fails to operate properly during testing on several occasions, due to problems with Verizon’s phone lines and software failures that resulted in all of Rockland County ’s sirens failing to sound for nearly an hour.
August 1, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving leakage of water from a safety injection accumulator which contained absorbed nitrogen gas. The licensee's evaluation and correction of this condition adverse to quality was inadequate. The violation cited the licensee's failure to (1) recognize the potential for nitrogen gas intrusion into the safety injection system and the resultant potential challenge to safety injection pump operation; and (2) adequately assess industry operating experience related to safety injection accumulator back leakage.
September 12-15, 2005: Department of Homeland Security conducts a review of security and emergency planning at Indian Point, as part of the federal government’s “Comprehensive Assessment” of the vulnerability of the nation’s infrastructure to terrorist attack. A siren test conducted during the review once again fails to activate a significant number of sirens. The review is unrelated to the widespread criticism of FEMA/DHS following Hurricane Katrina.
September 20, 2005: NRC and Entergy notify the public that radioactive water is leaking from IP2’s spent fuel pool. The leak was discovered by contractors excavating earth from the base of the pool in preparation for the installation of a new crane, for use in transferring spent fuel from the pool to dry cask storage. NRC assures the public there is no “immediate risk to public health or the environment.” NRC later admits that Entergy first discovered the leak twenty days earlier, but did not believe it was serious enough to warrant public notification. NRC orders a special inspection to determine the source of the leak.
September 29, 2005: A control rod malfunction at IP3 forces the reactor to cut power by 35% immediately and notify the NRC. The control rods are designed to operate in unison, dropping into the reactor core to slow the fission process if a problem arises. In this case, a single rod dropped into the core without warning.
October 2-9, 2005: Indian Point 3 is completely shut down following the control rod malfunction. The electrical switch the NRC believes caused the problem is replaced. Despite the loss of 1,000 MW to the NY power grid, there are no disruptions or significant price increases during the week that IP3 is inoperative.
October 5, 2005: Entergy notifies the NRC that a sample from a monitoring well located in the IP2 transformer yard shows tritium contamination that is ten times the EPA drinking water limit for the radionuclide, and is consistent with tritiated water from a spent fuel pool. The NRC broadens its special inspection to include this new information. The NRC also states in its report that the monitoring well had not been checked since its installation in 2000, following the transfer of IP’s ownership from ConEd to Entergy.
October 7, 2005: The NRC updates its Special Inspection Charter for the IP2 Tritium Leak to include a review of Entergy’s efforts to control the ongoing leak from the IP1 Spent Fuel Pool.
October 18, 2005 : The NRC and Entergy confirm that the radioactive leak discovered in August is greater than initially believed. The radioactive isotope, tritium, has been discovered in five sampling wells around Indian Point 2, while the leak at the spent fuel pool has increased to about two liters per day. Exposure to tritium increases the risk of developing cancer. The company plans to test more wells, inspect the liner of the leaking fuel pool, and install additional monitoring wells.
October 18, 2005: A test of the Indian Point sirens failed again today. Ten of 15 sirens in Orange County and another four of the 156 total sirens within the 10-mile evacuation zone failed to sound during the routine test.
October 28, 2005: NRC Region 1 Director Sam Collins formally requests permission from the agency’s Executive Director of Operations to increase oversight at Indian Point on two matters, the tritium leak and the continued problems with the emergency sirens. Permission is granted three days later.
November 16, 2005: The NRC holds a public meeting with Entergy to discuss the company’s plan for replacing the emergency siren system at Indian Point. Entergy announces their commitment to completely replacing the system by January 2007 with new sirens that will have backup battery power. However, statements by DHS officials regarding a lengthy approval process for the sirens put the time schedule in doubt. In addition, NRC official Erik Leeds argued that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 required that the NRC enforce the order within 18 months, not that backup power be installed within 18 months.
November 26, 2005: The tritium leak at IP2 remains unsolved, nearly three months after its discovery. Entergy’s use of underwater cameras and divers to visually inspect and test for leaks at three locations on the steel liner’s surface yield no results. Entergy must now employ different cameras to inspect the liner near the bottom of the pool, where the radiation is too high for a human diver to enter.
December 1, 2005: Entergy reports to the NRC that an initial sample from a new monitoring well five feet from the wall of the IP2 Spent Fuel Pool shows tritium levels in the groundwater at thirty times the EPA limit, the highest level of tritium contamination yet discovered. In addition, the NRC announces that preliminary tests of tritiated water found in the IP1 Pool Collection System contain too much tritium to be from the IP1 Pool, suggesting that tritium-laced water is being collected in the IP1 Drain from another, unknown source. The NRC still does not know where the leak is coming from, how long it has been leaking, or the extent of groundwater contamination under the plant.
December 2006: Right before the kickoff of the Christmas holiday, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an inspection report on the Indian Point nuclear power plant which notes a “potentially chilling effect” amongst workers who identify safety problems at the site.
December 21, 2006 In letter to Entergy’s site Vice President, Fred Dacimo, NRC Director for the Division of Reactor Projects David C. Lew noted, “the NRC has become aware of incidents through insights gained during these inspections and from the allegation program where workers perceived that individuals were treated negatively by management for raising issues. As a result of these incidents, some workers expressed reluctance to raise issues under certain circumstances.” In addition, Lew notes that Entergy had “deferred action” on an “alleged potential chilling effect in the Maintenance department.”
January 5, 2007: “Unusual event” declared at IP3 due to rapidly lowering cooling water levels- Intake pipe screens on Hudson riverfront found to be clogged with ice and debris. (no shutdown)
January 16, 2007: The Journal News reported that four of twelve fish samples taken from the Hudson by Entergy showed detectable levels of strontium-90 in their flesh, raising new concerns as to the level of environmental damage caused by the leak of radioactive water containing strontium-90 from the Indian Point 1 spent fuel pool. Of the four showing higher levels, one was collected near Indian Point, and the other three near the Newburgh-Beacon bridge, about fifteen miles north of the plant. Riverkeeper immediately called on state and federal regulators to broaden their sampling program, so that a better picture of the extent of contamination could be ascertained. This toxic radionuclide, known as a “bone seeker” because it mimics calcium and concentrates in bone, can cause leukemia and bone cancer if ingested in high amounts. Despite Entergy’s claim to the contrary, Indian Point is known to be at least one source of strontium-90 in the Hudson, and the only one currently known to be discharging this toxic substance into the river. Low levels of strontium-90 remain in the global environment from nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 60s, and the Knolls Atomic Laboratory dumped radioactive waste into the Mohawk River near Schenectady during the same time period. The Mohawk is a tributary of the Hudson.
February 16, 2007: First test of Entergy’s new siren system is “unsuccessful”, according to Westchester county Emergency Management commissioner Tony Sutton.
February 24, 2007: A cracked spent fuel rod is discovered in IP2 spent fuel pool- IP2 pool has been leaking tritiated water into the environment since August 2005.
March 1, 2007: IP2 shutdown due to low water levels in the steam generators, caused by a broken pressure transmitter. (Restarted one day later)
April 2, 2007: Second test of new siren system is a failure- 123/150 sirens fail to sound properly. April 15 is the deadline for the new siren system to be up and running.
April 3, 2007: IP3 shutdown due to low water levels in steam generator system, caused by failed boiler feed pump.
April 6, 2007 (Good Friday): One of the two main transformers that carry electricity from Indian Point 3 to the grid failed and exploded, resulting in a fire and automatic shutdown of the IP3 reactor. Entergy declared an “Unusual Event” and notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which activated its emergency response center. Fortunately, the fire was put out in a few minutes and the reactor was shut down safely. The problems for Entergy were just beginning, however. The company discovered that the second main transformer was damaged in the explosion, preventing Indian Point from restarting at 50% power. As of April 27, IP3 was still shut down while Entergy replaced the failed transformer and repaired the damaged one. The NRC gave Entergy a “White Finding” under the agency’s inspection process because IP3 had 4 unplanned shutdowns in less than 12 months. (The NRC grades on a four scale color rating. Green the highest, then white, then yellow, then red. Indian Point 2 received a red rating - the only plant in the nation - after the 2000 accident that released radioactive toxins into the air and Hudson River.) Indian Point 3 remained offline for nearly three weeks with no interruption in electricity.
April 12, 2007: Just days before the extended deadline to install new emergency sirens for Indian Point, Entergy’s new system failed its third and final test when 31 of the 150 sirens failed, including all 14 in Putnam County. Entergy requested but was denied yet another extension by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Entergy is subject to up to $130,000 fine per day under federal regulations. To the dismay of many, on April 23, the NRC announced that it had decided to impose a one-time fine of $130,000 on Entergy. At a Senate hearing on NRC oversight, Senator Clinton, who successfully included an amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that forced Entergy to install backup power to the siren system, grilled the NRC.
March 1, 2007: IP2 shutdown due to low water levels in the steam generators, caused by a broken pressure transmitter. (Restarted one day later)
April 2, 2007: Second test of new siren system is a failure- 123/150 sirens fail to sound properly. April 15 is the deadline for the new siren system to be up and running.
April 3, 2007: IP3 shutdown due to low water levels in steam generator system, caused by failed boiler feed pump.
April 6, 2007 (Good Friday): One of the two main transformers that carry electricity from Indian Point 3 to the grid failed and exploded, resulting in a fire and automatic shutdown of the IP3 reactor. Entergy declared an “Unusual Event” and notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which activated its emergency response center. Fortunately, the fire was put out in a few minutes and the reactor was shut down safely. The problems for Entergy were just beginning, however. The company discovered that the second main transformer was damaged in the explosion, preventing Indian Point from restarting at 50% power. As of April 27, IP3 was still shut down while Entergy replaced the failed transformer and repaired the damaged one. The NRC gave Entergy a “White Finding” under the agency’s inspection process because IP3 had 4 unplanned shutdowns in less than 12 months. (The NRC grades on a four scale color rating. Green the highest, then white, then yellow, then red. Indian Point 2 received a red rating - the only plant in the nation - after the 2000 accident that released radioactive toxins into the air and Hudson River.) Indian Point 3 remained offline for nearly three weeks with no interruption in electricity.
April 12, 2007: Just days before the extended deadline to install new emergency sirens for Indian Point, Entergy’s new system failed its third and final test when 31 of the 150 sirens failed, including all 14 in Putnam County. Entergy requested but was denied yet another extension by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Entergy is subject to up to $130,000 fine per day under federal regulations. To the dismay of many, on April 23, the NRC announced that it had decided to impose a one-time fine of $130,000 on Entergy. At a Senate hearing on NRC oversight, Senator Clinton, who successfully included an amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that forced Entergy to install backup power to the siren system, grilled the NRC.
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